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Abstract 
This thesis is an in-depth study into the New Zealand-Australian relationship and the 
two nations' divergence in International Relations, with particular reference to the 
disparate foreign and security policies implemented under the Howard and Clark 
Governments from 1996/1999 respectively until the present time in 2007. The purpose 
of this study is to provide an accurate and up-to-date overview of the New Zealand-
Australian relationship as it stands today, and to define the main areas of difference 
between the two countries which are driving trans-Tasman divergence in the 
international sphere. In pursuit of this goal, the subject-area is explored in the following 
ways. 
Chapter One provides a general overview of the trans-Tasman relationship, reflecting 
specifically on three abiding dynamics which together have contributed to the 
'strangeness' of the trans-Tasman rapport from the mid-1800s until today. Chapter Two, 
defines in fuller detail the greatest areas of divergence between the two countries in their 
foreign and security policies, and then additionally outlines three important issues in the 
international sphere on which the Tasman pair have diverged most strikingly in recent 
years. Chapters Three to Five explore three areas of fundamental difference between the 
Tasman pair in their International Relations, considered here to be driving factors 
behind the trans-Tasman divide - namely, different beliefs and approaches towards 
multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States. Finally, Chapters 
Six and Seven explore three contemporary theories attempting to explain New Zealand 
and Australia's divergence in International Relations today. 
There are three main arguments throughout this thesis: first, that New Zealand and 
Australia are becoming increasingly divergent in their foreign affairs; second, that this 
divergence is primarily due to the fact that the two countries are fundamentally different 
in their views and approaches towards three crucial areas within international politics -
multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States; and thirdly, that 
these differences in view and approach, and the divergent policies they produce, in turn 
arise chiefly from completely disparate senses of national identity in the two Tasman 
countries, which motivate differing - and sometimes conflicting - foreign policy 
behaviour. 
These three arguments are explored and expounded in the following ways. With regard 
to the first argument, Chapter Two provides an in-depth overview of the most 
important areas of divergence between New Zealand and Australia since 1999. As to the 
second argument, Chapters Three to Five employ a case study based on discourse 
analysis into New Zealand and Australian governmental speeches on the 2002-2003 Iraq 
Crisis - an issue that inherently involved these three fundamental areas of difference - in 
order to specify how precisely New Zealand and Australia diverge in their view and 
approach to these three matters based on the two Governments' own self-proffered 
statements and explanations. These disparate beliefs are then shown to translate into 
divergent actions and foreign policy behaviour on the world stage, by substantiating 
such rhetorical statements with evidence taken from the Howard and Clark 
Governments' foreign policy record, as documented in governmental documents as well 
as in political and academic literature. Finally, with regard to third argument, Chapters 
Six and Seven involve a discussion and critique of two rather convincing orthodox 
explanations for trans-Tasman divergence, Hugh White's 'Strategic Perception' and 
David McCraw's 'Divergent Political Ideologies', as well as a summary and broad 
application of one new theoretical explanation called 'Identity Theory' to New Zealand 
and Australia's foreign policy record, in order to show that it is indeed identity-based 
explanations, when combined with other strategic and political factors, that in fact 
provide the most accurate, comprehensive and insightful explanation for New Zealand 
and Australia's divergent behaviour in the international sphere from the time of 
Federation in 1901 until today in 2007. 
This thesis makes the following conclusions: first, that it is fundamentally different 
beliefs in regard to multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States 
which are driving the 'continental drift' between New Zealand and Australia, through 
motivating disparate policies and conflicting behaviour by the Tasman pair in their 
international affairs, as shown during the 2003 Iraq Crisis; secondly, that these dissimilar 
beliefs regarding the three matters stem in turn from deeply-rooted foreign policy 
traditions within New Zealand and Australia's own core national identity, namely 
traditions of independence, idealism and multilateralism in New Zealand, and 
independence, realism and alliances in Australia; and thirdly, that it is in fact national 
identity - encompassing national beliefs, traditions and ideas of what the nation stands 
for and is destined to become - that can best explain nation-state behaviour and action 
on the world stage today. In my own view, I believe that it is identity theory, when 
combined with aspects of disparate strategic perception and predominant governmental 
political ideology advocated by White and McCraw, which together present the best and 
most wide-ranging means of understanding the complex realities of International 
Relations today. 
It is hoped that the research undertaken in this thesis will not only contribute to the new 
wave of academic literature attempting to describe and explain the differences between 
New Zealand and Australia in our foreign affairs today in 2007, but also add to the 
growing consensus in the constructivist academic world that identity-based 
explanations are crucial for understanding foreign affairs. 
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Introduction 
Nearly forty years ago, when New Zealand stood at the crossroads following Britain's 
membership in the EEC, the then New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs gave a 
series of speeches that emphasized the point that "the time has come for New 
Zealand to recognise that our relationship with Australia is more important to us than 
our links with any other country in the world ... It has to be the cornerstone of New 
Zealand's external policies" (Talboys, cited in McMillan , 1980, p. 166). This same 
notion is still being voiced today, as a speech given by Winston Peters, the current 
Minister of Foreign Affairs recently illustrated. "New Zealand's relationship with 
Australia is unique, and it is the cornerstone of our foreign policy", he said. "In many 
ways the strength of our foreign policy depends on this bond" (Peters, 2006a). 
Nevertheless, despite this kind of rhetoric, the fact remains that New Zealand and 
Australia have been drifting apart politically for quite some time. 
Back in 2001 , for instance, Gerald Hensley, a high profile former diplomat and 
Secretary of Defence, concluded a New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 
(NZIIA) conference by remarking on the prevailing atmosphere of pessimism among 
the academics and politicians participating in the proceedings, on the topic of 'New 
Zealand and Australia: Where are we going?' . "Politically the two nations are in fact 
on different courses and are drifting apart," he stated (Hensley, 2001 , p. 95). 
According to Max Bradford, moreover, a former NZ Minister of Defence and Member 
of Parliament, the Australia-New Zealand relationship is not only drifting apart, but 
doing so rapidly. As he states: "Certainly there are more factors pushing us apart 
than are pulling us together at any time since I have been in politics, or in business 
before I entered Parliament" (Bradford, 2001, p. 27). Academic Bob Gatley likewise 
asserts the two nations are diverging, and attributes the blame to the rise to power of 
the Clark Labour governments since 1999, under whose leadership, he argues, the 
process of steadily-increasing integration between the two countries in defence, 
migration and economic liberalization has been most drastically reversed (Gatley, 
2001 ' p. 18). 
The disparity between these two Antipodean nations is particularly prevalent in the 
realm of security. Bradford describes defence as New Zealand's "most important 
single difference with Australia", and one that has become not only the biggest 
source of friction and dispute between the two countries , and a real source of 
grievance to Australians, but one that has also contributed substantially to the 
deterioration of Australia-New Zealand relations - even though "both countries know 
neither can do without the other" (Bradford, 2001 , p. 27). As David Dickens, a 
former Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand has concluded: "The 
ANZAC strategic relationship is drifting apart" (Dickens, 2001 , p. 50). 
Today in 2007 too, despite the Clark's Government's continual assertion that New 
Zealand's closest relationship is with Australia in every sense and that Australia 
remains New Zealand's most important defence ally (Kennedy, 2002), the political 
and military gap between the Tasman nations has continued to widen and reverse 
'continental drift' seems the order of the day. The divergence in foreign and security 
policy has become so obvious, in fact, that Helen Clark herself has been known to 
remark on several occasions that New Zealand and Australia are "embarked on 
fundamentally different directions and the cultures of our two countries are moving 
further apart. The way our nations view the world and our place in it is also diverging" 
(Clark, in Hawke, 2006). More dire have been the statements made by Allan Hawke, 
the former Australian High Commissioner, who warned forebodingly that the 
relationship is "in crisis" (Hawke, 2004a). "The relationship we have taken so much 
for granted is at risk," he states (Hawke, 2004a): 
We now stand on the cusp - our future relationship is anything but 
certain ... the Anzac relationship is finely poised on the fulcrum. It can 
go one way or the other - in defence, in trade, in every way. That 
assessment will underpin my three year term here as High 
Commissioner (Hawke, 2006). 
If ominous tidings such as these have not resulted in alarm on the southern side of 
the Tasman , it has at least generated a great deal of interest about New Zealand-
Australian relations , especially as globalization heightens awareness of the 
2 
differences in both countries (Patman, 2001 ). This is especially the case in the 
academic community and among the policy-making 'movers and shakers' of New 
Zealand's political world. Firstly, a number of attempts have been made to account 
for the way New Zealand and Australia have diverged from each other in the past 
three and a half decades and to ascertain what exactly is driving these differences 
between us. In 2001 , for instance, the 361h Otago Foreign Policy School discussed 
the subject of 'New Zealand - Australia Relations: Moving Together or Drifting 
Apart?' . This was then followed by two seminars on the same theme arranged first 
by the Wellington NZIIA, and then by the Stout Centre and Institute of Policy Studies 
(Keith , 2001 ). 
Secondly, calls have been made for a greater push to ameliorate the trans-Tasman 
relationship arising from several quarters of New Zealand's academic and diplomatic 
community. In 2002, for example, participants at a Australian Historical Association 
conference called for "Closer Intellectual Relations" (CIR) between the trans-Tasman 
literary community in order to enhance and deepen understanding of the trans-
Tasman relationship through "the rehabilitation of that 'repressed memory' in our 
joint pasts - Australasia - air-brushed out of both historiographies" (Hempinstall , 
Smith & Goldfinch, 2003). Similarly, in 2005 both New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and two contributors of the 'Anzac Neighbours Project' 
called for increased academic research to provide more knowledge about "the 
mosaic of connections" between New Zealand and Australia , in order that the level of 
trans-Tasman commentary might be raised and popular attitudes towards the 
relationship improved (Rigoli , 2003; Smith & Hempenstall , 2005). 
Finally, even at the social level cultural interest in the trans-Tasman relationship has 
reached new heights with plays like "The Underarm", touring the nation throughout 
October-November 2006. This piece of theatre attempted to address the many 
issues connected with trans-Tasman relations through exploring "relationships 
between brothers and brother countries", focusing on two estranged brothers - an 
Aussie and a Kiwi - and the controversial "unsporting incident" that took place at a 
1981 cricket match that reportedly sparked the nadir in New Zealand-Australia 
relations (Ricketts, 2006; 'Kiwi theatre revisits the underarm saga' , 2006). 
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It is in this vein of renewed interest in the New Zealand-Australian relationship that 
this thesis attempts to explore this record of divergence between New Zealand and 
Australia in their International Relations. It seems in the year 2007 the ties of ANZAC 
are still waning , and so much so in fact , as to become a matter of serious concern to 
both countries , though particularly New Zealand as the smaller, most reliant, and 
therefore, more vulnerable partner. Indeed, in many ways it is New Zealand's 
policies and behaviour in the international sphere that has contributed most to the 
growing divide, owing to the fact that it is New Zealand which is the Anzac nation 
most out of sync with its historical traditions and attitudes towards military 
Australasian collaboration , as well as other matters of external policy. Indeed, as the 
new year of 2008 approaches, it is clear that the two Tasman neighbours have 
become noticeably divergent on a wide array of foreign and defence policy issues. 
This thesis is an examination of this trans-Tasman political divergence that has 
become so apparent in New Zealand and Australia's International Relations over the 
last several years under the Howard and Clark Governments (1996/1999- present 
respectively). Chapter One will explore the "strange" trans-Tasman relationship, 
discussing three of the dynamics inherent in the relationship that together render the 
relationship so interesting, if rather odd . Chapter Two will provide an overview of 
New Zealand and Australia's divergence in the international sphere, focusing on 
three main areas of foreign and security policy, as well as disparate stances on three 
important international issues. Chapters Three to Five will examine in finer detail 
three areas of fundamental difference between the nations, which , in the author's 
opinion , have become the driving forces in the widening political and military gap 
between the neighbours - multilateralism, the use of force and respective 
relationships with the United States. In these chapters the neighbours' respective 
beliefs and positions on these three matters will be closely examined through , first, a 
case study of New Zealand and Australian speeches on the Iraq Crisis between 
September 2002-May 2003, during which time the two nations' views were most 
clearly expressed on these points; and . These views will then, secondly, be 
supplemented by information from the two countries' foreign policy record , as 
recorded in political and academic discourse, to show how these beliefs expressed 
in rhetoric have translated into action on the world stage. In Chapter Six two 
orthodox theories attempting to explain these trans-Tasman differences will be 
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discussed and critiqued in order to show how they are both incomplete and fail to 
stand up under scrutiny, and therefore, can not provide the best explanations for this 
divergence between the nations. Finally , Chapter Seven will introduce a new 
theoretical approach to explaining trans-Tasman divergence- Identity Theory- and 
attempt to apply this new means of explanation for foreign policy to New Zealand 
and Australia in their international affairs. 
Through this course of research it is hoped this thesis will not only be able to pinpoint 
how exactly the Tasman neighbours are diverging in IR, and in which areas 
predominantly , but also provide a fuller and more convincing explanation for this 
modern-day phenomenon in trans-Tasman affairs. 
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Chapter One: Odd Couple 
The Strange Trans-Tasman Relationship 
The Odd Relationship 
Mates, Anzac brothers, rivals - all words regularly employed to describe the unique 
relationship that New Zealand shares with Australia , all of them true, and yet in a 
sense they all fall short of describing the real nature and complicated dynamics of 
the trans-Tasman relationship. Much like a tight knot made of many strands, the 
New Zealand-Australian relationship is a complex and multi-faceted creation - a 
product of history, geography, politics, war, trade and social interaction - which 
defies definition at every turn . According to Brabazon, it is this factor that causes 
the relationship, whenever it is discussed, to become simplified and "enclosed in the 
sandwich of Anzac Cove and the imperatives of economic integration" (Brabazon, 
2000, p. 31 ). Indeed, as Denis Mclean points out in his insightful book The Prickly 
Pair: Making Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand, the fact that the two 
countries struggle even to find a mutually favourable collective term to describe 
themselves , as two similar and interrelated countries located in the same 
geographical area at the bottom of the globe, is evidence of the mysterious and 
elusive nature of the relationship (Mclean , 2003, p.1 0). 
In fact the relationship is a rather odd one, the dynamics of which can enthrall , 
surprise, disconcert and repel. As lan F. Grant so aptly puts it: "The Australia-New 
Zealand relationship is a strange, complex one... few countries bicker and grizzle 
about each other more without actually going to war" (I. Grant, 2001 , p. 9) . Three 
dimensions of the relationship in particular contribute to this oddity and strangeness, 
each reflecting a different yet integral dynamic of the relationship -closeness, rivalry 
and indifference. 
1) Close Relationship 
The first dimension relates to the often recited 'close' and 'unique' relationship that 
exists between New Zealand and Australia, along which corollary we are said to be 
friends, allies, and even members of the same family. This is the aspect of the 
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relationship much espoused and revisited by government representatives on either 
side of the Tasman 'Ditch'. Take for example the passage relating to trans-Tasman 
relations on the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) website 
which proclaims: 
Australia and New Zealand are natural allies with a strong trans-
Tasman sense of family. Migration , trade and defence ties , keen 
competition on the sporting field , and strong people-to-people links 
have helped shape a close and co-operative relationship ('New Zealand 
Country Brief , 2006). 
Or New Zealand's version from the website of the New Zealand equivalent, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT}, which likewise echoes this assertion: 
The New Zealand-Australia relationship is a uniquely close one, 
underpinned by geography, and shared history, values, and institutions. 
Migration, trade, and other people-to-people linkages have helped 
shape a strong trans-Tasman sense of identity ('Australia' , 2006). 
As a former Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, said of the two countries 
following an official visit to New Zealand in 1987: "We are, enduringly, the closest of 
friends .. . we are one Australasian family, but two nations" (cited in Wilde, 1989, p. 
25) 
Indeed, no-one can deny the inter-connectedness of the trans-Tasman relationship, 
nor the extensive wide-ranging networks that now exist between these two 
neighbours. As political commentator Colin James states, "No two nations are as 
closely intertwined socially, institutionally and economically as we" (James, 2005b). 
The New Zealand-Australia inter-governmental relationship, for instance, is 
considered to be better developed and more extensive than any other of its kind in 
the world with formal meetings between the respective Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Ministers conducted twice yearly, and meetings between the Finance, Trade and 
Defence Ministers of each country held annually ('New Zealand Country Brief , 2006; 
'Australia ', 2006). In addition, New Zealand ministers sit on no less than 27 
Australian federal-state ministerial councils responsible for determining national 
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policy on a wide range of issues, from agriculture to health, making political and 
official trans-Tasman ties "tight to the point of intimacy" (Ansley, 2001) . 
Economically, the Australia-New Zealand CER (Closer Economic Relations) trade 
agreement of 1983, designed to create a free trade zone between the Tasman pair, 
continues to be one of the most open and comprehensive trade agreements of its 
kind in the world with further advancements made every year, and is in fact reputed 
to be the leading model of a successful Free Trade Agreement in the world (Downer, 
2001 ; Hawke, 2004a). Moreover on a social level, people-to-people contact between 
Australians and New Zealanders, in addition to large-scale migration in both 
directions since the early years of the nineteenth century , have combined to forge 
practically impermeable bonds between our two nations. Thousands of Australians 
and New Zealanders cross the Tasman each year on a casual basis, either to visit 
family members, conduct business or to take vacations, while thanks to the 1973 
inter-governmental trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements (which allows citizens to 
visit, live and work in each others respective countries without restrictions) there are 
currently over 60,000 Australians residing in New Zealand and at least 430,000 New 
Zealanders living in Australia - not including those who have opted to relinquish their 
NZ passports to take up solely Australian citizenship ('New Zealand Country Brief , 
2006; Hawke, 2004d). Last but not least, the emotional bonds of kinship , nostalgia 
and shared historical experiences - such as British colonisation in the 'New World ' 
and the Anzac tradition of World War I and II - along with common values, beliefs 
and interests, innumerable personal bonds, and an unspoken yet firm commitment to 
come to each other's defence should either country be at risk of attack, have 
combined to form "real and thoroughly pervasive cables" (Ansley, 2001) between the 
two countries (Downer, 2001 ; Hawke, 2003a). As Denis Mclean states: "These two 
have more in common with one another than either has with any other country on the 
planet" (Mclean , 2003, p. 14). 
2) Rivalry 
Nevertheless, in spite of this closeness and interconnectedness, this odd relationship 
also incorporates a second dimension that mystifyingly can both reinforce or defy the 
first - that of trans-Tasman rivalry. As a widely accepted and engaged in 
phenomenon of antipodean life, this Australia-New Zealand rivalry has in turn 
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become something of an enigma in itself, in that it presents itself at different times in 
different forms and degrees of intensity. 
On one end of the spectrum, for instance, one finds a friendly comedic type of good-
natured banter, comparison and joke-telling , or as Mike Moore describes it "abuse as 
a sign of friendship" (Moore, 2005, 85) , with members of each country trying to 'out-
do' those in the other. Good examples of this include the frequent teasing back and 
forth over the use or pronunciation of words 1 and the never-ending competition over 
which country can legitimately lay claim to such things as the infamous antipodean 
invention the Pavlova and champion racehorse 'Phar Lap', or indeed to any and 
every successful musical band , actor or phenomenon of the Southern Hemisphere2. 
This kind of friendly rivalry is particularly in evidence at sporting contests between 
the two nations, especially rugby matches, where the competitive atmosphere along 
with the exultant jubilation and glee of the winners regularly converge to make quite 
a spectacle of this dimension of the trans-Tasman relationship .3 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, however, inter-Australasian rivalry can take a 
decidedly darker form revealing a rather different dynamic of the relationship - a 
deep-seated hostility and outright antagonism of a surprisingly malicious nature. 
Indeed, the rapidity with which the one can change into the other, in any realm and 
on any subject catches many foreign on-lookers off guard (I. Grant, 2001 , p.76). Of 
course, this has been most noticeable in the domain of International Relations, as 
the former Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand once admitted, 
"Relationships between trans-Tasman heads of government have been fraught more 
often than not" over the years (Hawke, 2006). Consider, for example, the strained 
and sometimes volatile relationships between Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon, 
or Hawke and Lange in the 1980s, or indeed Keating and Bolger in the early 1990s 
1 Is it 'Esky' or 'chilly bin'? 'Thong' or 'jandal'? Is the number 'six' pronounced as 'sicks' or 'sex'? Or 
'Sydney' as 'Sidney' or 'Seydney'? 
2 A recent illustration of this occurred on the 24•h ovember 2006 when a radio announcer from 'More 
FM' \1(/ellington lamented that: "The Aussies have stolen our pavlova, 'Split Enz', 'Crowded House', 
Russell Crowe and now our iceberg!" in reference to the large block of ice recently found floating off the 
South Island last year. 
1 A contemporary illustration of such national jubilation over an ;\ustra lian sporting defeat by a ew 
Zealand sports team occurred in February this year with celebration up and down the length of ew 
Zealand and across all mt!dia aftt!r tht! New Zealand Black Caps achieved a " black-wash" of the 
,-\usrralians in tht! Chappt! ll-Haulet! crickt!t series. 
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(Hawke, 2005; I. Grant, 2001 , p. 42). Or in a more general way, the widespread 
anger and incomprehension in Australia, especially among the political elites there, 
following the New Zealand government's cancellation of the F-16 air jet deal with 
America in 2001 (Bradford, 2001 , p. 27). Indeed, on the announcement of capability 
cuts to the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) The Australian newspaper produced 
the angry headline of "NZ turns back on tradition of Anzac" (Ansley, 2001 ). Or as 
another telling illustration may show, the very public remarks made to all and sundry 
at the 2001 Gallipoli commemoration held at Anzac Cove by the Australian chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Sandy MacDonald, 
who said: 
To have your foreign minister get up - he's a very nondescript little 
fellow - in his crass suit and purple tie and purple shirt and talk about 
his commitment to nuclear disarmament ... showed a lack of 
understanding of what the real world is ... I think he and Helen Clark 
must be floating in the same boat (cited in Ansley, 2001 ). 
Similar emotions of anger, incomprehension or outrage have likewise been 
expressed on the other side of the Tasman too with Kiwi outcries against Australian 
government policy on issues such as Ansett and the Australian Qantas bid for Air 
New Zealand, or more recently , Australia's refusal to give 'special treatment' to 
newly arrived New Zealand migrants and its subsequent imposition of limits on New 
Zealanders eligibility for migrant status and welfare payments once in Australia 
(Ansley, 2001 ). At these times it seems the respective peoples of the two nations, in 
Grant's words, "work hard at enlarging and distorting the differences" between them 
(1. Grant, 2001 , p. 76). Yet this explosive kind of rivalry has been an every-present 
intrinsic part of the relationship since the beginning. As journalist Greg Ansley 
concludes: 
From the time New Zealand gained its own direct shipping links to 
Britain and broke with New South Wales until the joint advent of 
affordable transtasman air travel and the New Zealand-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (Nafta) in the 1960s, the only time we got together 
was in war (Ansley, 2001 ). 
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This very changeableness of attitude between Australians and New Zealanders, the 
potential for large-scale mood-swings symptomatic of a very real sense of underlying 
tension between the two nations over their differences, contributes largely to what 
could be called the 'ugly underside' of the rapport , or what Grant has termed "the 
edgy relationship" (I. Grant, 2001 , p. 10). In fact Alexander Downer, the Australian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, attributes this Australian-New Zealand rivalry , both in 
politics and on the sports field , to be the reason one feels "a bit of trepidation" when 
talking about trans-Tasman relations (Downer, 2001 ). Yet surprisingly this rivalry 
has also become an integral part of the trans-Tasman relationship. As Downer once 
expressed concerning this mysterious element of the relationship, it is a "great 
conundrum ... how our great affinity and friendship manages to thrive side by side 
with what must be one of the truly great global rivalries," and yet at the same time, 
"that almost visceral rivalry is still very much what makes an Aussie an Aussie, and a 
Kiwi a Kiwi" (Downer, 2001 ).4 
3) Indifference 
Equally strange in nature as the former is the final dimension of the relationship - a 
cold , off-hand kind of mutual ambivalence and indifference , equally on display on 
both sides of the Tasman , to which one could perhaps attribute the larger share of 
blame for the oddity of this New Zealand-Austral ia relationship. Many New 
Zealanders grow up much as Mclean describes of his own experience, "neither 
knowing nor caring about Australia" (Mclean, 2003, p.9) . Likewise across the Ditch 
these same age-old patterns of indifference and ignorance have become so firmly 
rooted in Australian culture that New Zealand is practically invisible to them (Smith & 
Hempenstall , 2005). Indeed, Bob Catley asserts that in at least four Australian 
states -the Northern Territory, Western Australia , South Australia and Tasmania-
New Zealand "might as well not exist, except as a tourist destination" (Catley, 2001 , 
p.17). Grant argues this "infuriating indifference" of Australians towards New 
Zealand and New Zealanders is part of the reason why Kiwis find it of such great 
importance to thrash Australia in sporting matches as often as possible - in as many 
sports as possible- and may explain why, though puzzling to the rest of the world , 
~ Perhaps it is this centrality of rivalry in maintaining separate ;\.ustralian and New Zealand identities that 
can also explain why ew Zealand trans-Tasman rivalry has become such a prominent feature of 
television advertising campaigns this year, with both 'NZI Insurance' and 'Kiwi Bank' using trans-Tasman 
rivalry (along with a few anti-Australian jibes) to promote the 'Kiwi' identity of their businesses. 
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"a victory over the Aussies at rugby is an excuse for national celebration and a loss 
casts a palpable pall over the country" (I. Grant, 2001 , p. 11 ).5 In truth , indifference 
seems to tarnish every aspect of the relationship so that even the shared Anzac 
legends, reputedly the "most potent historical force bridging the Tasman", generally 
ignore each other (Smith & Hempenstall , 2005). Indeed, the 'NZ' in ANZAC has 
largely been deleted from the Australian Gallipoli legend altogether (Salmond , 1987, 
p. 306-307). As political commentator Colin James once remarked: "To Australians 
the 'nz' in Anzac is a consonantal hiccup in a name to which they claim proprietary 
rights" (James, 2001 a) . 
Smith & Hempenstall , main contributors of the Anzac Neighbours Project paper 
written in preparation for the 2006 Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum, lately 
exclaimed over this lack of interest between the two neighbouring peoples. "It is 
curious how incurious Australians and New Zealanders are about each other," they 
state. "We know much more about the links that New Zealand and Australia have 
with third countries outside the region , like Britain and the United States, than about 
the multiple, complex networks between Australia and New Zealand themselves" 
(Smith & Hempenstall , 2005). In fact, Smith & Hempenstall consider indifference to 
be the one crucial factor that explains why Australian and New Zealand 
representatives often "talk past one another" (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005). 
Brabazon provides a good example of this in describing the strange first meeting in 
1997 between newly-elected Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, and his New 
Zealand counterpart at the time, Jim Bolger, and his deputy Winston Peters. She 
describes the Australian-New Zealand behaviour on this occasion (the "deeply 
hostile" atmosphere with Howard assuming the role of the "cold warrior", confronting 
New Zealanders for neglecting their defence responsibilities and refusing to grant 
special treatment to its citizens in Australia , and on the other side Bolger coolly 
promising to do likewise to Australian citizens in New Zealand) as being comparable 
to an uncomfortably dysfunctional, dissatisfied , ageing , old married couple who have 
5 :\ recent example of New Zealand jubilation at :\ustralian de fear on the sports field took place on 13•h 
February 2007, when the evening One News anchor, Simon Dallow, happily announced "the best news", 
in reference to the Australian cricket team's two losses a1,~inst England in the One-Day 2007 
Commonwealth Bank Tri-series in Australia. As he then stated: "The ;\ustralians have been thrashed 
twice and now they're corning here!". 
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nothing left to say. 6 "Here they sit," she writes, "staring past each other, making 
assumptions that are not confirmed through conversation . Academics and journalists 
only reinforce this tendency" (Brabazon, 2000, p. 33-34). 
In an ever-globalising world of modern technology and communications, these 
prevailing attitudes of indifference and ignorance in Australia and New Zealand 
towards citizens of the other have contributed , as Simon Upton once acknowledged , 
to a feeling of "serious awkwardness" between the two countries that has grown not 
lessened over the years (cited in Hempinstall , Smith & Goldfinch , 2003). In point of 
fact , the problem has become of such concern that a 2002 report of the Foreign 
Affairs , Defence and Trade Committee, based on an inquiry into New Zealand's 
economic and trade relationship with Australia , argues that it would take a twenty-
year investment to build a generation of New Zealanders "whose fluency with 
Australia extends beyond good-natured insults and cut-price weekends in Sydney" 
(cited in Hempinstall , Smith & Goldfinch, 2003). 
Why is this so? Why are these neighbouring peoples, with a shared history and 
experience of isolation at the bottom of the world , so committed to being indifferent 
to each other's existence? Why have they persisted for over a hundred years in 
existing as strangers, though living side-by-side? Some academics have avoided this 
question by downplaying the level of indifference between the pair and alluding to 
the idea that, just as 'familiarity breeds contempt' , the sheer proximity and range of 
similarities between the two countries have led one to conclude, as Mclean once 
did, that 'knowledge of the one equated with knowledge of the other' (Hempinstall , 
Smith & Goldfinch , 2003; Mclean, 2003, p. 9) . However greater forces are at work 
here than meets the eye. Indeed, there are two ready wide-ranging explanations for 
this situation . 
Tradition of Indifference 
The first relates to the way that indifference has become somewhat of a tradition in 
trans-Tasman relations , a tradition which has its roots right back in the early 
1
' An observation reminiscent of Kiwi writer Fairburn's 1947 analogy that the Tasman pair resembled "two 
shipwrechd E nglishmen who lived together for years on a desert island without speaking, because they 
hadn't been introduced"( cited in I. Grant, 2001, p. 84). 
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formative years of the two nations, when New Zealand refrained from joining the 
Australian federation in 1901. As Mclean states: "In choosing to stand aside from 
the long march of Australia , New Zealand became unimportant in Australian sight" 
(Mclean , 2003, p. 22). Yet in actual fact , according to Grant, even on this most 
significant national decision in its entire history, New Zealand's decision to stand 
apart from Australia was more owing to disinterestedness and apathy among New 
Zealanders concerning the issue than to any conscious debate upon the merits or 
disadvantages of federation (I. Grant, 2001 , Mclean, 2003). As an observer at the 
time summed it up in 1902: "New Zealanders never seriously contemplated coming 
in ; nor have the Australians supposed that they would , or expended much time or 
trouble in efforts to enlist them" (cited in I. Grant, 2001 p. 22) . Indeed, the legacy of 
dismissive unconcern between the two Tasman neighbours can be traced even 
further back in our history to the late nineteenth century, when the New Zealand 
pioneers quite obviously displayed a notable contempt for their 'convict' 
counterparts, while on the other side of the Tasman the early Australians were 
likewise little enthused about their highly lauded and venerated neighbour. One 
Australian commentator, for example, became so angry about the constant 
discussion , debate and admiration for New Zealand in Australia during the 1880s 
that he exclaimed: ''The name of New Zealand is becoming nauseating ; I am sick of 
its being quoted" (cited in I. Grant, 2001 , p. 11 ). It seems little has changed since 
then. Like foreigners inhabiting two different worlds , Australians and New 
Zealanders continue to live more than a century later as though there were a wall 
between the two countries rather than simply a stretch of water (I. Grant, 2001 , 
p.84). 
Lack of Information 
A second explanation for this indifference stems from the first and concerns an 
ignorance springing from a general widespread lack of information available in either 
country concerning the history, literature, political processes and current affairs of 
the other. This ignorance is thought to arise from two factors : firstly, poor media 
coverage of trans-Tasman connections, policies or issues, particularly in Australia , 
owing to the scarcity of Australasian television networks, the 'parochial' and 
'localized' nature of newspapers and radio in either country, and to a lack of interest 
or effort in supplying their alternate newspapers cheaply in each other's countries 
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(Smith & Hempenstall , 2005); and secondly, and more importantly, from a near total 
neglect in the education sector of trans-Tasman studies from primary level right 
through to tertiary institutions in both countries. Brabazon asserts, for instance, that 
there is a marked absence of critical writing and commentary circulating in Australia 
about issues affecting New Zealand , likewise little systematic discussion of New 
Zealand in Australian schools, and not one Australian tertiary institution in the 
country that teaches New Zealand studies (Brabazon, 2000, p. 34). It would seem 
New Zealanders experience the same fate, though not to the same extent due to 
Australia's relative size and greater importance to New Zealand. For though New 
Zealand children of the 1940s and 1950s once received a thorough grounding in 
Australian geography, culture and history, largely due to schooling and widespread 
broadcasting of Australian radio programmes in the pre-television years, this has 
long ceased to be the case (Salmond, 1987, p. 300) . Another indication is that even 
the renowned Political Science and International Relations Programme of the 
prestigious Victoria University of Wellington - considered the "first of its kind" in New 
Zealand and the 'standard-setter' for all other political studies programmes in the 
country - though teaching courses on East Asian , Chinese, European, American, 
African and Pacific Island politics, does not teach one paper solely devoted to 
Australian politics7 (Programme History: 60 Years of Leading Political Studies in New 
Zealand !, 2007; Political Science and International Relations Courses, 2007) . 
Perhaps this explains why political people crossing the Tasman are said to be 
"commonly struck by the degree of ignorance displayed on each side about the 
political conditions and processes on the other" (Catley, 2001 , p. 13). Indeed, any 
cursory internet search will reveal the astounding fact that there are more Centers of 
Australian and New Zealand Studies in the United States of America than exist in 
either of these countries themselves. 
In truth successive generations of academics, historians and intelligentsia in both 
countries are much to blame for this lack of information and lack of academic 
interaction. They have unfortunately participated in and become themselves 
progenitors of a kind of 'selective amnesia' concerning the New Zealand-Australian 
7 In fact in the whoh: School of History, Philosophy, Political Science & International Relations of \ ' ic toria 
University there is not anything taught akin to ,\ustralian studies (only one solitary paper is offereJ there 
aJJressing Australian history) (History Courses, 2007). 
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connection, especially in the fields of history and literature (Salmond, 1987, p. 302). 
As Hempinstall , Smith and Goldfinch state: 
Australia and New Zealand have a shared past, but not a shared 
history ... For 100 years scholars on both sides of the Tasman have 
produced national histories that ignore a shared past and neglect the 
historical parallels ... [Instead] polite, mutual ignorance is the norm" 
(Hempinstall , Smith & Goldfinch , 2003) . 
One illustration of this point is the fact that despite the political connectedness of 
Australia and New Zealand in their political histories, with both countries producing 
politicians that would cross the Tasman to become leaders and shapers in the 
political and social development of the other8, the exhaustive six-volume Australian 
Encyclopaedia does not mention New Zealand's longest serving Australian Prime 
Minister, Richard Seddon, nor even New Zealand's reputedly greatest leader, 
Australian-born Michael Savage (Biainey, 1987, p. 316; Woolcott, 1993, p. 163). 
Likewise, few literary pieces survive the trip across the Tasman to wash up on the 
other's shores, and even when they do, they are generally regarded with a mixture of 
surprise and condescension , as New Zealand historians recently observed at an 
Australian Historical Association conference held in Brisbane in 2002 (Hempinstall , 
Smith & Goldfinch, 2003). Moreover, not one single modern literary work has been 
written in either country from a combined trans-Tasman perspective which "takes the 
antipodes as an integral experience across the twentieth century, in broad terms of 
culture and political economy or the patterns of antipodean modernism" (Peter 
Beilharz, cited in Smith & Hempenstall , 2005). In fact , according to Hempinstall, 
Smith & Goldfinch , few scholars since 1902: 
have been bold enough to discuss both countries together as a 
continuing community of interests. Thus, a century later, there remains 
K For ~:xample, ,-\ustralians P.C. W~:bb, Rob~:rt S~:mpl~:, H.E. Holland, l\1.]. Savag~: and \XI.E. Parry who 
eith~:r contributed to the socialist movement in N~:w Z~:aland, were involved in the development of the 
Labour party, or held the position of New Zealand Prime l\!.inister (Salmond, 1987, p. 304-306). 
Conversely New Zealander John \X!atson became the Prime l\!.inister of ,-\ustralia in 1904 (\X'oolcott, 1993, 
p. 163). Interestingly it was also a Kiwi, Fred Hollows, who b~:came th~: ,-\ustralian of the Year in 
1991 (\X 'oolcott, 1993, p. 163). 
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a significant gap in vital knowledge of the sustained nature of shared 
experiments in the twentieth century, the extent of continuing trans-
Tasman ties and interactions, and their impact on the respective 
identities of both nations (Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003). 
In the Shadow of Australia 
The baffling reality of this puzzle of trans-Tasman relations discussed here is 
accentuated when one considers that not only do these three dimensions of 
closeness, rivalry and indifference exist, and in parallel , but they continue to be 
bedrock forces in the Australia-New Zealand relationship to this day and show no 
sign of disappearing. What is more, this seems to be so even in an age when global 
communications and information are readily available - literally at one's fingertips. 
McPhee considers this unpredictable vacillating nature of the relationship - its ability 
to blow hot and cold , oscillating between heated spats and cold indifference- to be 
reflective of the typical 'love/hate' relationship so often prevalent between countries 
where one nation considers itself to be in "the economic, cultural , and sporting 
shadow of a similar but larger and more powerful cousin" (McPhee, 1987, p. 292). 
Certainly this could easily be said to be true of New Zealand in regard to Australia . 
Just as Canada pales in comparison to its larger and more powerful neighbour the 
United States, New Zealanders live in Australia's shadow and are vaguely conscious 
of the fact that as the smaller, less varied, less visible, less self-reliant partner, we 
need them more than they need us. Indeed, this obvious imbalance - sometimes 
called 'tyranny' - of geography, size, population, ethnic diversity, and trade and 
industry between the Tasman pair, has corresponded in an imbalance of knowledge 
between their respective citizens with New Zealanders, often unwillingly, knowing a 
great deal more about Australia and Australians than vice versa (McPhee, 1987). 
Moreover, New Zealanders have been abandoning their homeland and escaping the 
burden of welfarism, an obsessive rugby culture9 and the so-called "lwi-fatigue" 
(Catley, 2001 , p. 17) for better jobs, higher pay and greater opportunities in Australia 
at an alarming and steadily climbing rate (Allen , 2006), thereby exacerbating New 
~ Australia is thought to be more varied and diverse in the kinds of sport it embraces, with large support 
for not only rugby bur also cricket, Australian Rules football, swimming and netball to name a few 
(Salmond, 1987; l\ fcLean, 2003). 
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Zealand's 'brain drain'. Indeed, an exodus of 30,000 Kiwis migrated from New 
Zealand in 2001 , another 22,500 did likewise in 2004, and today 600 New 
Zealanders a week say, in National Party leader John Key's words, "au revoir to 
Helengrad and hello to the Lucky Country" (Key, cited in Bryant, 2005, p. 16). Of this 
number, 90,000 immigrants are of Maori descent, meaning that currently 14.6% of 
the total New Zealand Maori population is now living in Australia 10 (Allen , 2006; 
Collins, 2006a; Collins, 2006b). This implies of course that whenever Australians 
and New Zealanders come into contact, the latter are liable to feel a little resentful or 
hostile (McPhee, 1987, p. 290) . In the words of a one-time senior Australian 
politician, "Australians don't care a - about New Zealanders, and they resent us for 
it" (McPhee, 1987, p. 291). 
One of the ways New Zealanders have compensated for this imbalance is to 
perpetuate the element of indifference towards Australia by appealing to the age-old 
deeply ingrained part of the New Zealand psyche that wishes to remain 
unknowledgeable of all things Australian - what one could call a 'willing ignorance'. 
As Mclean states: "New Zealanders are unable to ignore Australia , but fall over 
themselves to be dismissive .. . Australia can never be irrelevant to New Zealand , but 
a surprising amount of energy goes into pretending otherwise" (Mclean, 2003, p. 21 -
22). One of the best means of doing this has been the widespread use of grossly 
exaggerated stereotypes and crass generalizations to paint a very negative picture 
of the larger neighbour, a move which is generally exceedingly well-received, 
indulged in and propagated by New Zealand mainstream media. Indeed, since 1900 
when the New Zealand Graphic newspaper published the demeaning depiction of 
the Australian criminal 'ogre' attempting to seduce and beguile the 'virtuous New 
Zealand maiden' and her 'noble Maori companion' under the words, "how we see it" 
(I. Grant, 2001 , p. 27), to the editorial of The Dominion Post on 18 May 2004, which 
warned New Zealand businesses following the Australia-New Zealand Leadership 
Forum of that year to beware and "read the fine print, or the Australians will shaft 
you" (cited in Hawke, 2004d), there has always been a tacit undertone in the media 
on the subject of Australia and Australians that leads one to conclude, like Rod Oram 
of the Sunday Star Times that: "It would be a serious mistake to believe that 
10 In fact this fi1,rure is expecteJ to rise so JramaticaUy in future years that more than a third of J\[aori may 
be Living in c\ustralia by the enJ of this century ( Collins, 2006b). 
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Australia is the answer to most of our problems ... by focusing too intently on Australia 
we [New Zealanders] would miss other, bigger opportunities" (cited in Hawke, 
2004d). Australians , on the receiving end of much of this hostility, seem to react to 
such treatment by responding in like kind . 
Evidence of this can be found in the sheer number of wide-ranging stereotypes and 
generalizations, constructed on either side of the Tasman concerning the other, that 
have come to occupy such a large area of the trans-Tasman lexicon and are 
regularly exchanged whenever New Zealanders and Australians come into contact 
with each other. In a way that can only serve to heighten inter-antipodean rivalry, 
New Zealanders regularly brand their neighbours as brash , dodgy, uncultured idiots 
and criminals (1. Grant, 2002). Australians, when they think of us at all , view New 
Zealanders as reserved , somewhat humourless and boring , quaintly hick, odd-
accented, old-fashioned - even sometimes mean-spirited - country folk, with an 
unpredictable passive-aggressive violent streak (McPhee, 1987, p. 287 -288; I. Grant, 
2002, p.148), "living in a 25-year-old world of eternally rusting Morris Minors and 
faded weatherboard bungalows" (Ansley, 2001 ). Or as Gatley puts it, "as under-
performing, sheep-loving losers, two hours in front and twenty years behind" (cited in 
I. Grant, 2002, p. 148). Of course such stereotypes as these are at the far end of the 
spectrum, far beyond the 'much-liked mate' (NZ) or 'tough , hard-nosed, must-win 
country' (Australia) metaphors that characterise other aspects of the relationship 
(James, 2005d), yet nevertheless they serve as a useful mask for certain long-held 
genuine insecurities on both sides of the Tasman . 
Openly aired for the first time at the inaugural Australia-New Zealand Leadership 
Forum of 2004, Kiwis tend to feel that Australians take them for granted, ignore or 
patronise them, or are totally dismissive - a good example of which is the oft cited 
illustration of former Australian PM Paul Keating's tendency, wherever he went in 
Australia , to tell the business community that every time Japan's GOP grew by one 
percent, that equated to the whole of New Zealand's GOP altogether (cited in 
Hawke, 2004d) . Aussies , meanwhile, think New Zealanders are much too sensitive 
toward Australia , even somewhat obsessed and paranoid, while acknowledging 
themselves to be constantly plagued by a vague suspicion, much like PM Keating 
once was, that the New Zealanders are in some way getting ahead and outsmarting 
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them by using their own lack of attention to New Zealand affairs as a weapon against 
them (Hawke, 2004b; Hawke, 2004d). Of course what is not so apparent about 
these sentiments is that they spring from deeper underlying issues in the two 
countries, namely: first, that Australian condescension springs from the sincere belief 
that New Zealand made a grave error in refusing to join the Australian 
Commonwealth in 1901 , and has suffered the consequences- isolation, irrelevance, 
parochialism- ever since11 ; and second, the centrality to New Zealand nationalism 
of not being an Australian 12 (Gatley, 2001 , p.18). 
Indeed, much of the rivalry between Australia and New Zealand can be contributed 
to a wish to maintain or defend separate identities. For though Australian and New 
Zealand identities were formed through interaction with each other, nevertheless, as 
Mclean states: "Each side has clearly marked off its identity from the other. New 
Zealanders have gone to great lengths to show that they are not Australians" 
(Mclean, 2003, p. 22). Mclean asserts that even a decade before Federation in 
1890, hints of such a New Zealand identity and destiny, separate from that of 
Australia, were already in evidence. As Wellington's Evening Post proclaimed in 
1890, in voicing its opposition to union with Australia , "The Australian people rather 
look down on New Zealand and New Zealand absolutely refuses to look up to 
Australia or accept a subordinate position" (cited in Mclean, 2003, p. 22). According 
to Mclean, this sentiment is still the crux of the issue concerning New Zealand 's 
relationship with Australia (Mclean, 2003, p.22). McPhee has argued even further 
that New Zealand's "national obsession" with anti-Australian jibes is revealing of an 
uncertainty about this very identity, and one which has grown not diminished with the 
passage of time (McPhee, 1987, p. 293). As fellow Kiwi Grant states: 
As a people most of the world cannot tell New Zealanders and 
Australians apart. From a distance our accents, interests and 
mannerisms are virtually undistinguishable. Perhaps perversely, that 
11 ; \ sentiment echoed in 2006 when speaking of renewed Australian hopes for political union with New 
Zealand, .-\ustralian journalist Tim Dick of the Sy dmy Momi11g Herald referred to New Zealand as "the 
errant one that chose to go it alone" instead of joining the other six .-\ustralasian colonies in 1901 (Dick, 
2006). Indeed, this condescending attitude has also been exhibited in the past by .-\ustralian politicians who 
have expressed the view that Australia's offer of the CER trade deal to ew Zealand was "an act of 
charity, because otherwise New Zealand was destined to be a basket case" (McLean, 200la). 
12 
.-\s :ti l cLean states: "By 1901, federation had be resisted because ew Zealand identity was already 
defined as not-Australian" (McLean, 2003, p. 22). 
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explains our antagonism. Our identity can all too easily disappear when 
Australia is prominent (I. Grant, 2001 , p. 76) . 
Certainly, according to one-time Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating: 'There are 
many parts of the New Zealand psyche that find it difficult to deal with Australia" 
(cited in I. Grant, 2001 , p. 11-12). 
If this be the case, one would have to acknowledge that it is New Zealand's 
insecurity complex which forms the Achilles' heel and most sensitive point of such a 
psyche in dealing with Australia . In point of fact , insecurity has often been cited as 
the motivating force behind the way that trivial though offensive Australian 
stereotypes are endlessly circulating in the New Zealand media (which in itself is 
often described as parochial and mundane compared to that in Australia) (McPhee, 
1987; I. Grant, 2002). Take, for example, the Kiwi obsession to hear outsiders -
especially from powerful countries - praise the landscape, New Zealanders and the 
Kiwi lifestyle (generally in that order) (McPhee, 1987; I. Grant, 2001 ). Or consider 
Grant's claim that in New Zealand, "pulling Aussies down a peg or two ranks highly 
as a national pastime" (I. Grant, 2001 , p. 9) , as well as the extent to which New 
Zealanders take fiendish delight when winning against Australia in any sport, 
especially rugby (Mclean, 2003). It seems that many New Zealanders feel , as Colin 
James does, that "we count in Canberra and the state capitals not as an opportunity 
but as, at best, a requisite afterthought and, more often , a niggling nuisance" 
(James, 2001 a). 
What makes New Zealand's insecurity complex peculiar, however, is the way in 
which it masquerades in a guise of cultural , moral and intellectual superiority, dating 
back to the time of Federation, that emphasizes the convict origins of Australia as 
compared to New Zealand's 'more genteel' British roots (McPhee, 1987; I. Grant, 
2001 ). Indeed, according to Grant, "when New Zealanders are feeling really put 
upon by Australians there are two lines of attack guaranteed to brighten them up: 
Australia's penal settlement beginnings and the treatment of Aboriginals" (I. Grant, 
2001, p. 85). By contrast, Australia seems entirely free from such narcissism arising 
from internal agonies of self-reflection and depreciation. Confident in the knowledge 
21 
that they live in a rich 13 and vast land the size of the United States, and with a 
diverse population five times the size of New Zealand's, Australians are optimistic in 
outlook, calling itself "the Lucky Country" and singing a bold national anthem of 
'Advance Australia Fair' . Rather characteristically and reflective of its internal 
psyche, New Zealanders sing along instead to 'God Defend New Zealand', while at 
the same time attempting to trump Australia , as always, with the self-appointed 
'superior' title of 'God's Own' (I . Grant, 2001 , p. 10, 76). 
Urged on by such strange patterns of behaviour as these, it seems the 
incomprehensible, unfathomable love-hate relationship between Australia and New 
Zealand is set to continue for many years to come. 
13 Though New Zealand is rich in black coal, gold and an abundance of well-watered grasslands, fisheries 
and forests, Australia's wealth in natural resources far outweigh those of ew Zealand, being rich in tin, 
lead, copper, coal, gold, silver, an assortment of base metals and minerals, diamonds, natural gas and oil 
(l\IcLean, 2001b, p. 21; McLean, 2003, p. 31, 35; Blainey, 1987, p . 318-319). 
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Chapter Two: 
Trans-Tasman Divergence in International Relations 
It could well be that the peculiarity of the New Zealand-Australia relationship owes 
much to the natural tension that occurs when two countries have so much in 
common , and yet at the same time have so much to set them apart. The fact is that 
despite the way that the two countries are so often and easily paired together in the 
minds of the world at large, even to the point of being considered anomalous, New 
Zealand and Australia are in truth quite different countries (Sutton, 2001 , p. 9; Teare, 
2001 , p. 92). Though sharing much in common, the two neighbours have 
developed important political , historical and social differences and formed different 
characters and perspectives as nations in the wider world , with "distinctive domestic 
and international agendas" (Calvert, 2000). Ideas of separateness, once more the 
product of imagination than grounded in reality 14 , have over a century worked to 
develop two different nations, each shaping and moulding their histories and 
destinies in different ways. As Mclean states: "The Australia-New Zealand story is 
about two adjacent peoples- of the same kind , and mostly from the same place on 
the other side of the world - who have grown apart rather than together'' (McLean, 
2003, p.13). 
Divergence in International Relations A 
The real ity of this divergence between the two Tasman neighbours is especially 
observable in the political sphere. Whether canvassing New Zealand and Australia's 
separate historical development, their divergent political organization (one as a 
federation of six states and two territories and the other a unitary state with a 
centralized system of government) , or their differences in dependence and 
allegiance with first Great Britain and then the United States in the twentieth century, 
differences between New Zealand and the Tasman pair can be found across a range 
of political literature. It is perhaps no surprise then , that just as these countries of the 
Antipodes have developed in distinctively different ways throughout their political 
1 ~ As New Zealand historian F. L. W. Wood has written: ' 'When in 1900 businessmen and politicians 
talked of the differences in character between the two countries this was nine-tenths of it nonsense. 
Within ten or twenty years it had grown up into a significant reality" (cited in I. Grant, 2001, p. 29) . 
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histories, the same pattern of difference and divergence should also be apparent in 
the international sphere. Indeed, despite retaining many aspects in common in their 
international relations , today New Zealand and Australia have developed quite 
disparate track records in their foreign and security policies, especially since the mid-
1980s, repeatedly taking rather oppositional stances on important issues in the 
international arena. The result of this actuality are , as Ashton Calvert and Winston 
Peters demonstrate in their statements, paradoxical and yet equally true facts to the 
effect that while "New Zealand and Australia share common purpose and effort on 
much of the foreign policy, trade and security agenda" (Calvert, 2000), "Australia and 
New Zealand are still two different countries , each with its own distinctive domestic 
and international agendas" (Calvert, 2000). As the current New Zealand Foreign 
(Minister has stated: "We can, and we do, naturally differ at times in our perspectives 
___)~nd policies" (Peters, 2007a, April 23) . 
This disparity in New Zealand and Australia's foreign and security policies is clearly 
evident even in an examination of the trans-Tasman relationship itself. For though 
unarguably New Zealand and Australia are very important to each other and both 
have a strong desire to maintain and strengthen the trans-Tasman relationship , 
nevertheless the relative importance of each country to the other actually varies in 
reality , with Australia being much more important to New Zealand than vice versa. In 
terms of trade, for instance, which is the area of greatest symmetry between the two 
neighbours, New Zealand's number one trade partner is Australia , while New 
Zealand reciprocally ranks only fifth for Australia after Japan, the United States, the 
Republic of Korea and China (Hawke, 2006) - a pattern which has remained static 
for over a decade (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 143). Furthermore in 
terms of security alliances, despite both nations being "the two largest military 
powers in the South Pacific" (Gyngell & Wesley , 2003, p. 3) , while New Zealand 
looks to Australia and relies heavily on Australian security , Australia looks to the US, 
Japan, South Korea and Singapore as reliable defence partners with whom to build 
strong security relationships in the Asia-Pacific region , with New Zealand now 
featuring of minimal importance in the overall strategic defence outlook and plan . As 
Emmet McElhattan sums up this difference: "New Zealand sees Australia as the 
defence partner. Australia sees New Zealand as a defence partner'' (Emphasis 
added) (McElhattan , 2006). In fact the inequality in importance between the Tasman 
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nations can even be seen in each country's respective MFAT/DFAT publications. 
Whereas New Zealand has assigned a whole category to its relationship with 
Australia, Australia's relations with New Zealand are conversely given limited 
attention in DFAT publications with New Zealand being grouped in with other South 
Pacific nations such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. 
Indeed, though often subtly expressed in official discourse of the Governments on 
either side of the Tasman, important differences between New Zealand and Australia 
can be seen in a variety of areas relating to these nations international affairs. The 
widening gap in terms of foreign and security policies between these old 'antipodean 
mates' has even been noticed at the highest levels , as mentioned previously, with 
New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clark, remarking on several occasions that New 
Zealand and Australia are: "embarked on fundamentally different directions and the 
cultures of our two countries are moving further apart. The way our nations view the 
world and our place in it is also diverging" (Clark, cited in Hawke, 2006). 
This chapter will examine several key areas of difference in New Zealand and 
Australia's international relations, namely those relating to the realms of foreign 
policy, security policies and approaches to important international issues on the 
international agenda today. 
Foreign Policy 
First of all in regard to foreign policy, though sharing a great interest and concern in 
the affairs and security of the Asia-Pacific region , New Zealand and Australia have 
diverged in their geographical area of prime focus and have developed different 
priorities. Australia, on the one hand, has focused the bulk of its attention within the 
region on Asia , particularly on strengthening and improving its ties with the nations of 
North and Southeast Asia. This is because close engagement with Asia is 
considered to be not only an abiding priority but also an imperative in Australian 
foreign policy, largely owing to "the fundamental strategic, political and economic 
interests we have at stake in the region" and because of "important relationships we 
have developed with Asian partners" - seven of which continue to be among 
Australia's top ten export destinations (Calvert, 2000). Indeed, up until the early 
2000s with the emergence of Pacific unrest and instability in the Solomon's, Tonga 
and Fiji , Australia gave hardly a sideways glance at its Pacific island neighbours, a 
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fact shown in the way that up until 2003 at least, Australian foreign policy 
publications were marked by "the absence of any discussion of Australia's relations 
with its Pacific island neighbours, not even any mention ... of the largest and most 
populous of them, Papua New Guinea" (Templeton , 2004). New Zealand , on the 
other hand, has in contrast tended to concentrate its attention primarily on the South 
Pacific, and made comparatively slower and more hesitant moves to engage with 
Asia , largely owing to the belief that the South Pacific is the area to which it can gain 
easiest access and in which New Zealand is able to more freely display its own 
qualities of leadership (Winston Peters, cited in 'Australia offers to evacuate Kiwis , 
2006). As Peters states, "our relationships in the Pacific are a special priority for the 
government" (Peters, 2006f) , "the Pacific is of critical importance to New Zealand 's 
foreign policy because it is our neighbourhood, and our primary sphere of influence" 
(Peters, 2006h) . Furthermore, even in the strategic area closest to 'home' for both 
countries - a zone extending from today's 'arc of instability' North and Northeast of 
Australia through to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands - Australia has tended to 
focus its efforts on Melanesia, while New Zealand has concentrated on Polynesia 
where New Zealand interests mostly lie (Mclean , 2001 b, p. 23). 
Moreover, comments have even been made in the international sphere regarding the 
two different styles of approach the Australasian nations have adopted in their 
foreign policies, in reference to their preferred style of diplomacy towards nations of 
the Asia-Pacific. Australia has been said to be much more assertive - even 
aggressive - in its diplomacy with nations within the region , more focused on 
obtaining concrete outcomes, and seemingly more prone to an approach of 
'influence through coercion' (Hawke, 2004d). Indeed, at times Australia has been 
criticized not only for being more driven for tangible results , but also for being less 
respectful of cultural differences. In fact, Australia was recently accused of being an 
"arrogant bully", adopting provocative tactics and attempting to manipulate island 
politics, as Prime Minister Sogavare of the Solomon's alleged this year with regard to 
Australia's influence within RAMSI (Berry, 2006a; 'Howard calls Pacific bully label 
'laughable", 2006; 'Pacific tension dominates Tasman talks', 2007). New Zealand , in 
comparison , is reputed to be more respectful , relaxed, and less demanding or 
intrusive than its larger neighbour, approaching sensitive issues with discretion, 
allowing room for the 'Pacific' or 'Asian Way' of conducting international negotiations, 
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and generally preferring to influence through persuasion by way of compelling 
arguments (James, 2006d). As Winston Peters has expressed on the New Zealand 
approach, the Government's over-arching foreign policy goal is to be able "to 
influence the international environment" through the promotion of the nation's 
interests and values, in the knowledge that "our influence comes not from our ability 
to impose our will on other countries , but from working with others and persuading 
them of the merits of our arguments" (Peters, 2006b). Or as stated elsewhere by 
John Wood, the NZ Ambassador to the USA, New Zealand is "conscious of the 
diversity that exists within our region and the different historical background of our 
peoples" in its approach to the Pacific region , and acknowledges that "approaches to 
problems in different parts of the Pacific need to be tailored to the cultural and 
national expectations of our diverse peoples and their abilities and needs" (Wood, 
2004, p. 9) . 
Security Policy 
However it is in the area of defence and security especially that New Zealand and 
Australia have diverged most noticeably from each other in recent decades. Indeed, 
according to Max Bradford divergence on security issues have become the biggest 
source of friction and dispute between the two countries , contributing greatly to the 
deterioration of Australia-New Zealand relations "even though both countries know 
neither can do without the other" (Bradford, 2001 , p. 27). Or as Derek Quigley more 
emphatically argues, divergence in security policy between the Tasman pair is one of 
the major internal divisions in the trans-Tasman relationship and New Zealand's 
most important single difference with Australia (Quigley, 2001 ). New Zealand and 
Australia's differing attitudes and actions with regard to two security matters in 
particular have been instrumental to this security gap between the pair. These 
concern namely: their differing approaches to the nuclear issue; and secondly, their 
oppositional strategic assessments of the surrounding security environment which 
have resulted in completely disparate policies with regard to the purpose and 
structure of their own defence forces, as well as over-all divergence in their 
approaches to security. 
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The Nuclear Issue 
New Zealand and Australia 's divergence on the nuclear issue is one that is well-
known and documented on both sides of the Tasman . It is an issue that extends 
back to the time of the Cold War and the year 1985 when the New Zealand Labour 
Government, under Prime Minister David Lange, imposed a ban refusing entry to all 
nuclear-powered ships to New Zealand waters, an action that was part of the 
Government's wider political agenda at that time of promoting a Nuclear Free Zone 
(NFZ) in the South Pacific. The move inevitably led to conflict with the United States 
in that it led New Zealand to , firstly , directly challenge the superpower's fixed "neither 
confirm nor deny" policy for US ship visits, and secondly, to question the United 
States overall strategy of nuclear deterrence in the Cold War15 - both American 
policies which were accepted and supported by Australia and its other major allies. 
At a time when the United States was keenly sensitive to dissension from traditional 
allies in its global Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States 
reacted by suspending all its obligations towards New Zealand either in terms of 
defence or its military development - which in effect equated to New Zealand's 
expulsion from the 1951 ANZUS security alliance - and by demoting the small 
country's status from 'ally' to 'friend '. This in turn lead to a colossal split in NZ-US 
relations, fuelled in New Zealand by an explosive merger of general anti-American 
sentiment with the much larger anti-nuclear lobby (Swindells, 2004), the echoes of 
which are still reverberating twenty years later (Debell , 2004). 
However New Zealand's introduction of anti-nuclear policies did not only affect the 
country's relations with the US, but also caused a rift in New Zealand's relationship 
with its nearest neighbour and primary security ally , Australia. Indeed, New 
Zealand's radical introduction of anti-nuclear policies was regarded by Australia as a 
violation of commitments New Zealand made in the tripartite ANZUS security treaty, 
especially its pledge to promote military inter-action between the other signatory 
nations Australia and the United States (Mclean, 2001 a) . Up until this time New 
Zealand and Australia had approached security issues in more or less the same 
way, sharing as they did a common strategic outlook (Mclean, 2001 a). New 
Zealand's actions in this matter marked the beginning of a parting of the ways 
1
' In his Oxford Union speech of 1985, Prime l\linister David Lange made the case that a deterrence 
strategy based on arsenals of nuclear weapons was "morally indefensible" (Lange, 1985). 
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between the Tasman pair, however, both in terms of their perspective on nuclear 
issues and their status with regard to the ANZUS security alliance with the United 
States. Indeed, essential differences on these matters, reflected in New Zealand 
and Australia's divergent security policies since the mid-1980s, have remained on-
going features of trans-Tasman relations to this day. 
Indeed, New Zealand's stance as a self-declared nuclear-free nation , with its anti-
nuclear legislation and strong opposition to nuclear weapons, the 'flawed logic' of 
nuclear deterrence, and nuclear energy more generally, is in marked contrast to 
Australia's nuclear policies. New Zealand has sustained its own Nuclear Free Zone, 
"against enormous pressure to change from close allies" (Goff, 2001 a, p. 12) and its 
anti-nuclear legislation has remained firmly in place since its imposition two decades 
ago. Indeed, since its official adoption by the National Bolger Government in 1992 
(James, 2006a) New Zealand's anti-nuclear security policies have enjoyed bi-
partisan support in parliament, a trend that is set to continue with John Key's recent 
pledge to retain the legislation and keep New Zealand nuclear-free under any future 
National government (Houlahan, 2006c). In the international sphere, moreover, New 
Zealand has become a fearless spokesman on nuclear issues in the international 
arena and a fierce opponent of nuclear testing , the development or improvement of 
nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) . 
Indeed, the country has been greatly active in the anti-nuclear cause, working to put 
in place the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty banning nuclear testing in the 
Pacific, with the aim of making the Southern Hemisphere totally nuclear-weapon free 
(Goff, 2001 a; Robson 2001 a) , and installing at least six monitoring stations in the 
Pacific as part of the International Monitoring system established to detect nuclear 
explosive testing anywhere in the world (Goff, 2001 a). New Zealand has also gained 
membership to a wide array of anti-nuclear groups including the New Agenda group, 
which was created to push nuclear states into disarming more speedily , and is 
presently engaged in compelling the five nuclear weapons states to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty towards the complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons (Goff, 2006b). In taking these actions New Zealand is working not only to 
make the world nuclear-free and to eliminate all Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs) for good (Robson, 2001 a}, but also - it has been said -towards the aim of 
becoming the "champion of the world anti-nuclear movement" (Locke, 2003). As 
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Matt Robson, the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister for 
Disarmament and Arms Control, has stated: "Ridding the world of nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons has long been important to New Zealand ... New Zealand is 
actively promoting the cause of nuclear disarmament ... Total elimination of these 
weapons is the real solution" (Robson, 2001 b). 
Like New Zealand , Australia is also seriously concerned about the spread of WMDs 
and is a strong supporter of the international non-proliferation and disarmament 
regimes as well as of moves to strengthen the safeguards system of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Calvert, 2000). In fact Australia and New Zealand 
have worked closely together on international anti-nuclear legislation in past years, 
such as on the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and on negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off 
Treaty (Calvert, 2000). Both nations have also strongly condemned North Korea's 
latest nuclear test in October 2006 and continue to show concern regarding Iran's 
nuclear ambitions (Peters, 2006d; 'Government condemns N Korea test', 2006) . 
Nevertheless, though Australia continues to support anti-nuclear initiatives in the 
wider world and actively promotes the importance of the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Conventions (Calvert, 2000) it is not a member of the New Agenda group 
as New Zealand is, nor has it opposed the transport of radioactive materials through 
the Pacific as does New Zealand (Calvert, 2000). 
In fact the reality is that Australia has never adopted any anti-nuclear legislation of its 
own, nor has there been in the past or at the present time a desire to do so among 
successive Australian Governments. Indeed, in addition to continuing to receive US 
ships in Australian waters as an on-going member of the ANZUS alliance, Australia 
retains nuclear installations at numerous US-Australian bases across the continent 
and has remained open to nuclear options, both in the realms of global security and 
that of energy production. For instance, Australia continues to mine uranium for 
export worldwide, even recently indicating an intention to export uranium to both 
China and India in future years (though under strict provisos in their case that 
Australian uranium is not to be used for military purposes) (Kelton, 2006). In fact as 
of September this year, the Howard Government has approved uranium sales to 
Russia and made plans to join an American programme designed to develop new 
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nuclear technology (Ansley, 2007). Furthermore, as far as the logic of nuclear 
deterrence is concerned , both throughout the Cold War and also today in the current 
War on Terror post-9/11 , as well as in view of North Korea and Iran's nuclear 
ambitions, the Australian Government remains committed with the United States and 
the United Kingdom to the principle of nuclear deterrence in the belief that, as former 
British PM Tony Blair phrased it, it would be "unwise and dangerous for. .. any of the 
nuclear powers, to give up its independent nuclear deterrent" as an "independent 
nuclear deterrent is the ultimate insurance" (cited in Knight, 2006). Finally, the 
Australian government is currently contemplating a nuclear solution to the twin 
problems of global climate change and Australia's looming energy crisis , with plans 
to construct 25 nuclear energy reactors across Australia with corresponding nuclear 
waste disposal sites from 2020 (Kelly, 2006b). 
Strategic Outlook 
The second area of divergence between New Zealand and Australia in their security 
policy concerns the recent unprecedented emergence of two disparate strategic 
outlooks between the neighbours. Since the early years of the Cold War Australia 
and New Zealand had considered themselves to be so alike in their defence 
posture 16 as to form a "Single Strategic Entity" (McLean , 1980; Hawke, 2003a). As 
the New Zealand 1978 White Paper Review stated: "In a strategic sense the two 
countries are one" (cited in Henderson, 1980b, p. 43). According to McLean this 
concept was "a reciprocal recognition on the part of both countries that in the great 
stream of history, Australians and New Zealanders have fetched up in a very 
anomalous position", finding themselves in a shared strategic predicament as "two 
outliers of the West perched under the very diverse, dynamic but unstructured realm 
of Eastern Asia" (McLean, 2001a). In 2000-2001 , however, this concept was put to 
an end under the newly-elected Labour-Alliance Coalition Government, with PM 
Clark starting that the concept of a 'single strategic entity' between New Zealand and 
Australia implied "the decisions would not be ours alone and , deeply as we love [the 
Australians] we are not prepared to take that step" (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 280-
281 ). Henceforth, it was announced , the nation would make its own decisions and 
16 The term 'defence posture' is used to encompass a state's military capability, as well as its orientation 
and perceptions as regards other states, which may include both physical and political considerations (Tbe 
Australia11 App1vacb /o IVa~fare, 2002, p. 19). 
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no longer be automatically involved with Australia militarily "come what may" 
(Quigley, 2001 , p. 53)- what Mclean calls separatism at the expense of what could 
best be achieved together in a shared strategic environment (Mclean , 2003, p. 281 ). 
As the notion of New Zealand and Australia constituting a single strategic entity had 
been a key element in the trans-Tasman relationship over many decades (Bradford, 
2001 , p. 27), New Zealand's complete departure from the status quo sparked a 
major rift between the two nations and signalled an unmistakable parting of the ways 
in years to come. 
New Zealand's decision to bury the concept of 'single strategic entity', in what was a 
radical departure from history, and the divergence in security policies between New 
Zealand and Australia that have ensued in the years afterwards, have in actuality 
been primarily driven by the development of disparate strategic outlooks between the 
Tasman pair. Historically Australia has always maintained a rather pessimistic view 
of its surrounding strategic environment (Dunn , 1984) and this is a pattern that has 
continued to the present day under the Howard Governments (Ayson, 2004). As a 
key maritime state in the Asia-Pacific located at close proximity to Southeast Asia 
and flanked by Indonesia, with the so-called 'arc of instability' "above its head 
inflamed with violence and insurrection" (Ansley, 2001 ), and interests to protect on 
the Asian mainland as well as in the Indian Ocean , Australians continue to feel today 
as in the past that while armed conflict with its neighbours is not considered likely, 
such an event is not at all unthinkable either (Bradford, 2001 , p. 27; White, 2003). 
Indeed, in viewing the region as one prone to conflict, threatened by state failure, 
and bursting with potential for collaboration with terrorists or engaging in 
transnational crime, the Australian Government considers Australia to inhabit a 
strategic environment that is "fluid and uncertain" and endued with great potential for 
change (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 16; White , 2002a). 
In stark contrast, following the 1999 election of the Labour-Alliance Government led 
by Helen Clark, New Zealand adopted a new strategic outlook - and one completely 
at odds with that of Australia - which emphasizes the absence of traditional military 
threats to New Zealand and the idea that the country enjoys an 'exceptionally' 
benign strategic environment as "a small nation without enemies" (Clark, 2001 b) 
located in the vast South Pacific ocean . As Clark stated in 2001 , "We count 
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ourselves very lucky to live in one of the most strategically secure environments in 
the world" (Clark, 2001 a) , or as she asserted more infamously in a Face the Nation 
television interview on 51h April 2001 , "New Zealander's do not need to be 
concerned. We live in an incredibly benign strategic environment .. . our region poses 
no security risks". While in defence of these statements, it has been suggested that 
the PM's comments have been misinterpreted or taken out of context (Ayson , 2004), 
the fact remains that the Government has continued to advocate this message 
(though the wording has been adjusted), even in the aftermath of the horrific 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the ensuing War on Terror, and the Bali Bombings of 2002 in which 
fifteen New Zealanders and scores of Australians were injured or killed. Consider, for 
instance, the following statements by Helen Clark and her consecutive Foreign 
Ministers, Phil Goff and Winston Peters, that continue to express the Government's 
view that "in terms of state-on-state conflict, of course it is a benign environment" 
(Clark, cited in Watkins, 2003) and that New Zealand "does not face a conventional 
military threat" (Goff, 2006a; Goff, 2007a; Peters, 2006b). As Goff remarked this 
year: 
"New Zealand does not face presently, a conventional military threat. We 
are an island country of only four million people ... Our closest neighbours 
are Australia to our west, the South Pacific Islands to our North , and 
Antarctica to our south. We are surrounded by the Pacific Ocean" (Goff, 
2007a) 
What this means is that Australia is preparing for a more risky future in what it 
considers a "strategically dynamic and uncertain region" of the world (White, 2002a), 
at the same time as New Zealand continues to assume the continuance of the 
present 'stable' environment (Hensley, 2001 , p. 97) and to ascribe to the prevailing 
belief that New Zealand is a country of the mostly "quiet South Pacific" (Mclean , 
2003, p. 256). This contradiction in terms between Australia and New Zealand in 
their strategic outlooks can be seen even in regard to specific security concerns. In 
regard to the prospect of major power confrontation in the region , for instance, both 
nations observe that relations between the great powers - China, Japan, India, 
Russia and the United States - are relatively stable, and significantly more so today 
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than in past years (Goff, 2006a; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 16). 
Nevertheless, while New Zealand optimistically views this fact as a sign that regional 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Straits and in South Asia "can be 
managed without military conflict" in the future (Goff, 2006a) , Australia conversely 
considers the risk of a great power conflagration escalating into a military conflict to 
be "not low", meaning that Australia could well be drawn into a conventional war, 
whether as part of a US-led coalition or alone in defence of its own interests, forces 
or assets in the region , or in order to protect its own territory should the conflict be 
not far from Australia 's borders (White, 2002a). As Colin James states in regard to 
New Zealand: "A small , isolated and sea-girt country finds it difficult to accept that 
the quiet south is co-extensive with the dynamic, fast-changing world of emergent 
Asian nationalisms and of serious great power confrontation in the North East 
Pacific" (James, 2006d). 
The rising spectre of international terrorism, now manifesting itself as a tough and 
adaptable menace to the world set to endure for years to come 17 , is another more 
vivid illustration of an issue on which divergent security outlooks have become 
apparent between the Tasman pair in recent years. In Australia the sense of threat 
among Australian policy-makers in the post-9/11 world has been greatly heightened 
with Government documents confirming that "Austral ia has been identified as a 
target" (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 11 ), that "militant extremists in 
Southeast Asia are prepared to take up the AI Qaida cause" (Advancing the National 
Interest, 2003, p. 11) and that overall there is an increased risk of terrorist attack on 
Austral ians and Australian interests domestically and internationally ('Defence and 
Security', 2006). Indeed, Australia's vulnerability to terrorist attack is something 
which weighs heavily in the minds of Australians with a 2005 poll revealing that 70 
per cent of Australians believe their nation will experience a terrorist attack in the 
17 ;\s the head of the British ,-\rmy, General Sir Richard Dannatt, recently expressed in a secret meeting 
with his senior staff, later leaked to the British press, the world needs to prepare itself for "a generation of 
conflict" involving decades of fighting against 'strident' Islamic terrorism. ,-\ccording ro General Dannatt, 
the British general public have not yet grasped the fact that Britain's armed forces are engaged "in a wider 
conflict that may last for a generation" in which Islamic extremism would continue to menace the \Xfest 
nor only in threatres of conflict in the l\1iddle East, as in ,-\fghanistan and lray, bur also within British 
society itself as "the threats and challenges to our society are global and have sympathizers in many 
societies and countries, including at home". In a battle of ideas in which the battleground is unpredictable, 
he concluded, "the challenge of this generation is as great as any that have gone before us" ('General 
predicts years of conflict', 2007, p. Bl) 
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future (Moore, 2005, p. 85). In contrast even the shocking September 11 terrorist 
attacks that devastated forever America 's notions of invulnerability have failed to 
affect New Zealand's view that it will never be directly attacked by anyone (Mclean , 
2003, p. 257). Indeed, despite its unalterable Western-nation stripe and the fact that 
it also displays the same democratic liberal qualities so despised by Islamic 
extremists, New Zealand not only continues to consider itself 'safe' from terrorist 
attack, but actually goes further in lauding itself as a 'safe haven' from terrorism. In 
fact, according to political commentator Colin James, the country has even taken to 
"preachiness and moralizing" about the strategic perceptions and concerns of other 
nations (James, 2006d).18 As Colin James wryly comments: "Where the troublespots 
are far away, it is easy to gloss over the security concerns of others" (James, 
2006d). 19 It is this prevailing attitude of complacency in New Zealand which White 
considers may explain why New Zealanders finds it so hard to accept the legitimacy 
of Australia's strategic perception , thought to underpin Australia's entire defence 
posture, and why they are so apt to suspiciously question Australian motives and 
purposes (White, 2003). 
The result of such different strategic outlooks of course are two neighbours that are 
not only anticipating disparate futures in the region , but that are each making 
oppositional capability decisions in order to meet these divergent expectations. As a 
consequence, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and New Zealand Defence Force 
(NZDF) have become widely dissimilar in recent years in their purpose or raison 
IH As Michael Bassett states: "The country's leaders, with public support at their elbows, preach to others, 
whether in Washington, London, or Beijing. \Xlhen they do so, they clutch the security blanket that 
thousands of miles of ocean throw around ew Zealand's landmass" (Bassett, 2002). 
1 ~It is interesting to note, however, that though this notion of a 'benign strategic environment' continues 
to be the predominant view among New Zealand politicians and citizens alike Qames, 2006d), there are in 
reality signs of a rising uneasiness among the New Zealand population. ,-\s a recent T\' ONE internet poll 
has shown, 82 per cent of those polled answered 'no' in response to the question 'Do you think New 
Zealand is prepared for a terrorist attack', with only 8 per cent answering in the affirmative (1\'NZ Poll, 
2007 In addition, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service reported in September 2007 that though 
the risk of a terrorist attack in New Zealand is considered low, the threat is in actual fact rising (Schouten, 
2007). Indeed, the SIS has confrrmed that ew Zealand is not invulnerable or isolated from terrorism -
there are Islamic extremists living in New Zealand who are sympathetic to ,-\1 Qaeda and have strong anti -
\Vestern views and links to extremists overseas ('SIS says terrorist attack risk low', 2007). As concerns 
continue to augment overseas in regard to Islamic extremist activities and the 'radicalisation' of some 
communities, the perceived threat to New Zealand from terrorism is abo expected to increase in the 
coming months and years (Shouren, 2007). 
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d'etre, their structure, and the level of Government funding invested in their 
development. 
The Australian Defence Force CADF) 
Purpose 
In continuing to view nation-states as well as the al ignments and conflicts between 
them as the key components to Australia's strategic environment (Advancing the 
National Interest, 2003, p. 16}, Australia remains firmly anchored in a traditional 
defence posture with the main purpose and highest priority of the ADF being "the 
defence of our country and our community from armed attack" (Defence 2000, 2000, 
p. VII) . For while a major attack on Australia is considered unlikely at the present 
time, the Australian Government considers that the consequences of even a minor 
attack would be sufficiently serious to Australia as to compel it to address and 
prepare for such an attack (Defence 2000, 2000, p. 30). Indeed, in accordance with 
its more wary strategic outlook, Australian strategic decision-making is formed with 
two very real possibilities kept in mind : first , that one can not assume the continuity 
of present circumstances; and second , that force-structure decisions must be made 
on the basis of long time frames of about 40-50 years , in recognition of the fact that 
"over long time-frames there may be significant potential for changes to our strategic 
environment which could make major conflict much less unlikely than it is today" 
(White, 2002a). After all , as Hugh White points out, Australia came very close to 
conflict with Indonesia after its INTERFET deployment in East Timor in 1999 (White, 
2002a). Linked to this priority is an Australian security doctrine of 'independent self-
defence'20 - said to be at the heart of Australia's defence posture - by which the ADF 
must not only have a capacity to defend the Australian homeland and its people from 
all threats, but also be able to perform such an act alone and in a comprehensive 
fashion should the worst case scenario occur as "Australia believes alliances and 
allies cannot be completely relied upon if the crunch comes" (McElhattan , 2006). 
20 This security posture o f 'independent self-defence ' was acrually adopted in the fmal years of the Cold 
\Xlar. Up until this time .\ustralia had sought to assure irs own self-defence though maintaining strong 
deft nce alliancts with its key allits New Zealand, the United Statts and tht United Kingdom, and through 
entering in to collectivt security arrangements as in "\NZUS or SE.\ TO. However with great power 
alliancts seeming of diminished value as the global political environmtnr changed in the late 1980s, 
"\ustraiia decided it was necessary to have an independent security strategy, thereby taking on the new 
posture o f independent self-rtiiance, while also continuing to place great emphasis on irs key alliances. 
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Structure 
With such an objective as this in mind , Australia has developed the ADF in a manner 
that completely mirrors its 'independent self-defence' security doctrine, with a great 
deal of importance being continually placed on the ADF's maintenance of a high 
level of combat capabilities across all traditional security branches of air, sea and 
land forces in order that it might be able to fight major conventional wars , either in 
defence of its own territory or within the region at large (Kennedy, 2002; Winning in 
Peace, Winning in War, 2004). As the 2002 Australian White Paper indicates, the 
goal of the ADF is to maintain and further develop an "integrated and balanced joint 
force", comprised of a credible combat-capable navy, army and air force, able to 
operate jointly to defend Australia by controlling the air and sea approaches and 
"responding effectively to any armed incursion by hostile forces onto Australian soil" 
(Defence 2000, 2000, p. XII) . In maintaining highly trained and equipped war-
fighting forces across all three branches of the ADF, moreover, Australia considers 
itself to have created forces that are adaptable and flexible enough to be drawn 
upon to meet its second and third priorities in the realm of defence - contributing to 
the security of Australia's immediate Asia-Pacific neighbourhood (either through 
combat operations in response to emerging threats or low-level operations 
addressing non-military threats like coastal surveillance, counter-terrorist response, 
emergency management, search and rescue, or disaster relief) , and contributing to 
international operations towards global security in alignment with Australia's national 
interests (either in UN or NATO sanctioned humanitarian operations or in coalitions 
of the willing in concert with Australia's allies and friends - particularly the United 
States) (Dickens, 2001 , p. 40; The Australian Approach to Warfare , 2002, p. 20; 
Australia in Brief, 2003, p. 26; Defence 2000, 2000, p. XIII) . As a publication of the 
Australia Department of Defence makes clear: 
The Australian Defence Force aims to develop and maintain high levels 
of professional war fighting mastery. In pursuing such mastery, our 
defence force deliberately focuses its training upon the most demanding 
and dangerous warfighting tasks, enabling it to perform lower level 
peacekeeping missions with comparative ease (The Australian 
Approach to Warfare , 2002, p. 20). 
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Investment 
Consequently, due to this commitment to maintain a defence force of the highest 
level of combat capability feasibly possible, since "a strong and capable defence 
force is fundamental to Australia's security" (Australia in Brief, 2003, p. 26), Australia 
invests hefty sums into the ADF in order to maintain such a structure, much of which 
goes towards the reinvigoration or upgrade of its air combat, maritime, strike and 
information capabilities (Kennedy, 2002; I. Grant, 2001 ). In fact this is a trend that 
extends back to the end of the Cold War and the birth of Australia's self-reliance 
doctrine which has continued under successive Australian governments to the 
present day. Indeed, total defence funding reached $16.35 billion between 2004-
2005, and $20 billion has been pledged for the years 2006-2007 - a figure which is 
expected to rise by about 3% per annum over the next decade21 (Australia in Brief, 
2003, p. 26; 'Defence and Security', 2005; Dodd, 2006; Defence 2000, 2000, p. VI , 
XVII) . 
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) 
Purpose 
Upon coming into office in 1999, the Labour-led New Zealand Government was 
quick to turn its attention to reorganizing the NZDF, which it then regarded as 
"representing a confused view of the roles our armed forces are likely to be called 
upon to perform" (Burton , 2001 ). Traditionally the priority task of the NZDF, as in 
Australia and elsewhere, had been the defence of New Zealand and its interests 
through the application of deadly force, with humanitarian tasks relegated to a 
secondary role (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). In the Government's view, however, 
traditional defence postures were outdated and ill-suited to the security environment 
21 This is the most specific long-term defence funding commitment given by any Australian Government 
in over 25 years. }.nother example of ,-\ustralian divergence in its defence and security policies and 
outlook from that of its small neighbour, is the fact thar while New Zealand has banished its air combat 
capability, .-\usrralia recently committed itself to a S16 billion purchase o f up to 100 Joint Strike Fighters by 
2013, and has pledged a total of S20 billion for defence spending during the years 2006-2007, a proportion 
of which is being funneled into recruiting over 2,600 .-\ustralians into the army so as to make two extra 
battalions, thereby boosting total army numbers to 30,000 (Australia in B1ief, 2003, p. 26; 'Defence and 
Security', 2005; D odd, 2006; Stewart, 2006; Advancing tbe N ational Interest, 2003, p. \ ' I). Indeed, while the 
size of the Australian Army is set to increase by 20% from 25,000 to 30,000 over the next decade, New 
Zealand's Army remains under strength with its regular and territorial forces at critically low levels - a fact 
said to have played a major role in its inabili ty to make a meaningful peacekeeping contribution to 
Lebanon - with every increase of 5,000 .-\ustralian soldiers representing almost the entire full -time ew 
Zealand .-\rmy (Roy, 2006). 
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of the modern world - after all New Zealand's first battalion level deployment since 
World War II had been that of peacekeepers to East Timor (Burton, 2004a) . 
Consequently, motivated by its new "realistic strategic assessment" (Burton , 2001 ), 
the Government set about to revolutionise (or in the Government's words "re-
energise") both the NZDF and general thinking about the basic premises of defence 
and security in New Zealand (Burton, 2001 ). In June 2000 the Government released 
its Defence Policy Framework that declared that since New Zealand is not likely to 
be involved in widespread armed conflict, it can best contribute to regional stability 
and world peace by promoting comprehensive security through a range of initiatives 
including diplomacy, trade and cultural links, foreign aid , and arms control (Defence 
Policy Framework, 2000, p. 2) . The new prime purpose of the NZDF, asserted the 
Government, was to produce sizeable well-equipped combat-trained land forces 
ready and able to act as effective UN peacekeepers overseas, to perform non-
traditional military tasks such as South Pacific resource protection, disaster relief and 
New Zealand civil defence, and act against what are widely deemed non-military 
threats like transnational crime, natural disasters, state fragility and failure in the 
Pacific, and the proliferation of WMDs (Defence Policy Framework, 2000; White, 
2002a; Goff, 2006a; McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). In this way defence policy in New 
Zealand became - almost overnight - an adjunct of New Zealand's foreign policy, 
concerned with the defence of New Zealand's wider external interests rather than 
traditional self-defence against foreign aggression (Mclean, 2001 a; Burton, 2004a; 
O'Brien, 2005). 
Structure 
In what Colin James calls an agenda to "convert militarism to humanitarianism" 
(James, 2001 b) , the Government subsequently reorganized the NZDF to reflect this 
new role and to develop "an appropriate force structure to match New Zealand's 
defence objectives" in pursuit of "a modern , professional , well-equipped Defence 
Force that is sustainable, affordable, and appropriate to New Zealand's Defence 
requirements" (Burton, 2004a). Instead of maintaining a traditional three-branch 
defence structure oriented around self-defence capabilities and a 'balanced military 
force', which in the Government's view had only produced an NZDF of "shallow 
breadth" (Burton, 2004a), the Government opted to develop "depth over breadth" 
(Burton , 2004a) and focus on equipping the NZDF only to perform the well-defined 
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humanitarian tasks and roles delegated in the Framework, which the Government 
considered New Zealand could best perform (Burton , 2001 ). Thus severe 
downgrades were undertaken to New Zealand's naval combat and maritime 
surveillance capabilities , and the air combat capabilities of the Air Force were 
abandoned - including infamously and controversially the cancellation of a planned 
F-16 purchase from the US and the scrapping of the NZRAF's Skyhawk combat wing 
- since the Navy and Air Force were now relegated to playing supporting roles 
(Burton, 2001 ; Kennedy, 2002). In carrying out such a drastic action, the 
Government ensured that any future New Zealand deployment overseas would be 
undertaken in collaboration with a larger international force, an approach called 
'jointness' which is considered "particularly relevant for small countries such as New 
Zealand" since it offers "a valuable alternative" to the increased costs and 
complexities of maintaining the all-round capabilities required by more traditional 
defence structures (Burton, 2001 ). Indeed, in acting this way the Government 
considered itself to be implementing a security strategy that would improve the 
NZDF's ability to contribute effectively to international deployments, and thereby 
enhance New Zealand's status on the world stage, while at the same time sparing 
the country the expense of maintaining a broad range of capabilities which the 
Government contended could be provided by other countries anyway (Kennedy, 
2002). As the former Minister of Defence stated a few years ago: "We had to 
maximize our strengths, directing our resources to those areas in which we excel, 
and where we can make a real contribution to international deployments. We are a 
nation of four million people, and we cannot be all things to all people" (Burton , 
2004a). Or later on, "We had to refocus defence policy, in light of what New 
Zealand's security needs were, and what part we wanted , and were able to play, in 
regional and global security" (Burton , 2005b). 
Investment 
Unsurprisingly the Government's investment in the NZDF since 2000 likewise 
reflects this strategy, with funds being channelled primarily into equipping and 
outfitting the army, such as with light, highly-deployable craft like the LAV3 armoured 
personnel carriers necessary for effective peacekeeping , and in transforming the 
Navy and Air Force to better perform their 'softer' military roles, exemplified by the 
acquisition of New Zealand's first Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) the HMNZS Canterbury 
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to support New Zealand's regional deployments. Through the Government's 2002 
'Defence Long Term Development Plan' (L TOP) and 2005 'Defence Sustainability 
Initiative' (DSI) , the Government has pledged a $3.5 billion investment into new 
equipment over the next ten years and a further $4.6 billion into military personnel as 
part of its initiative to remould the NZDF, through "transforming the Navy, 
modernising the Army, and implementing capability improvements in the Air Force" 
(Burton, 2005b; 'Annual Report 2006', 2006; 'Defence Long-Term Development 
Plan', 2006) . This is in order to meet Government objectives of creating a 'fiscally 
and resource sustainable, ready, deployable, up-to-date NZDF that is equipped and 
trained for combat and peacekeeping and able to operate alongside other forces' 
('Statement of Intent of the NZDF', 2006). However, when seen in light of its 
downgrades and combat capability cuts, this injection of funds is merely a 'life-
extension' that covers only the basics of restoring the NZDF to a twenty-first century 
equipment level, boosting low personnel numbers so that it might perform its 
peacekeeping and peace support abilities , and generally retaining abilities that are 
necessary for the NZDF to carry out peacekeeping missions like those undertaken in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor, not to mention basic non-military functions 
(McCraw, 2006a, p. 24-25; 'Statement of Intent of the NZDF', 2006) . Indeed, though 
the Clark Governments investment in the NZDF forms the first major boost in 
defence funding in five decades (Moore, 2005) , according to McCraw as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product it is still one of the lowest in the world 
standing today at 0.85 per cent22 in spite of the 'Defence Sustainability Initiative' 
(McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). 
Reactions: Condemnation & Approval 
This dramatic transformation of the NZDF undertaken by the Clark governments 
since 1999, and the country's resulting shift away from its traditional defence posture 
and that maintained by Australia , has been alternately condemned as well as 
applauded by antipodean academics on both sides of the Tasman. As Ayson points 
out, at one end of the spectrum there has been a substantial number of voices raised 
22 In comparison ;\ustralia spent 1.8 per cent on defence as a percentage of GDP in 2004 (Hide, 2004) - a 
figure which is expected ro rise. Interestingly, though under-investment in the NZDF and defence 
infrastructure was rife in the 1980s with New Zealand's armed forces undergoing multiple downgrades and 
steady cuts in the defence budge throughout the decade (Henderson, 1991a), the average percentage of the 
GDP spent on defence before 1990 was a much higher 1.9 per cent with New Zealand having "no trouble 
funding a combat-ready army, navy and air force" (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). 
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both in New Zealand and in Australia portraying concern and alarm at what is viewed 
as an "apparent fraying of traditional linkages" on the New Zealand side of the Ditch 
(Ayson, 2004, p. 2). Indeed, New Zealand's downgrade of its combat capabilities 
and shift towards humanitarianism in its security policies is reputed to have not only 
angered Australia but bewildered and distressed New Zealand's other key security 
allies the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore, all of whom have 
become increasingly suspicious that there is a hidden agenda in the Clark 
Government to turn New Zealand towards isolationism and a form of non-alignment 
in world affairs (Bradford , 2001 , p. 27-28). Within New Zealand's political community 
the change in direction has raised talk of New Zealand "drifting into irrelevancy" 
(Bradford, 2001 , p. 28) and questions regarding whether the country is developing a 
welfare mentality about security (Hensley, 2001 , p. 97). Fierce criticisms have even 
been made that the Clark Government "has emasculated the New Zealand armed 
forces at the very time when our main security partner, Australia, is making defence 
preparedness a top priority" (Prebble, 2002) and that as a result of Government 
decisions "our Air Force cannot fight to defend us, our Navy has only a part-time blue 
water combat capability, our Army is incapable of fighting as part of an allied 
formation ... we cannot supply essential Defence" (Hide, 2004). As McCraw has 
stated: "No country maintains military forces just to cope with disasters or to keep the 
peace in other countries" (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). 
In Australia , moreover, there has been strong criticism that New Zealand has 
become "a strategic liability" (Paul Dibb, cited in 'Two Different Dreams', 2005) and a 
free-rider on its defence systems, being both unwilling and now unable to pull its 
weight in defence or to carry its share of the military and fiscal burden of maintaining 
peace and security in the Asia-Pacific - a situation seen to be reflective of the Kiwi 
'bludging' or 'something-for-nothing' mentality (Bradford, 2001 ; McElhattan, 2006; 
James, 2005). In fact since New Zealand is viewed as having made itself entirely 
dependent on Australia for its own self-defence in a worst case scenario, while 
unable to contribute anything of significance to the defence of Australia should it 
likewise require assistance, some Australians have become very upset and resentful 
that New Zealand seems to be 'pulling out' and "turning its back on the cooperation 
and comradeship of the ANZAC tradition" (Bradford , 2001 , p. 27). This has caused 
some to conclude, like Pallot, that New Zealand is making "a mockery of eulogies so 
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easily given on Anzac Day" (Pallot, 2006). Certainly New Zealand's decisions on 
defence have led to a growing divergence between the Tasman pair as the tech gap 
widens and differences in force structure, strike capability and position with regard to 
the US alliance becoming increasingly apparent ('Two Different Dreams', 2005). In 
fact New Zealand has so limited itself and its abilities, in terms of contributing to 
medium to high-level conflicts within the Asia-Pacific, and its abilities to effectively 
protect itself while operating, that should the security environment in the region 
become more threatening and conflict between regional powers more imminent, 
further strains in the Australia-New Zealand security relationship are expected to 
result (Ayson , 2004, p. 9-10). 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, however, the changes made to the NZDF are 
considered to be realistic modern measures reflective of the security landscape of 
the twenty-first century. In this vein of thought, traditional perceptions about security 
are being re-aligned away from responding to military threats from states and 
towards reacting to threats emanating from non-state sources, and performing an 
increasing array of non-military security tasks (Fortune, 2005). From this perspective 
Australia's defence posture, emphasizing preparedness for conventional warfare 
within its own region in defence of its own territory , is becoming old-fashioned and 
increasingly obsolete in the globalizing world of today. As the head of the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, Hugh White , has predicted: 
Industrialised countries around the world will slowly follow New Zealand's 
lead by moving out of expensive capabilities needed in old-fashioned 
wars, and will move further down the road towards forces dominated by 
light, highly-deployable land forces suited to the new tasks which have 
become so common in the decade since the Berlin wall came down 
(White, cited in Kennedy, 2002). 
Indeed, a broader definition of security which places a greater emphasis on non-
conventional aspects of security has been increasingly accepted within both 
academic and policy-making circles in recent times (Kennaway, 2001 ). In this sense 
New Zealand sees itself as having taken a modern and holistic view of security , 
reflective of a world in which threat-based assumptions about security are being 
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altered to interest-based calculations and large armed forces and sophisticated high 
tech weapons systems are no longer necessary (Fortune, 2005). Instead, it is 
attempting to meet the new requirements of this new security paradigm which 
involves increased cooperation, interdependence and common security initiatives at 
the international level, and flexible, self-reliant armed forces with multi-role 
capabilities at the national level, with emphasis on interoperability with all likely 
partners (Fortune, 2005). What is more, New Zealand feels perfectly justified in 
taking this decision since, as Kennaway indicates, the major threats to the well-being 
of New Zealanders since the end of the Second World War have been threats to 
economic well-being rather than the threat or use of armed force (Kennaway, 2001 ). 
In Australia , too, an independent assessment of New Zealand's defence strategy 
undertaken this year by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute gave the NZDF as it 
is today in 2007 an "A pass", describing it as "becoming modern" with "fully capable 
operational forces" - something which Phil Goff has expounded as constituting 
"overall a ringing endorsement of progress that has been made in the NZDF and 
how it is currently placed" (Goff, 2007b). Indeed, enthusiasts of New Zealand's 
current security stance frequently point to the way New Zealand won Australian 
approval in its rapid and professional commitment to East Timor's INTERFET 
operation in 1999, reputed to have made "a massive impression" in Canberra 
(Patman, 2005, p. 55), as well as to the fact that Australians continue to regard the 
NZDF as "a highly professional force" and the high quality of its personnel to be 
"beyond question" (Australia's Defence 2000 White Paper, cited in McElhattan, 
2006). 
It has even been suggested that, though distasteful to traditional realists , New 
Zealand's security stance today is actually "a natural equilibrium or resting place" in 
the evolution of New Zealand's defence and security policy philosophy which is likely 
to become a long-term position in future years even with changes in government 
(Ayson, 2004, p. 5). This is because, as Colin James has asserted , "this strategic 
outlook has become so predominant among New Zealanders that it would be highly 
unlikely that any government could win an election should it advance a policy to 
spend commensurately with Australia on defence" and "New Zealanders are too few 
anyway to counter it" (James, 2006d). Consequently, despite the fact that many 
continue to believe that a less stable, less predictable security order has emerged in 
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the world post 9/11 , in which events and conflicts may occur without precedent in 
world history making it impossible to predict the future shape of the global security 
environment (Ferguson, 2002), it is expected that New Zealand will continue to 
emphasise a humanitarian approach and look towards multilateral options in the 
years ahead, which equates to "being a good international citizen, playing by the 
rules of international law and preferring multilateral mandates" (James, 2006d). 
International Issues 
In addition to this divergence in foreign and security policy as related on these 
particular issues above, New Zealand and Australia have found themselves at odds 
on a number of international issues in the global arena, foremost among which have 
been America's plans for a system of National Missile Defence (otherwise known as 
the 'Star Wars' project) , the Kyoto Protocol , and lastly and more controversially, the 
matter of Iraq's disarmament in 2002-2003. 
1) National Missile Defence 
The first issue of major disparity between the Tasman neighbours in their 
International Relations concerns the Bush Administration's plans to develop a 
National Missile Defence (NMD) system to protect itself and its allies from ballistic 
missile attacks, especially those potentially launched by rogue states like North 
Korea, Iran and pre-2003 Iraq (Patman, 2005, p. 59). In 'understanding' the 
American desire for such a system, the Australian Government has supported the 
project even expressing a readiness to be involved in its implementation (Patman, 
2001 ; Patman, 2005). In contrast, the New Zealand Government has loudly 
opposed and condemned the project, stating not only that the missile shield would 
not at all ensure the protection of the US and its allies from attacks by terrorists or 
rogue states, but also that it risked causing tension with China and Russia while 
more generally undermining the existing international network of arms control and 
disarmament treaties (Patman, 2001 ). 
2) The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international convention formulated in response to growing 
worldwide concern about global climate change and the destructive phenomenon of 
global warming now so strongly manifesting itself at the dawn of the twenty-first 
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century. First negotiated in 1997, the Protocol is a treaty ratified by 141 countries 
that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5 per cent of 1990 levels 
by the year 2012, primarily through imposing binding national limits on the amount of 
carbon dioxide permitted to be released into the atmosphere (Devine, 2005). In its 
early stages both New Zealand and Australia had expressed an intention of entering 
into the international agreement. However following the US withdrawal from the 
Protocol under the Bush Administration , which cited fears for the harm such limits 
would inflict on the US economy, the Australian Government followed in America's 
footsteps and likewise withdrew, stating that without the United States agreement 
and participation the Protocol was 'dead' (Patman, 2001 ). According to Prime 
Minister Howard, Australia 's decision not to ratify the treaty was also based on 
genuine concerns that the treaty did not address important associated issues and 
that if Australia signed the Protocol it would be disadvantaged when competing to 
provide liquefied natural gas in Asia where there is a growing energy demand 
(Devine, 2005). Indeed, from the Australian's Government's point of view, signing on 
to the treaty would prove futile if countries like Indonesia, that have gas resources 
containing high levels of carbon dioxide, are free to provide energy unfettered by 
Kyoto constraints and thereby make the global environment worse while Australia 
"will have lost out" (Devine, 2005). Instead, Howard explained , Australia would meet 
self-imposed limits of its own, for example by aiming to keep greenhouse emissions 
to 108 per cent of 1990 levels (Devine, 2005). 
New Zealand strongly objected to this point of view and in stark contrast has 
remained firmly engaged in the agreement having signed on to the Protocol prior to 
its entry into force in February 2005 (Devine, 2005;'Keeping up appearances', 2007). 
In fact in the two years since, New Zealand has demonstrated its firm commitment to 
emission reductions in having already imposed some of the limits set by the Protocol 
on New Zealand businesses and infrastructure. It has also engaged in the newly 
created system of 'carbon trading' of "carbon credits", developed by the European 
Union, chiefly through government investment in "clean energy" projects such as the 
creation of an immense wind-farm on the hills surrounding Palmerston North, and 
the expansion of hydroelectric dams in the South Island (Patman, 2005; Devine, 
2005). In administering undertakings such as these, however, the Government has 
also been criticized by New Zealanders. This is particular the case on the part of 
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rural South Islanders who have accused the Government of destroying South Island 
waterways in their headlong pursuit to enhance New Zealand 's "clean, green image" 
and play the "virtuous international citizen" (Devine, 2005). As they have argued , the 
country's power needs would be better met through building a nuclear power station 
in Auckland rather than "squeezing the last drop of hydro capacity out of South 
Island creeks" (Devine, 2005) - a suggestion which is destined to fall on deaf ears in 
nuclear-free New Zealand. Indeed, as one of the few APEC countries committed to 
the emission reduction targets set out under the Protocol the Government continues 
to expound its strong commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and to promote the cause, 
as it has at the 2007 APEC summit in Sydney, even indicating that it is "highly likely" 
that New Zealand's commitment to the Protocol will extend beyond 2012 regardless 
of the actions of Australia and the United States (Watkins, 2007b) . 
3) Iraq 
Finally, the issue of Iraq's disarmament culminating in the Iraq war of 2003 was 
another international matter which revealed a flagrant difference of view between 
these two Antipodean neighbours. The global crisis over Iraq arose out of a need for 
the world community to deal once and for all with Iraq and achieve its full and final 
disarmament in light of that country's twelve-year history of disdain , non-cooperation 
and non-compliance with multiple UNSC resolutions regarding it under the 
leadership of the renowned dictator Saddam Hussein . Exactly one year after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks that shocked the world and gave rise to the global war against 
terrorism, the United States placed the matter of Iraq in the international spotlight 
and onto the UN agenda through an address to the UN General Assembly delivered 
on 12 September 2002. In this memorable speech President Bush named Saddam's 
regime a "grave and gathering danger" to international peace and security 
('President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly', 2002) and called for 
decisive measures by the international community, and the UN specifically , to 
immediately and finally address what America considered to be a dangerous 
scenario in such an uncertain and turbulent time in modern history. The call would 
ultimately lead to a full-scale war the following year. Though Saddam Hussein's 
regime was rapidly and successfully overthrown, no WMDs have been located. 
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Prior to the war, that was eventually conducted by a concert of nations outside the 
sanction of the UN in March 2003, all nations - with the exception of Iraq itself -
believed the country to be in possession of substantial undeclared WMD stockpiles. 
The central question, therefore, was not whether Iraq was in breach of the 
resolutions concerning it, some of which formed part of the cease-fire agreement 
ending hostilities at the close of the 1991 Gulf War, but rather when, by what method 
and by whose authority the international community should bring Iraq to account and 
achieve its complete compliance. It was upon the discovery that there existed sharp 
disagreement and division on these three questions within the international 
community that the matter of Iraq's disarmament quickly unravelled into a full-scale 
international crisis, with clear divisions visible not only within the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) itself - the heart of the UN organisation - but also within the entire 
international community at large. The heated debate would rage for seven months, 
reaching its zenith just prior to war being commenced against Iraq by the US-led 
Coalition of nations. 
Throughout the crisis Australia was unequivocal in its support for the US 
Administration led by President Bush and shared the American point of view on the 
serious threat Iraq posed to the world , especially in the context of the global War on 
Terror post-9/11 . In the months of intense international debate over the matter, the 
Australian Government worked tirelessly with the US and the UK to explain the 
compelling case for Iraq's disarmament, and then ultimately for war against 
Saddam's regime, motivated by the hope that in doing so it would not only gain 
international understanding of the Australian and American positions and their 
reasons for taking it, but also win international support and participation should any 
future action against Iraq become necessary. Finally on 20 March 2003 Australia 
joined with the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain in a "Coalition of the 
Willing" to wage war against Saddam Hussein's regime and finally disarm Iraq of all 
its illegal weapons with the support of an assortment of 44 nations of the world , yet 
without explicit UN sanction . Not only were relations between Australia and the 
United States greatly strengthened and enhanced as a result , but in 2004 the 
country was also seemingly 'rewarded' with a valuable Australian-US Free Trade 
Agreement. To date Australia continues to maintain a presence in Iraq with a 
warship stationed in the Gulf along with a number of Air Force craft on site, and 
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approximately 1 ,400 personnel in Iraq including a task force of 550 in the south of 
the nation and a small security detachment based in Baghdad (Ansley, 2007). 
By contrast, though New Zealand supported the ultimate objective of disarming Iraq, 
it stood with the opponents of an Iraq war in emphasizing a diplomatic solution to the 
crisis and in refusing to participate in any military action against Iraq undertaken 
without unanimous UN Security Council authorization. Indeed, in remaining firmly 
committed to the multilateral process and the United Nations system, the New 
Zealand Government did not join the Coalition of the Willing and engage in hostilities 
against Iraq, instead expressing the view that any unsanctioned military attack 
against Iraq would undermine international law and "play into the hands of terrorist 
groups like ai-Qaeda" (Patman, 2005, p. 60). Though New Zealand was 
subsequently excluded from a free trade agreement with the United States in the 
years afterwards, raising concerns within New Zealand that the Clark Government is 
paying "an economic price for failing to fully recognise the link between defence and 
trade" (Patman, 2005, p. 62), the Government has advocated that its ability to take 
an independent and strongly multilateralist position on key international issues like 
the Iraq invasion "should not be traded for hypothetical economic or political benefits" 
(Patman, 2005, p. 58, 62). Iraq has remained an issue of contention within New 
Zealand's own political circles in the years since the war too. Not only has it been 
the cause of heated arguments between the Government and the Opposition in 
parliament, but it has also exposed acute differences of view between the Foreign 
Minister Winston Peters and the Minister of Defence Phil Goff of the Labour-NZ First 
Coalition Government, not to mention fissures between Peters and the Prime 
Minister herself ('Pullout from Iraq would create chaos- Peters', 2007). 
These overt differences in perspective over Iraq have remained a constant dividing 
factor in trans-Tasman relations in the years since. In a context of continuing 
difficulties within Iraq in the creation of its first democratic system of government as 
well as on-going sectarian violence, while PM Clark has contended that "the invasion 
of Iraq has made the world less safe from terrorism" (Houlahan , 2006b) , Howard 
continues to express the view that "Iraq is an active battleground in the 'war on 
terrorism"' (cited in 'Australian role deepens despite shooting fiasco', 2006). Indeed 
the Australian Government firmly believes that the disturbing media images so 
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frequently haunting news television programmes "offer a distorted picture of the 
historic change occurring in Iraq" during Iraq's first chance at democracy in not 
accurately reflecting the real progress being made there. Indeed , the Government 
continues to advocate its deeply-held belief that Iraq's transition from dictatorship to 
democracy "will be one of the most significant global strategic developments this 
decade" ('Iraq -the path ahead', 2006). 
Furthermore, Howard has praised the 1500 ADF personnel currently working in Iraq, 
calling them Australia's "finest internationalists" (Walters, 2007; 'Nelson backs 
Howard's letter to Iraq', 2007), and has indicated that Australia , like its ally the United 
States, "will not be hostage to a particular timetable" but will withdraw its troops from 
Iraq only "when the job has been finished" ('Australian role deepens despite shooting 
fiasco', 2006). In fact even in light of Britain's significant withdrawal from Basra in 
recent weeks, the Government has announced that it remains committed to Iraq, that 
the Australian Government will continue to judge its deployment in Iraq on a "day-by-
day, month-by-month , year-by-year" basis, and that as long as its forces are required 
the ADF will continue to play a role in Iraq as Austral ia will not desert the Americans 
in their time of need (Ansley, 2007). By contrast New Zealand has maintained a 
policy of 'non-involvement' since its initial contributions to post-conflict rehabilitation 
in 2003. 
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Introduction to Iraq Case Study : Chapters 3-5 
In Chapter Two it was shown how New Zealand and Australia have become 
increasingly divergent in their foreign and security policies, with significant 
differences in outlook and approach evident on a wide range of issues in the 
international sphere. Indeed, for all the two countries commonalities in history, 
heritage, culture, language and political development, there are nevertheless, as 
McElhattan states, "surprising differences between us" (McElhattan, 2006). As Mike 
Moore asserts: "New Zealand and Australia, for so long on similar political paths, 
seem to be going their separate ways. Australia is becomjng more like the United 
' r ' t""\ 
States and New Zealand more like Canada and a bjt Nordic"y(Moore, 2005) . Indeed, 
journalist Greg Ansley sums up the growing trans-Tasman divide in these words: 
Australia's growing sense of identity with Asia and the pursuit of much 
larger trade and diplomatic partners have lowered New Zealand on the 
nation's horizon. Since the mid-1980s, New Zealand's path has been 
very different, pursuing small-power diplomacy, and developing a new 
internationalism that eschews military alliances and questions Australian 
perceptions, while developing Australia as our major partner (Ansley, 
2001 ). 
Or as the Editor of the Sunday Star Times , Rod Oram, has concluded on the key 
differences between the Tasman pair: 
Our foreign policy is independent and multilateral through the likes of the 
UN, WTO and APEC. Theirs is bilateral and closely tied to the US. We 
seek relationships with Asia-Pacific countries. They try to impose 
leadership on the region (cited in Hawke, 2004d). 
Indeed, over the past few years a number of crucial differences between the Tasman 
neighbours have been highlighted by various academics and political commentators 
within New Zealand. While Colin James has noted that our demographics as well 
as strategic and trade priorities are diverging (James, 2005a; James, 2005b), Emmet 
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McElhattan and David McCraw have emphasized the two countries different ways of 
looking at the world (McElhattan , 2006; McCraw, 2006a). Moreover, speaking in 
reference to the fact that "New Zealand and Australia have been on different security 
tracks for some time", as PM Clark has remarked (cited in Mclean, 2003, p. 281}, 
Greg Ayson has pointed to "significant elements of difference in the perspectives and 
approaches adopted by the two countries" on matters of security (Ayson , 2004, p. 4). 
However, there is one major overarching divide in particular, between New Zealand 
and Australia's general approach to security and foreign affairs, that seems to be 
especially predominant on the radar of political analysts. This relates to the 
difference in emphasis between the Antipodean lands on alliances or 
internationalism as the way forward in the twenty-first century world . For example, in 
addition to being "profoundly divergent" in its approach to its alliance with the United 
States and by extension to the entire security context in Asia and the Pacific 
(Mclean , 2001 a) , Australia continues to emphasise the intrinsic value of alliances in 
its foreign and security affairs. Through developing strong defence relationships with 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, improving dialogue with Russia , India and 
South Korea, and building good relations with its largest and nearest neighbour 
Indonesia, Australia has shown its commitment to the logic of alliances and remains 
"determined to engage with whoever it needs to in order to look after Australian 
interests" (McElhattan, 2006) . New Zealand, meanwhile, has taken a significant step 
away from a strategy of alliances - and the United States - and instead looks to 
diplomacy and collective security organizations such as the United Nations, thereby 
becoming the Pacific's first major 'internationalist'. In fact McCraw has gone one 
step further arguing that while Australia endorses a 'collective security' approach to 
its international affairs, along which paradigm like-minded countries work together to 
defend themselves against an aggressor or potential aggressors, New Zealand has 
since 1999 moved away from such traditional means of ensuring security, adopting 
instead a 'common security' approach in its international relations. This approach 
emphasises extensive multilateral engagement within the international community , 
including with potential adversaries, by promoting dialogue and confidence-building 
measures to foster cooperation and thereby work towards the security of all 
(McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). 
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In sum it seems, just as Mclean concluded, that though similar in many ways New 
Zealand and Australia are in actuality two separate and different South Pacific 
countries (Mclean, 2001 a) . 
Three Fundamental Differences: 
Multilateralism, the Use of Force & the US Alliance 
In investigating this reoccurring pattern of difference between the Tasman 
neighbours in recent times, there appears to the author to be three fundamental 
areas of difference in particular between the two countries which , as key underlying 
factors, could well be said to be the driving forces in the growing divide between New 
Zealand and Australia in their foreign affairs. These essential areas of difference 
concern : the Tasman pair's disparate views of, and approaches towards, 
multilateralism; the use of force; and their respective relationship with the United 
States. Indeed, it seems that much like the Pacific plates beneath the two lands, that 
over time have thrust up and compelled a different shape and form to the two 
Antipodean landscapes, these fundamental differences have likewise over the years 
played an instrumental role in the formation of divergent foreign and security policies 
on either side of the Tasman. 
In the interest of investigating further these major areas of difference in the Trans-
Tasman relationship, these three areas of fundamental difference between New 
Zealand and Australia - multilateralism, the use of force and relations with 
Washington - will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. This will be 
done in two ways: firstly , through a case study examining New Zealand and 
Australia's stance on a great international issue of the day, each nation's position on 
these three areas will be explored as they have been articulated by the Clark and 
Howard Governments respectively in the course of their speeches; and secondly, by 
demonstrating the motivating force of the two nations' rhetoric in these three areas 
by providing supporting evidence for these beliefs from a wider array of material 
available on the two nations' International Relations. Through this two-step process 
it will be shown how these expressed beliefs have translated into tangible foreign 
and security policies in the international sphere. 
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Case Study: New Zealand, Australia & Iraq 
The chosen issue for this case study, on which New Zealand and Australia's 
differences in multilateralism, the use of force, and their relations with the United 
States as expressed in their rhetoric are to be explored, will be that of the "Iraq crisis" 
which provoked an international upheaval in 2002-2003. 
The issue of Iraq's disarmament was both extremely divisive and illuminating of the 
international community - revealing in startling contrast the many subtle, long-held 
differences of perspective, approach and attitude between nations of the 
international community concerning certain aspects of international affairs. As such 
the Iraq Crisis is particularly relevant to this study into Australia and New Zealand's 
relationship and their key differences, that likewise have been so often overlooked or 
overshadowed in the hustle and bustle of world affairs. Indeed, Iraq has become the 
most flammable issue of contention between the Tasman neighbours in the past two 
decades, a fact clearly demonstrated in the way that 600 New Zealanders protested 
Australia 's pledge of commitment to the war outside parliament during one of 
Howard's visit to New Zealand in early 2003 (Watkins, 2007a). Not since New 
Zealand's imposition of the nuclear ship-ban in 1984-85 has there been such a stark 
division between New Zealand and Australia in their foreign and security policy as 
came to light in the two countries' respective stance on the 2003 Iraq War. In fact , 
the momentous import and impact of this crucial difference of outlook and action 
between Australia and New Zealand on an international issue is comparable in 
significance to the historical import of New Zealand's decision during the Second 
World War to acquiesce to the British request to keep its troops stationed on the 
British front line in Europe, while Australia instead recalled its soldiers to the Pacific 
theatre of war in order to face the Japanese threat in concert with the US. Both 
decisions signify large and real differences in loyalties and outlook within the two 
policy-making circles of either nation, and both mark a turning point in each nations 
choice of direction in the complex world of international relations, with both countries 
signalling their willingness to travel down two very disparate paths in world affairs. 
In fact , the issue of Iraq is one that is especially enlightening with respect to the key 
areas of differentiation between New Zealand and Australia , argued here to be 
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crucial factors in the widening divide between New Zealand and Australia in their 
foreign affairs. This is because each nation 's attitude or stance towards 
multilateralism, use of force , and the United States necessarily came together to 
become factors in each nation's assessment and positioning on the matter of Iraq's 
disarmament. Consequently the views of the New Zealand and Australian 
Governments on these three subject areas are expressed in a clear, compelling and 
revealing way in their many Iraq speeches. Indeed, perhaps it is the combination of 
all three of these matters, already areas of strong disparity between the Tasman 
neighbours, when combined with the complexities of the Iraq issue itself, that has 
fuelled the fire of discord between New Zealand and Australia over the issue in 
recent times, causing the Iraq War to become a heated bone of contention between 
the Antipodean nations and causing relations between the two to sour more in 2003 
than in any other year in the last two decades. It is of particular importance to 
mention here, however, that in discussing New Zealand and Australia's disparate 
positions on the matter of Iraq's disarmament, this case study's intent is to employ 
the two Tasman Government's speeches as vehicles to better understand the two 
countries' differences in these areas, rather than make the case either for or against 
the Iraq War. 
Case Study Aim 
In undertaking this research , the aim of this case study was twofold : first , to 
investigate and reveal in finer detail how specifically New Zealand and Australia are 
different in their viewpoints and approach to the issues of multilateralism, the use of 
force, and their relations with the US ; secondly, to illustrate how these subtle though 
marked differences were instrumental in contributing to the two nations' opposing 
positions on the Iraq War. It is hoped that by combining this kind of information with 
evidence from other sources of political and academic material on New Zealand and 
Australia's behaviour in foreign affairs, it will be demonstrated that, just as these 
three differences have been fundamental in contributing to the widely disparate 
positions taken by New Zealand and Australia on this most important issue of our 
day, it is indeed also these three subject areas - multilateralism, use of force and 
US relations - that are of crucial import in the Tasman 'drift' and the widening 




The methodology of this case study is as follows: 
Resources 
The resources examined were written texts in the form of speech transcripts , 
ministerial statements, and records of press conferences that were specifically 
related to the Iraq Crisis of 2002-2003. Only the speeches delivered by the Prime 
Ministers and Foreign Ministers of either country were examined, namely those by 
PM John Howard and Alexander Downer in Australia , and PM Helen Clark and Phil 
Goff in New Zealand . 
Method of Selection 
The resources were selected by going to the official websites of the said four 
politicians, www.pm.gov.au and www.foreignminister.gov.au for Howard and Downer 
respectively , and www.beehive.govt.nz for both New Zealand politicians, and 
obtaining all materials that appeared on the basis of a website search under the 
keyword "Iraq". 
Time Span 
The case study speeches were then selected on the basis of whether or not they 
were given within the specific time period of September 2002 - May 2003. This 
time period was selected because it was over these months most especially that the 
debate over Iraq's disarmament were most intense and evoked the most material 
from national governments, the crisis beginning as it did in September and 
continuing right through to May 2003 when the war was considered to have ended 
and the cessation of hostilities in Iraq was declared. Additionally, the speeches 
delivered during this time period focus predominantly on the logic and justifications 
for the two nations decisions either to support or oppose the war, thereby providing 
the greatest clarity and insight into what exactly the beliefs of each national 
Government are on the matter, whereas post-June 2003 the subject of discussion 
changes noticeably to matters of post-conflict reconstruction , the implementation of 
an Iraqi democratic government and of course the rise of sectarian violence. 
56 
Method of Examination 
The method of research was to apply discourse analysis to the text of the speeches, 
taking especial note of all passages, taken from anywhere within the body of the 
speech , where the subjects of multilateralism, the use of force or each nation's 
relationship or attitude towards the United States were mentioned, discussed, 
described, or referred to. In this way, it was hoped that by examination of a series of 
New Zealand and Australian Iraq speeches, a fuller picture of each nation's true 
perspectives on these issues might be painted and the beliefs they hold on these 
subject-areas more deeply explored . 
Findings: Note to Reader 
It is of some importance to note here that during the course of the case study it was 
found that the Australian speeches on Iraq far exceeded in both length and range of 
content those given by New Zealand officials on the same issue during the same 
period of time. For instance, though New Zealand was found to have given 15 
speeches on Iraq between the period of September 2002 - May 2003, compared 
with 12 speeches given by Australia within the same time period, the average length 
of a New Zealand speech on Iraq was a mere 2 pages, while Australia's Iraq 
speeches had an average of 7 pages. Indeed, whereas the entire sample of New 
Zealand speeches during the given time period only ranged from 1-5 pages, in 
comparison the entire sample of Australia 's speeches over the same time period had 
page lengths that ranged from 2-11 pages. In fact both PM Howard and Alexander 
Downer were found to have delivered two speeches each of 10-11 pages in length 
during this time. Moreover, owing to the difference in length of the speeches, 
stemming from either different stances on the Iraq issue or perhaps the different 
purpose of each Government's discourse, the Australian speeches had a tendency 
also to be broader in scope canvassing a much wider array of subjects related to the 
Iraq issue than did the New Zealand speeches. As a result , speeches made by the 
New Zealand Government tended to be rather scanty and narrowly-focused by 
contrast. 
This has meant that in the writing process and compilation of the information found in 
the speeches on New Zealand and Australia's three fundamental differences in 
International Relations, there is a greater length and breadth to explore in the 
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Australian discourse, and therefore more to discover about Australia's stance and 
perspectives on the three matters, than is possible in reference to New Zealand . 
Consequently, though a semblance of equality in explanations and descriptions of 
the two nations positions has been attempted, on some subjects the Australian point 
of view can be described in a much fuller and detailed way. Thus to a significant 
degree, the brevity of New Zealand's speeches, when contrasted with the sheer 
abundance of material provided by Australia in their speeches on the matter, has 
itself become a hindrance to a comprehensive understanding of the psyche and 
perspectives of the New Zealand Government on Iraq, and by extension, on these 
three areas of major difference with Australia - multilateralism, the use of force, and 
relations with the United States of America. 
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Chapter Three: 
Fundamental Difference 1: Multilateralism 
Since the end of the Cold War multilateralism in international affairs has increasingly 
become the preferred and predominant form of diplomacy in the international arena. 
Indeed, as a multi-party, multi-issue, multi-role and multi-value form of diplomacy, 
flexible and adaptable to the challenges of a complex and globalizing world in a way 
traditional state-to-state bilateralism can never be, multilateralism is now widely 
considered to be the best and most appropriate means of managing interactions 
between states, forming coalitions, resolving conflicts and reaching international 
consensus in the world of today (Aviel , 1999, p. 11-12). As an internationalist 
approach to international affairs, multilateralism is predominantly employed in the 
international arena whether within international organizations, of both governmental 
and non-governmental stripe, or at international conferences or summit meetings 
(Sullivan, 1999, p. 202). 
The New Zealand Perspective 
On examination of the New Zealand speeches delivered by either Prime Minister 
Helen Clark or Foreign Minister Phil Goff during the months preceding and 
immediately following the Iraq war, there are five particular themes regarding 
multilateralism and the country's position concerning it that are repeatedly and 
strongly articulated by the New Zealand government. 
1. New Zealand's Commitment to Multilateralism 
First, between 19 February - 26 March when the international debate over the Iraq 
issue was at its most intense stage of discussion and argument, New Zealand made 
clear on no less than five separate occasions its firm belief in multilateralism and its 
total commitment to the process in its own foreign policy. This is shown, for instance, 
by Gaffs statements that "our position is based on our strong support for 
multilateralism" (Goff, 2003 [2]), that "New Zealand remains committed to finding 
multilateral solutions to problems" (Goff, 2003 [4]) , and finally that "New Zealand 
remains a firm believer in the multilateral system" (Goff, 2003 [5]) . Likewise, the 
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Prime Minister reiterates the same view in her speeches during the same period, 
stating that "New Zealand has rather clear views about multilateralism ... and using 
those processes to the utmost that it can" (Clark, 2003 [1]) and that "New Zealand's 
position on this crisis has at all times been based on its strong support for 
multilateralism and the rule of law" (Clark, 2003 [2]) . 
These expressed beliefs can easily be seen in the New Zealand Government's 
approach and conduct of its foreign policy too. Indeed, since the rise to power of the 
Labour-led governments from 1999 onwards, the belief in and emphasis on 
multilateralism has been a central pillar in New Zealand's foreign and security 
policies along with ~n equal commitment to the rule of law and respect for the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) (Goff, 2002; Goff, 2005). Accordingly, New Zealand has 
invested much time and energy into developing multilateral cooperation in the 
international sphere, motivated by the belief that multilateralism is not only the best 
and most pragmatic means by which countries can collectively determine their 
futures and formulate regional/global responses to regional/global problems, but also 
a most important vehicle for ensuring the rules-based system New Zealand believes 
should govern conduct between nations (Goff, 2005; Goff, 2006b). As Goff has 
stated: "Through our multilateral diplomacy we seek security, prosperity and the 
preservation of freedom, for ourselves and others" (Goff, 2005) . Indeed, New 
Zealand considers itself to be "one of th~ most_£ommi!ted suppo_rteJ..s of the 
multilateral s stem" in the worldJ o.day (Clark, 2004), a fact e~ide !:Jced in_ the_ way that 
New Zealand has Q_ecome one of the most outspoken ~dvgc_(!t~s _pf -~~ ltila!~T?tl 
initiatives in the international community, for instance on the Kyoto Protocol and the 
crea!ion of the lnterna~onal Cri112inal Court (ICC) (Patman, 2005). Additionally, the 
way that this emphasis on multilateralism has translated to New Zealand's behaviour 
in the international sphere can be seen in its staunch support of a wide array of 
multilateral institutions, ranging from the UN - the multilateral organisation which 
features most prominently in this regard - APEC or ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific, to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) , to 
international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Goff, 2006b). 
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2. Multilateralism the Only Legitimate Means of Addressing World Problems 
Second, the Iraq speeches provide an explanation for New Zealand's strong 
commitment to multilateralism- namely, that from the Government's perspective it is 
multilateralism alone that is the most legitimate and successful means of addressing 
problems in the international sphere as well as resolving international disputes. In 
short, it is multilateralism that is the best force for good in the world . This belief 
stems from the view that multilateral processes allow international problems, many of 
which have the power to affect many nations in an ever-globalising world , to similarly 
be dealt with by many nations together in a collective fashion . Goff makes these two 
points apparent on several occasions in speeches given between 15 September 
2002 and 12 May 2003, stating that "it is essential that we renew our commitment to 
multilateralism as the best way to address global problems" (Goff, 2002 [1]) , that 
New Zealand's position on Iraq was "a principled position founded in the conviction 
that world order is best secured through peaceful , multilateral action" (Goff, 2003 
[1 0]), and that progress on the level of international participation in the multilateral 
process "will contribute to the goal of a more secure, just and harmonious world" 
(Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . Indeed, according to Goff the United Nations itself has proven that 
"collective action can save lives and help rebuild nations" (Goff, 2002 [1]) . Since the 
Government believes moreover that "in today's globalising world , no member state, 
no matter how powerful it is , can disengage from multilateralism entirely" (Goff, 2003 
[5]) , from New Zealand's point of view it is the duty of every nation in the 
international sphere to engage with each other in a collective way to guarantee world 
peace and security. Indeed, from the Government's perspective the Iraq war 
demonstrates the failure of nations to come together collectively in pursuit of an 
agreed goal of Iraqi disarmament and thus "represents a failure to resolve an 
international problem through multilateral channels" (Goff, 2003 [5]) . 
These beliefs have likewise translated into action too in the international sphere. 
New Zealand's approach to "striving for the global human good" is to not only 
advocate multilateral channels as "the only legitimate means by which to achieve 
long-standing solutions to global problems" (Goff, 2006; Peters, 2006f) , but also to 
engage heavily with the United Nations organization. Indeed, the New Zealand 
Government has gone so far as to name the UN "our hope for the future" (Goff, 
2003b) as "vital" for peace, security and progress in the world (Goff, 2005; Oliver, 
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2006), and "the greatest force for good in the modern world" (McElhattan, 2006). As 
a consequence of endorsing and embracing the UN in such a way, however, New 
Zealand has tended to have a rather optimistic, even idealistic, view of the UN 
organization and its role in world affairs, even displaying a tendency to blame UN 
failures on great power politics rather than on flaws within the organisation itself 
(McElhattan , 2006). This can be seen most noticeably in New Zealand's behaviour 
and apprehensive pronouncements on the matter of UN reform, where in considering 
the matter to have been pushed onto the UN agenda solely by the Western great 
powers, New Zealand was initially very guarded and slow to overcome its 
reservations on the matter, and even today repeatedly places the responsibility on 
the great powers for the results of such changes, calling on them to ensure that the 
improvements work (Peters, 2006e; Peters, 2006f). 
3. Multilateralism Sole Basis for Authority & Legitimate Action 
The third theme in the New Zealand discourse on Iraq concerning the subject of 
multilateralism relates to the notion that actions taken by states in the international 
sphere are only legitimate when they are taken on a multilateral basis and 
sanctioned by the UN. As to the former, emphasis on multilateralism as the basis for 
authority with great attention and adherence given in parallel to international law, can 
be seen in PM Clark's statements in March that any participation by New Zealand in 
the realms of reconstruction or humanitarian assistance following military conflict in 
Iraq would only occur "within the umbrella of the multilateral system" (Clark, 2003 
[3]), in accordance with its "strong support for multilateralism and the rule of law" 
(Clark, 2003 [2]) . As to the latter, moreover, New Zealand's strong insistence on the 
centrality of the UN in authorizing all international action corresponds with its 
considered view that a UN resolution embodies "the collective instruction which 
should have the unanimous endorsement of all member countries" (Goff, 2002 [1]) -
even where states disagree with the UN's judgement - due to the Government's 
equally strong desire for "upholding the authority of the Security Council" (Clark, 
2003 [2]) . Indeed, New Zealand's speeches on the Iraq crisis reveal the country's 
absolute refusal to participate in any international action which does not originate 
from a multilateral source or abide within the boundaries of international law, and 
most especially, which is not undertaken in accordance with a specific mandate 
authorized by a collective security organization - the UN and clear sanction of the 
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UNSC being uppermost in this respect. In fact even with regard to the question of 
New Zealand involvement in post-conflict reconstruction in a post-war Iraq, the 
Government refuses to contribute to such an operation outside of a 'multilateral 
umbrella' with a UN resolution at is centre authorizing "the international community 
as a whole to assist in the rebuilding process" (Goff, 2003 [9]; Goff, 2003 [1 0]) , so as 
"to clear the way for New Zealand and a wide range of other countries to make 
further contributions across areas such as humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction" (Goff, 2003 [9] ; Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
Indeed, as a consequence of this commitment to the principle of multilateralism-plus-
authorization, the New Zealand Government refuses to participate in any unilateral 
action itself, and condemns those other states that do, no-matter the reason or 
provocation . This is because from the Government's point of view, any action 
undertaken by either an individual country or a group of like-minded nations on any 
matter within the international sphere without authorization by the UN above all , or at 
least by another collective security body such as NATO, constitutes a direct 
challenge to international law and international security. Indeed, such is the extent 
of New Zealand's belief in the multilateral process and its conviction that 
multilateralism works best in international relations, that unilateralism has become 
very much a dirty word in New Zealand's political circles, and a dangerous one at 
that. As Goff twice pointed out on behalf of the Government in the weeks leading up 
to the Iraq war, "the process for enforcing resolution 1441 however must be 
multilateral , involving a clear UN mandate. We are opposed to unilateral action" 
(Goff, 2003 [1] ; Goff, 2003 [4]) . This means that while the New Zealand Government 
fully understood "the frustration, impatience, and outrage felt by the United States, 
Britain, and Australia at Iraq's slowness to comply and resistance to complying with 
UN resolutions" (Clark, 2003 [2]) and similarly shared the same objective of 
disarming Iraq (Clark, 2003 [2]) , New Zealand refused to sanction any action taken 
by one or more of these states on a unilateral basis, or in other words, without 
explicit UNSC sanction. As Clark expressed on the m~_~.:_r.:_N~w Zealand was 
divided from its traditional allies over opposing "views on how to proc~ed" (Clark, 
- -- - -- --- --· --. ____ .,.--
2003 [2]) , namely, the Coalition's decision to by-pass the UN and act on their own 
sovereign authority. In fact the Government considered this action not only abhorrent 
- in that it appeared to be a clear case of unilateralism - but also "illegal" in having 
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been undertaken without a specific sanction for military action from the UNSC. So 
severe is the New Zealand Government's conception of the evils of unilateralism that 
Clark called the Coalition's military invasion of Saddam's Iraq "a matter of profound 
regret to us" (Clark, 2003 [2]) , since from the Government's viewpoint , the Iraq war 
could have been avoided had the US and the UK stayed within the multilateral 
framework (Goff, 2003 [1 ]) . 
4. Multilateralism Essential for Maintaining Global Order & Securing World 
Peace 
The fourth revelation from New Zealand's Iraq speeches on the nation's approach to 
world affairs generally, and multilateralism specifically, concerns the notion of global 
order and how best to maintain it. For New Zealand the easy and obvious answer to 
such a question is to support the centrality of the UN in world affairs. As Goff stated 
in reference to 1945 and the founding of the UN , for instance, when nations of the 
world came together "in the belief that collective action was necessary to guarantee 
global peace" and to "protect humanity against such threats" (Goff, 2002 [1 ]) , such 
as those that had sparked the Second World War conflagration in international 
politics: 
Today in the second year of the new millennium the need to act 
multilaterally is greater than ever before. Terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction , environmental degradation, people smuggling , drug-
trafficking , diseases such as HIV/Aids and the unsustainable depletion 
of our natural resources , are all global problems which require a 
collective response (Goff, 2002 [1]) . 
In point of fact, as one of the foremost multilateral organizations in the world today, 
New Zealand has been a strong supporter of the UN since its creation and remains 
today a nation "heavily committed" both to the idea of the United Nations and to the 
sentiments of the UN 's founding documents of "saving succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war" (McElhattan, 2006). Indeed, as the current Minister of Foreign 
Affairs , Winston Peters, recently declared, the Government "remains unwavering in 
its support for the United Nations" in the belief that "the world would be substantially 
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worse off without the United Nations" (Peters, 2006f). Additionally, it considers itself 
to be "a country that engages with the United Nations with no hidden agenda" 
(Peters, 2006a) . Expressions of commitment to the UN such as these have not 
surprisingly been mirrored in the country's foreign policy record , with New Zealand 
being a signatory party to all the major UN treaties, ratifying nearly every key 
convention passed by the UN, as well as an active and influential lobbyist for issues 
relating to human rights, self-determination, disarmament issues and environmental 
concerns, and a significant contributor to multiple UN peacekeeping operations and 
aid programmes - even being one of the few members to faithfully pay its 
membership fees on time (Patman, 2005, p. 58). In fact, New Zealand's 
commitment to the UN has been so great and extensive in past years that the nation 
was recently praised by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, as "a model 
member of the United Nations" (Goff, 2002). 
According to Robert Patman, this dedication to the UN, so prominently displayed by 
New Zealand in its International Relations, can be attributed to the nation's view of 
the kind of global order evolving today. New Zealand seems to believe that 
globalization is reinforcing the multilateral system, and above all the role of the UN in 
the international order as "the embodiment of the multilateral process" (Patman, 
2005, p. 58). It consequently rejects the realist contention of influence-through-
power and instead, considering the need for multilateral institutions to be "as great 
as ever'' (Peters, 2006f) , regards greater participation in global forums to be the best 
way of managing the forces of globalization and curb its negative aspects while also 
accessing its benefits (Patman, 2005, p. 58; Goff, 2005). As Goff has stated on the 
matter: "Countries need to realise that to secure their national interests they must act 
multilaterally" (Goff, 2003b). 
5. Multilateralism Key for Small States like New Zealand 
Fifth and finally, it seems that multilateralism's preponderance in New Zealand 
diplomacy is inherently related to the nation's comparative size and status on the 
international stage. This is because as a small - some would say tiny - nation on 
the world stage, historically prone to being either overlooked or recruited into Great 
Power political struggles, New Zealand finds both political and psychological security 
in numbers and consensus. As Goff stressed repeatedly in the run-up to the war, 
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"New Zealand is a small country" (Goff, 2003 [1 ]; Goff, 2003 [4]). For this main 
reason, and since "it remains true that New Zealand and any state can achieve far 
less in isolation than it can working collectively with other states under UN auspices" 
(Goff, 2003 [5]), New Zealand "recognises the need for the rule of law internationally" 
(Goff, 2003 [1 ]; Goff, 2003 [4]) and "remains a firm believer in the multilateral 
system" (Goff, 2003 [5]). 
As a consequence of this belief New Zealand pursues multilateral engagement and 
relies on the global rule of law in preference to the logic of alliances in its 
international affairs (Patman, 2005; O'Brien , 2005). Indeed, as a small state without 
hard power, New Zealand considers itself to gain advantages through engaging 
multilaterally, as well as a sense of psychological security, that would not otherwise 
be available elsewhere. As Goff has said: "We have a strong belief in 
multilateralism, which allows small countries like New Zealand to have a say in 
regional and world affairs" (Goff, 2002): 
Effective multilateralism matters for hard-edged reasons of self-interest. 
As a smaller player on the international stage, our economic and physical 
security depends on a properly functioning system of collective security, 
the international rule of law and dispute settlement (Goff, 2005). 
Additionally, however, this connection made between New Zealand's small size and 
multilateral diplomacy can be attributed to the nation's view of globalization and the 
idea that globalization is creating a more level playing field for small states like New 
Zealand (Patman, 2005). Consequently, in viewing globalization as a force enabling 
small states to "punch above their weight" in international affairs, and tending 
towards the perspective that a 'balance of interest' rather than a 'balance of power' 
approach is increasingly the way of the future in global politics (Patman, 2005), New 
Zealand has opted to engage extensively in multilateral forums and initiatives. 
However, New Zealand's heavy reliance and devotion to the multilateral process 
could additionally be attributed to the fact that as a geographically-isolated nation 
located at a distance from the wider world , multilateralism guarantees New Zealand's 
access and involvement in international affairs in a way that traditional politics never 
could. 
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The Australian Perspective 
The Australian speeches on Iraq during the same time period reveal quite different 
ideas about multilateralism in international affairs. On the one hand, the Australian 
Government expresses the same desire as New Zealand, that the multilateral 
process be employed in addressing the Iraq crisis , and likewise reiterates the 
hopeful wish that such an endeavour through the UN will succeed in achieving Iraq's 
compliance to UN resolutions and that country's complete and final disarmament of 
WMDs. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the speeches reveal a marked if subtle 
variance in Australia's viewpoint and approach to multilateralism, both generally and 
in regard to collective security organizations in particular. As in the New Zealand 
speeches, there are five main themes in the Australian speeches on this subject. 
1 . Multilateralism where Useful 
Firstly, in contrast to the many statements made in New Zealand's speeches 
regarding its strong belief and unshakeable commitment to multilateralism, the 
Australian speeches are conspicuous in the total absence of such emphatic 
declarations. Nowhere in the speeches given between 28 January 2002 - 14 May 
2003, delivered by either Australian Prime Minister John Howard or his Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer, is such a general belief in multilateralism itself asserted . 
Rather, an alternate theme regarding the Australian view of multilateralism is 
frequently alluded to in the Iraq speeches, namely, that the Australian Government 
is strongly supportive of the multilateral process when related to specific issues or 
areas of pressing importance to international security, and subsequently to 
Australia 's own national security since the nation considers the two to be intrinsically 
linked. Among the speeches, these issues of primarily concern in which multilateral 
action is emphasized include the War on Terrorism, the non-proliferation campaign 
against the spread of WMDs, and arms control regimes. 
Just as in New Zealand, this belief concerning multilateralism has translated into 
tangible Australian behaviour on the international stage and the fostering of an 
alternative form of diplomacy as the primary means of interrelating with other 
countries in the international sphere. In terms of the idea of multilateralism only on 
important 'high politics' issues, for instance, though the nation also interacts 
multilaterally in the international sphere on 'low politics' issues concerning the 
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promotion of human rights and protection of the environment - or in fact wherever 
maximize leverage can be obtained when acting in concert with other nations in 
areas of shared interests and agendas (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. x) -
Australia engages most readily in multilateralism wherever it faces matters of key 
concern , i.e. in the areas of security and trade which are central to Australia's 
ultimate foreign , trade and security policy aim of 'advancing the security and 
prosperity of the Australian nation' ('Foreign and Trade Policy', 2006). 
In the realm of security, for example, Australia has been a strong supporter of 
multilateral engagement on key issues such as non-proliferation, addressing 
transnational threats, the campaign to enforce a global ban on anti-personnel 
landmines (in which Australia has played a leading role) , and most predominantly 
and importantly today, in combating terrorism such as through working multilaterally 
with other concerned nations to freeze the finances and restrict the movement of 
terrorist groups (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. xi) . Likewise, in terms of 
trade, Australia regularly employs multilateral diplomacy in order to assist the trade 
liberalization process and secure improved access to Australian goods and services 
overseas, motivated it seems by the belief that the multilateral trade system is the 
best way to ensure a level playing field so that Australia may trade on an equal 
footing in the global sphere ('Foreign and Trade Policy', 2006; Calvert, 2000). As 
Ashton Calvert, the Secretary of the Australian DFAT, has stated in past years: "We 
believe that the multilateral system offers the greatest benefits for a medium-sized 
economy with diverse exports to a wide range of markets" (Calvert, 2000). As a 
consequence, Australia is active today in a range of multilateral institutions on the 
international stage which address these issues -the UN, ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), APEC, the WTO and many others in which New Zealand also takes part. 
Indeed, Australia is a member of sixteen multilateral issue groups in these areas, of 
which New Zealand also has membership, with the addition of several others in 
which New Zealand does not participate.23 
21 Australia and New Zealand are members of the Cairns Group, Friends of Fish, \Xforld Wine Trade 
Group, Australia Group, C\NZ, JUSC\NZ, 1\Iargineers Group, l\lissile Technology Control Regime, 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, \X!assenaar "-\rrangement, Biosafet:y Commmlity Exporters Group, Umbrella 
Group, Valdivia Group, \X!hale Protection Group, Consular Colloyue and Five Nations Conference . 
Australia is moreover a member of the Geneva Group concerning U reform ,and the Zangger 
Committee concerning the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons through tightening export 
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However, as to the question of Australia's preferred means of diplomacy more 
generally, it is in fact bilateral diplomacy, not multilateralism, that is Australia's 
"diplomatic instrument of choice" (Kelton , 2006, p. 232) and which is considered 'the 
bedrock' and first priority of the nation's international engagement (Advancing the 
National Interest, 2003). As the 2005 Australian White Paper states: 
Bilateral relations are fundamental , including for multilateral 
cooperation ... Australia depends on the strength of its bilateral relations 
around the world to advance its national interests. The greater part of 
the day-to-day work of Australia's foreign and trade policy is bilateral 
advocacy (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 7). 
Indeed, so preponderant is bilateralism in Australia's approach to International 
Relations, that even in the areas of security and trade where multilateralism is 
employed most readily, there is a greater emphasis on bilateral ties and agreements 
as the over-arching diplomatic strategy rather than multilateral engagement, which 
seems to rank as a kind of back-up network working to reinforce Australia's pre-
existing bilateral arrangements. In terms of security, for instance, Australia's bilateral 
ties with important security partners like the US, Japan and Indonesia are perceived 
to be of greater importance than general multilateral regional arrangements (Kelton , 
2006, p. 232). Likewise in the area of global trade, Australia has long been active in 
pursuing bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to underwrite multilateral ones 
such as the 2003 SAFT A with Singapore, 2004 TAFT A with Thailand and more 
famously the 2004 AUSFTA with the United States24 ('Foreign and Trade policy, 
2006) , a course of action taken in the belief that FTAs can bring gains "more quickly 
and more extensively" than those available through multilateral channels -including 
the WTO - and that bilateral trade initiative help "to set benchmarks" for multilateral 
negotiations anyway (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. xiv, 49; Calvert, 
2000). 
controls on sensitive nuclear items ('Australia's Global Diplomacy', Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 
150-153). 
2~ "-\ustralia is also still in tht: midst of nt:gotiations for the ftrst prt:ferential trade;: dt:al with the so-called 
'economic powerhouse' the People's Republic of China - in compt:tition with New Zealand - as well as in 
bilatt:ral neo:gotiations with Japan to form a supplementary arrangemt:nt to that already anaint:d under tht: 
ASEAN Free Trade Area regional agreement (AFTA) (Kelton, 2005; 'Foreign and trade policy', 2006;) 
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2. Multilateral Solutions Preferred 
Secondly, whereas the New Zealand Government continually reasserts the 
multilateral process as the only legitimate means of solving the Iraq problem, and the 
UN especially as the collective body through which the matter of Iraq must be 
addressed, the Australian speeches show that the Australian Government is much 
less fixed on this point. Instead of such a declaration, the Australian statements 
merely announce, on the one hand, the Government's strong preference that the 
issue be resolved in a multilateral way, with the backing and authorization of the 
UNSC, and on the other hand, express the desire that the UN be given at least 'a 
chance' to come up with a decisive solution to Iraq's non-compliance. The former 
can be seen in Howard and Downer's statements that "we want the [multilateral] 
process to work" (Howard , 2003 [1]) and "we have supported a leading role for the 
United Nations in addressing this threat" (Howard, 2003 [2]) . In the same way the 
latter is illustrated in the Australian Government's assertions that "we should give the 
United Nations process an opportunity of working" [Emphasis added] (Howard, 2003 
[1]) , that "this matter should be worked through to the maximum extent feasible by 
the United Nations ... to the maximum degree possible" [Emphasis added] (Howard, 
2003 [1 ]) , and "I want the United Nations process to be given a go" [Emphasis 
added] (Howard, 2003 [1]) . 
This strong preference for UN involvement in world issues can be seen in the way 
that Australia "strongly supports the efforts of the United Nations to promote 
multilateral cooperation in core areas" (Australia in Brief, 2003), not only in the 
arenas of international peace and security , but also in the development of 
international legal instruments and norms, the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
and the protection of the environment and sustainable development. Indeed, while 
the UN is not considered the 'golden panacea', able to dealing effectively with all 
global problems and evils of the twenty-first century, the Australian Government 
nevertheless continues to regard the institution as "the most important framework the 
world has to achieve a secure and peaceful world" (Howard , 2003 [5]). In fact, 
Australia's strong commitment to the UN can be seen in the nation's record of large 
and regular peacekeeping deployments under the auspices of the organization since 
1947, during which time Austral ia has participated in UN peacekeeping missions all 
over the world. For instance, Australia has over the decades taken part in 
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peacekeeping deployments in Indonesia, Zimbabwe, the Middle East, Iran, Namibia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon 
Islands and East Timor among others (Australia in Brief, 2003, p. 30) . Indeed, as 
Howard points out, Australia 's support and commitment to the UN is demonstrated 
today in the fact that Australia presently has 1,200 ADF personnel serving in UN 
peacekeeping operations around the globe (Howard, 2003 [5]) . 
However, the Australian view that the UN does not work quite as one would wish, 
can likewise be seen in Australia's efforts to address the many issues thought to 
compromise and hinder the efficacy of the UN system, for instance in addressing its 
outdated Cold War structure which provides disproportionate representation within 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) -the heart of the organization , its unrepresentative 
electoral groups which biases the election of member-states to important UN bodies 
including the UNSC, and its failure to cope with problems of collective security from 
the time of the Vietnam War and ensure the security of all the members of the 
collective - its purpose for existing (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 24-25). 
Indeed, Australia has set in motion an Australian government UN treaty body review, 
and become a member of the Geneva Group promoting UN management and fiscal 
reform in order to strengthen the UN treaty body system and bring about the "radical 
and fundamental change" needed to ensure a "more focused and efficient UN 
system" (Calvert, 2000; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 151 ; Hawke, 
2004a). 
3. Multilateralism Sometimes Beneficial. But Often Fails 
The third area of disparity between New Zealand and Australia concerns the 
Australian Government's view that the multilateral process ought to be used not 
necessarily because it is the best or most legitimate means of resolving international 
disputes or problems, or indeed the most appropriate or legitimate 'force for good' in 
the world , but because there are often merits or advantages in doing so in pursuit of 
a desired goal. As Howard stated in reference to his conversations with US 
President George W. Bush in the months prior to the war, "I then argued to him the 
merits of working through the United Nations. That has been the steady theme of a 
strong diplomatic effort by Australia, ably led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs" 
[Emphasis added] (Howard , 2003 [2]) . 
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In fact , though encased in subtle language, it seems a striking feature of the 
Australian discourse that while recourse to multilateral methods is considered both 
desirable and beneficial in dealing with international problems, nevertheless, owing 
to the inherent problems involved in trying to formulate a collective response and 
achieve consensus among nations of a wide variety of backgrounds, values, 
outlooks and religions , there exists the potential and realistic possibility that the 
process will fail completely, either through the said lack of consensus or lack of 
political will to sustain the process. Indeed, in stark contrast to assumptions 
regularly made in the wider world to the effect that the Antipodean pair share the 
same worldview owing to their close physical proximity (O'Brien , 2005), New 
Zealand and Australia in actuality display major differences in their outlook on the 
world. As Terence O'Brien has stated: "Neighbours, allies and friends can indeed 
disagree quite profoundly about the big value-laden issues of peace and justice in 
the world . New Zealand and Australia are no exception, as their differences over 
non-nuclear policy also demonstrate" (O'Brien, 2005). This could be said to be true 
particularly towards the UN, which while useful, is not considered by Australia to be 
the primary force for good in the world today, as New Zealand advocates. Indeed, 
whereas New Zealand considers the UN multilateral system to be "our hope for the 
future" (Goff, 2003b) and "the greatest force for good in the modern world" 
(McElhattan , 2006), Australia sees movements towards a more active UN as still 
only a trend and seems to hold to the view that the UN is "not the definitive force for 
good in the world" (McElhattan, 2006). As McElhattan states: "Both nations 
fundamentally agree on the universal rights of man, they just do not necessarily 
agree on the right ways and means of achieving them" (McElhattan , 2006). 
Primarily , this Australian perspective owes much to the belief that the multilateral 
process often fails , or as the 2005 Australian White Paper Advancing the National 
Interest phrases it, "multilateral regimes do not always work" (Advancing the National 
Interest, 2003, p. 44) . This being so, it is self-evident to Australia that the UN itself 
will likewise fail to deliver from time to time as had been the case in past decades. 
Indeed, it is exactly this point Downer attempts to underline during one particular 
speech delivered in February, in which he draws attention to the many instances in 
which the international community and the UN as an organization has failed to 
address critical global problems multilaterally in a collective way. As he states: 
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We allowed the slaughter of one million people in Rwanda - the 
international community did not intervene until it was too late. We 
allowed slaughter in Bosnia and again , the international community did 
not intervene until it was too late. We allowed President Milosevic to 
murder Kosovars until the US-led coalition of the willing put a stop to it 
(Downer, 2003 [1]) . 
Indeed, the UN's inefficiency and ineffectiveness in dealing with collective security 
crises in history is amply demonstrated in its failures over Vietnam, the Indo-Pakistan 
wars , the Soviet invasions of Afghanistan and Cambodia, the Iran/Iraq wars , Rwanda 
and the former Yugoslavia (i.e. Kosovo) in addition to Iraq (Anderson , 1998; 
Advancing the National Interest, 2003). In fact , the matter of UN failure and Iraq has 
itself become a sticking point between the Tasman neighbours. For though New 
Zealand and several other countries do not consider the UN's inability to secure a 
further resolution authorizing force against Iraq to be a failure by the UN to perform, 
from the Australian Government's point of view and that of its supporters, the UN's 
refusal to authorize the explicit measures previously implied in Resolution 1441 
amounted to nothing less than a complete failure, and a clear demonstration of the 
organization's inability to function as it was intended to at times of great crisis. This 
being the case, it follows from the Australian standpoint that it is neither logical nor 
plausible for multilateralism to be thought of by Australia or the international 
community more generally as the only means of resolving world disputes, or the only 
legitimate one at that. It seems that, like the United States, which having been the 
supreme architect of the multilateral system in the 201h century has subsequently 
become "disenchanted" by its own creation (O'Brien , 2005) , Australia has developed 
"a more cynical attitude" towards the internationalist approach and holds a more 
negative assessment of the feasible perimeters of multilateralism in international 
affairs (McElhattan , 2006). 
4. Multilateralism Not Sole Basis of Authority 
The fourth theme in the Australian discourse on Iraq regarding its position on 
multilateralism concerns the idea of multilateralism and authority. It is not the 
Australian Government's view that all actions taken by states on the international 
stage must proceed from a multilateral body or be sanctioned by the UN in order to 
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be appropriate or legitimate. Inherently this belief is linked to the Australian 
conviction that multilateralism- and specifically the UN -often fails. 
In situations where the multilateral process does fail , the Australian Government 
considers it to be in the interests of national and global security that Australia and 
other concerned nations act to right the balance and perform where the UN or other 
collective security bodies can not through lack of political will or consensus among its 
members. This is especially true where the issue is regarded as being of utmost 
importance for maintaining global security, as was the Australian view on Iraq when 
prior to the war the intelligence community gave its consensus that the rogue regime 
possessed illegal WMD stockpiles. In fearing that Saddam might pass this 
technology and weapons on to international terrorist groups to use against America 
and the Western democracies - Osama Bin Laden's AI Qaeda network and its 
affiliates being of chief concern among them - Australia believed it was the duty of 
concerned nations to act against such a threat, regardless of the UNSC's ultimate 
verdict on the matter. In fact this belief was hinted at early on in the debate by 
Downer when he said that while "it remains our aim to work with our friends and 
allies, through the UN Security Council , for such an [peaceful] outcome", 
nevertheless "we have a responsibility to deal with the facts , and the facts speak for 
themselves" (Downer, 2003 [2]). Later on , following the events of early March when 
UNSC member France voiced its determination to veto any further resolution 
authorizing force against Iraq "no matter the circumstances" ('France, Russia 
threaten war veto', 2003, March 1 0) , the point was expressed more clearly by 
Downer on 18 March 2003 in a speech to the Australian parliament which was 
effectively a declaration of war. At that time Downer affirmed that the veto: 
denied the Security Council any further role in the disarming of Iraq -
but it did not deny, and it could not deny, the clear and immediate threat 
posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction to global security. And it 
can not deny responsible members of the international community the 
legal capacity to act together to protect international peace and security, 
and to enforce existing Security Council resolutions (Downer, 2003 [3]) . 
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Or as Howard argued early on in the international crisis, in reaching its final decision 
the Australian Government would be influenced not only by its WMD proliferation 
concerns and its US alliance, but "also importantly by the past practice of nations 
which have taken collective military action in the interests of world or regional 
security" (Howard , 2003 [2]) . 
Indeed, the very concept of multilateralism itself is understood differently by the 
Tasman neighbours. From the Australian vantage point, multilateral actions may 
consist of those undertaken under authorization by a collective security organization 
like NATO or the UN, as New Zealand likewise asserts. However, they may 
additionally also involve operations executed and legitimized by a 'concert of 
nations', comprised of a good number of like-minded sovereign nations that, being in 
agreement on a certain principle, cooperate with each other and act together to 
achieve a mutually agreed objective or outcome. Thus in working together with the 
US, the UK, Spain , Poland and Denmark, with the support of a further forty-four 
nations from every geographical region in the world (Statements of Support', 2003; 
Rice, 2003)25 , including several from Australia's own home region of the Asia-Pacific 
- the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, Thailand and East Timor (Downer, 
2003 [3]) , Australia considered the invasion of Saddam's Iraq to be both a legitimate 
and a multilateral war. As Downer states, "I can say to you that we are not alone, 
either in our concern or in our preparedness, ultimately, to act if necessary. The 
international community - not just one or two countries - is serious about his 
compliance with UN resolutions" (Downer, 2003 [1 ]) , and more emphatically on 
March 18, two days before the war against Iraq commenced : 
It is also wrong to say that Australia is one of only very few countries 
prepared to assist in the forceful disarmament of Iraq. The fact is that a 
broad international coalition will assist to this end. It is expected that 
tens of countries will join this coalition for the immediate disarmament of 
25 As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice states on the official website of the \Xlh.ite House: "Nearly 50 
nations are committed to ridding Saddam Hussein's regime of all irs deadly, destructive and illegal 
weapons. To pur this in perspective, the combined population of coalition countries is approximately 1.23 
billion people, with a combined gross domestic product of approximately 522 trillion. These countries are 
from every continent on the globe, representing every major race, religion, and ethnicity in the world. 
Diverse as this coalition is, each member shares a common goal. \Ve seek nothing less than safety for our 
people. 1\Iany members have sufftred from terror themselves; all understand the awful price of terrorism 
and the potentially catastrophic danger from weapons of mass destruction" (Rice, 2003). 
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Iraq [to do for the UN what it could not achieve itseiW (Downer, 2003 
[3]) . 
Indeed, this disparity of understanding on what is meant by the term 'multilateralism' 
can also explain such statements as those made in reference to criticisms about 
America acting 'unilaterally' with the help of Australia , where Downer states that "to 
those who accuse us of backing US unilateralism, I would say that in Europe last 
week I worked to extend the coalition of concerned countries" (Downer, 2003 [1 ]) , 
and Howard's argument that "the United States has also been falsely accused of 
acting unilaterally and thus in contemptuous disregard for the role of the United 
Nations" (Howard , 2003 [2]) . 
This Australian willingness to act outside the UN to safeguard national and global 
security also raises another matter in relation to multilateralism. From the Australian 
perspective, when forced to act in situations where the multilateral process or the UN 
itself has malfunctioned, Australia does not view such an undertaking to contravene 
international law, unlike New Zealand . This is because the nations involved are 
regarded as acting on behalf of the failed institution in order to both enforce member 
nations compliance to the resolutions passed by that institution , as well as restore 
the legitimacy and status of the collective body itself. This point is illustrated most 
emphatically in Howard's March 2003 speeches in his declaration that, though 
should military action become necessary "Australia's strong preference is that it 
takes place pursuant to a new Security Council resolution" (Howard, 2003 [2]) , such 
a wish "is not because Australia believes, as a matter of international law, that a new 
resolution is required" (Howard, 2003 [2]) . Or more explicitly, upon embarking with 
the US and Britain in the overthrow of Saddam's regime, Howard's statement that in 
taking this option "Australia and the other members of the coalition are therefore still 
acting under the authority of the United Nations Security Council resolutions [and 
thus within international law]" (Howard , 2003 [5]). 
5. Role of Multilateral Institutions in the Global Order Determined by Efficacy 
Finally, the fifth theme in the Australian discourse regarding Australia's beliefs about 
multilateralism concerns the idea of global order and the way that failure by 
multilateral bodies, such as the considered failure of the UN over Iraq, essentially 
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corrode not only the organizations' authority and respectability, but also their role as 
enforcers of global order and central actors in the international system. In particular 
this relates to the way that the UN's performance in international affairs is critical to 
its perceived role, authority and purpose on the world stage. As Downer stated on 
this point in relation to Iraq : "If the Security Council is unable to assert its own 
authority, then that will be detrimental to the prospects for Iraqi disarmament. 
Moreover, it also will have a long lasting and negative impact on the standing of the 
Security Council itself' (Downer, 2003 [2]). Or as both Howard and Downer warned 
prior to the war, "if the United Nations doesn't match its responsibilities it will do itself 
a grievous injury and will I think leave a legacy of a more precarious world" (Howard , 
2003 [1 ]) , and "this is not just an issue about Iraq - it is about our future. It is about 
whether the international community's will as expressed through the Security 
Council , amounts to any more than words" (Downer, 2003 [3]) . 
Indeed, from the Australian viewpoint, collective security organizations are only 
considered to preserve their vested authority when they function effectively and fulfill 
the purpose for which they were created . In this sense, failure amounts to not only 
an erosion of its authority and a possible sidelining or reduction of its role in world 
affairs, but also to a diminished position and status on the world stage . Evidence of 
this belief can be found scattered throughout Howard and Downer's speeches on 
Iraq. Consider, for example, Howard's statements following what he regarded as a 
damning Blix Report that "if the United Nations is to retain its authority it has to 
match by deeds the rhetoric of its own resolutions. You can't pass a resolution like 
1441 and when it gets a bit difficult walk away from it without damaging your 
credibility" (Howard, 2003 [1]) , or his assertion that the members of the UNSC "now 
have a responsibility to match the rhetoric of that resolution with action. If they don't 
do that, then they will deliver an enormous blow to the authority and the prestige of 
the United Nations" (Howard, 2003 [1]) - "excessive delay or indifference, risk 
crippling its own authority" (Howard , 2003 [2]) . Or indeed the Government's 
additional warnings that failure to take action would be "a humiliation of the United 
Nations" (Downer, 2003 [2]) , that would "undermine the concept of collective 
security, and years of efforts through the UN Security Council to disarm Iraq" 
(Downer, 2003 [2]) , and which would "also make a mockery of the support for the 
United Nations, in particular those [other nations] who regard it as the only 
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legitimate vehicle for achieving and maintaining peace and stability" (Downer, 2003 
[2]) . As Downer states, "If they do not - or cannot - act to ensure compliance with 
Resolution 1441 , they will damage not only the trust the international community 
places in them, but also the very institution they serve" (Downer, 2003 [1]) . 
Australia's view of the UN following the Iraq war is an apt illustration of this belief. In 
considering the UN to have failed to deal effectively and finally with Iraq's non-
compliance and achieve that country's disarmament, Australia considered the UN to 
have relegated itself a smaller, less powerful role in world affairs through inefficacy. 
In the months following the war this can be clearly seen in the way that the 
Government was "deeply disappointed" that the UNSC was "unable to maintain a 
unity of purpose on the issue of Iraq" (Howard , 2003 [5]) and "extremely 
disappointed that the Security Council has been unable to demonstrate the 
necessary resolve to confront Iraq's continued defiance of the United Nations" 
(Howard, 2003 [5]) . Or additionally, in a diminished belief, that was shared among 
the Coalition partners, in the UN's ability to play a realistically powerful role in Iraq's 
reconstruction , other than endowing a sense of legitimacy to those other nations who 
equate international law with that institution's passed resolutions. As the Australian 
Government expressed on the matter in May: "The Security Council will need to act 
much more constructively than it has to date if the United Nations is to have any 
meaningful role in rehabilitating Iraq" (Howard, 2003 [6]) . From the Australian point of 
view, their deepest misgivings and apprehensions regarding the multilateral process 
and collective security through the UN had been shown to be correct and rightly 
founded . 
Additionally, with regard to global order, this retreat from emphasizing only the role of 
multilateral institutions in the world can be explained by the fact that Australia 
generally tends to hold the view anyway that the pivotal forces shaping the world 
today are globalization and the primacy of the US in a 'balance of power' unipolar 
world , rather than the UN or multilateral institutions as New Zealand contends 
(O'Brien, 2005; Patman, 2005). Consequently, since world order and globalization 
are considered to be centred on the United States, as the sole superpower in the 
world today, close relations with Washington are esteemed to be of greater 
consideration in Australia's foreign affairs that just multilateral institutions, and a 
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more effective means by which Australia can harness the benefits of globalization 
(Patman, 2005, p. 59). 
Moreover, Australia's large size and the perception of its "middle-power" status in 
world affairs has relegated a smaller role for multilateral institutions in Australia's 
outlook on International Relations. This is primarily because large size insulates the 
country from feeling a need to operate predominantly in a multilateral way and does 
not promote the notion of close UN ingratiation being fundamental to either national 
security or the attainment of its national interests on the world stage. This has 
meant that Australia not only does not reap the same sense of psychological security 
from engaging in the multilateral process as New Zealand does, but that it also tends 
to put more weight on the 'balance of power' realist paradigm and the logic of 
powerful alliances (Patman, 2005, p. 50). 
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Chapter Four: 
Fundamental Difference 2: The Use of Force 
The Iraq speeches are even more revealing as regards a somewhat more 
controversial issue in International Relations - the use of military force in resolving 
international disputes or problems. Due to the rise of terrorism since 9/11 , as well as 
to the inherent complexity of the post-Cold War world with its 'incessant challenges 
to statecraft' , the use of force has become more prevalent as a political tool in the 
twenty-first century world (Grant, 2005). In the Gulf War, the chaos of fragmenting 
Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan and most recently in Iraq, the incidences where force has 
been employed by one of more states against another have increased noticeably 
since the end of the Cold War (Grant, 2005), even as paradoxically multilateralism 
and non-traditional forms of conflict and approaches to security have become more 
widespread . 
In the Pacific Ocean , New Zealand and Australia seem to have developed quite 
disparate attitudes towards the use of force in international affairs today. The Clark 
government has adopted an idealistic and internationalist approach to force, stating 
that "military force is not the method of choice" for New Zealand since force involves 
"difficult political and moral judgements" (Defence Policy Framework, 2000, cited in 
McElhattan, 2006). By contrast, the Howard Administration in Australia has opted for 
a realpolitik approach in the realist tradition indicating in its Defence 2000 White 
Paper that as "armed force will remain a key factor in international affairs", 
Australia's task is to prepare the ADF to engage in future conflicts and to decisively 
apply military force wherever international constraints prove ineffective, whether 
these conflicts arise from traditional inter-state or non-traditional non-state sources 
(McElhattan, 2006). 
There are five themes in both the New Zealand and Australian speeches that appear 
on this subject, which explicitly relate to the use of force as a political tool and the 
conditions under which each nation considers such action to be justified . These will 
be discussed in the following . In addition, the Governments of both nations each 
80 
express their own particular views of war itself in the speeches, and since their 
different approaches to the idea are related to the matter of force in global politics 
generally, each nations' perspective of and experiences with war will also be touched 
on where relevant. 
The New Zealand Perspective 
1. Preference for Diplomacy. Aversion to Force 
The first theme to appear in the New Zealand discourse regarding the use of force 
concerns the Government's strong preference for diplomatic solutions to 
international problems and its deep-rooted aversion to the implementation of force in 
international affairs. From the New Zealand point of view, peaceful methods of 
conflict resolution should be given as much time and room as possible, that the 
diplomatic process might run its course to the furthest extent realistically attainable. 
Certainly, this was New Zealand's definite preference on the issue of Iraq's 
disarmament. As both Goff and Clark emphasized during the Iraq crisis , "the New 
Zealand Government has a very strong preference for a diplomatic solution to this 
crisis" (Goff, 2003 [2]) , "we place considerable weight on the inspection and 
disarmament process" (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, 
March 18). Indeed, throughout the speeches the New Zealand Government 
repeatedly urged the Security Council and all its members "that the diplomatic 
process be allowed to run its course" (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 
12; Clark, 2003, March 18). In fact New Zealand's belief that diplomatic options be 
given full reign in disarming Saddam's regime is so fervent, when combined with the 
view that "while many questions remain to be answered, real progress is also being 
made" by the weapons inspectors (Goff, 2003 [3]) , that time and again New Zealand 
insists the inspectors work be allowed to continue, for "as long as their work is 
useful" (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, March 18). 
Goff indicates that this position was arrived at, not due to a wish to indulge or 
tolerate Iraq's behaviour (Clark, 2003 [1]) , but by: "a dispassionate assessment of 
whether progress could continue to be made by means other than war" (Goff, 2003 
[4]) ; a real desire that "the catastrophe of war" (Goff, 2003 [3]) not be visited on Iraq's 
people; and a firm conviction that "all alternative avenues of achieving Iraqi 
disarmament should be exhausted before war is considered" (Goff, 2003 [4]) . Not 
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surprisingly then, as a consequence of such a stance, the news that diplomatic 
options had been discarded in favour of force by the Coalition was received by New 
Zealand with "deep" and "profound regret" (Clark, 2003, March 18; Clark, 2003, 
March 20). 
This aversion to war and the use of force in international affairs can be seen not only 
in New Zealand's rhetoric but also in its behaviour in its foreign affairs. Though 
avowing it is not a pacifist nation, the New Zealand Government has displayed a 
deep conviction that war is a tragic waste of human life and seems singularly 
unwilling to commit NZDF personnel to theatres of conflict where military war-fighting 
capabilities will be required . Indeed, since 1999 the New Zealand Government has 
shown a clear preference for the 'softer' military option of participating only in 
multinational peacekeeping and peace support activities under the auspices of 
NATO, the EU or most especially the UN, in accordance with its key foreign policy 
and defence objective of contributing to "global security and peacekeeping through 
participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support, 
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations" ('Peacekeeping - Overview', 
2007). Yet, as noticeably apparent here, New Zealand's commitments tend towards 
low-level missions like after-the-fact or post-conflict reconstruction operations such 
as those presently being undertaken by New Zealand in East Timor, Afghanistan and 
Tonga, as opposed to more combative high-level peace-making operations as those 
that took place initially in both Bosnia and Afghanistan .26 In so doing , New Zealand 
considers itself to be not only supporting the role of the UN in maintaining peace and 
security, but also providing "practical expression" of its commitment to multilateralism 
(Goff, 2002 ; 'Peacekeeping -Overview', 2007). Today New Zealand is the 22"d 
largest contributor of peacekeeping forces to the UN with 751 NZDF personnel 
presently in operation on 18 missions worldwide, which span 13 different countries 
across the globe27 (Tour of Duty', 2006; Goff, 2002; 'Peacekeeping- New Zealand's 
Contributions to Peace Support Operations', 2007). 
21
' The sole exception being the deployment of three rotations of S:\S personnel to :\fghanistan in 2002 , 
2004 and 2005 which were actively engaged against the :\ fghan Tale ban resistance in support of 
'Operation Enduring Freedom' (OEF) against terrorism led by the United States (Burton, 2005c; 'New 
Zealand and the Campaign against Terrorism', 2007) . 
27 In fact, as a smaU nation New Zealand has a remarkable international record of contributing to fifty 
peacekeeping operations in support of coUective security since 1991 ('Peacekeeping - Overview', 2007). By 
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2. Repulsion to Force as a Negative Solution to Problems 
This leads in to the second theme in the New Zealand discourse regarding force in 
international affairs - the strongly held view not only that force should be avoided in 
favour of diplomacy, but that the use of force is in itself an undesirable and 
particularly dislikeable and distasteful course of action for the New Zealand 
Government. For while it acknowledges the occasional usefulness of threatened 
force as a tool in global politics, for example in effectively coercing Iraqi cooperation 
with the UNSC as Goff affirms saying "without the threat of military force there would 
not be the degree of compliance with disarmament requirements we have so far 
seen" (Goff, 2003 [4]) , nevertheless in general the Government sees force as a 
negative solution that on the whole can "exacerbate that threat" (Goff, 2002 [1]) and 
which leads to the "loss of innocent lives" (Goff, 2003 [4]) . Consequently, the use of 
force in international affairs is considered to be "very much a last resort ... 
[that] ... should only be contemplated when all other options have failed" (Goff, 2003 
[1 ]) . 
In fact the New Zealand Government's strong repulsion from the idea of military 
force in international affairs is inherently related New Zealand's view and 
experiences of war - a fact made evident in the tension between the two nations 
over the significance of the joint NZ-Australian ANZAC memorial in Canberra in April 
2001 .28 As Patty O'Brien and Bruce Vaughn have pointed out, war leaves its mark 
on nations in an infinite number of ways (O'Brien & Vaughn, 2005, p. 1 0). This is 
particularly apparent in the trans-Tasman relationship: throughout its history 
Australia has venerated their war history and its war heroes, New Zealand has 
instead buried them in a cloak of tragedy and forgotten them. This fact can be seen 
in the way that New Zealand's 'Unknown Warrior' of World War I was not brought 
home for over eight years (finally interned in 2004); that New Zealand's greatest 
Resistance fighter of World War Two, Nancy Wake, remains largely unknown and 
unrecognized; and in the way that many New Zealanders are still unaware of 
the end of the 1990s New Zealand's levd of deployment overseas at 10% of the ZDF was the highest 
since the \'ietnam War (,-\damson, 1999), a figure which has risen greatly in the las t decade . 
28 \XllUle the ,-\ustralians were very clear on the purpose of the memorial as a commemoration of the 
,-\NZ~-\C bonds forged between New Zealand and ,-\ustralia through war, New Zealand refused to see the 
kete flax basket memorial as a war memorial per se and rejected the theme of war as the bond between 
them, staring that "although New Zealand and ,-\ustralia's shared military history should be reflected in 
some way, a memorial which expresses only this dimension of the relationship would be unacceptable" 
(Hunter, 2002, p . 333-334). 
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Passchendaele's place in our national history as New Zealand's bloodiest battle in its 
military history ('Capital at standstill for unknown warrior's final journey', 2004; 
McNaughton & NZPA, 2007; Harper, 2000, p. 10). Indeed, as John Terraine has 
pointed out, while the tragedy of Passchendaele "has evoked more horror and 
loathing than any other battle-name" in the United Kingdom and Canada, in New 
Zealand the disaster is largely an untold story (John Terraine, in Harper, 2000, p. 
1 0) . Indeed, as an editorial of The Dominion Post made clear this year, 'Anzac Day' 
in New Zealand is a day for "somber reflection and remembrance ... that war is a 
murderous affair of loss and unspeakable suffering", or in Colin James' words, "a day 
to commemorate, not celebrate , war" ('A day of reflection ', 2007, 84; James, 2006c). 
For New Zealanders war has become a metaphor for personal and national tragedy, 
devastation, unspeakable suffering and the squandering of life, or as Colin James 
summed up World War 1: "Mud, death, sadism" (James, 2007c). This emphasis on 
the tragedy of war has not surprisingly led New Zealanders to conclude that "war is a 
problem not a solution", and to believe that even when war is absolutely necessary, 
as against Hitler and Imperial Japan in WWII or Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, 
'wars do not make the world better, only defend it from being worse' (James, 2006c). 
Consequently, the lesson drawn from New Zealand's experiences of war is the need 
for international collectivity to prevent war, so that by creating a "just and peaceful" 
world "those who gave their lives did not do so in vain" (Adamson, 1999; Goff, 
2007c). As Winston Peters stated in his address this year at the Anzac Chunuk Bair 
ceremony in Gallipoli : "We should honour their memories by striving for a just and 
peaceful world , where disagreements between nations are settled by diplomacy, 
rather than warfare" (Peters, 2007b). 
3. Force Only as a Last Resort 
The third New Zealand view in regard to the use of force concerns what is in actual 
fact meant by the term 'last resort', which , as cited above, is the only justification 
under which New Zealand will support the use of force to resolve global problems. 
From the New Zealand Government's point of view, a general threat to world peace 
does not constitute a time of 'last resort' (Goff, 2002 [1 ]). 'Last resort' instead 
relates to situations in which firstly , a clear and imminent danger exists in the global 
sphere, and secondly, that danger can not be resolved through peaceful diplomatic 
means. Goff makes this point clear in a statement on March 13, stating that: "The 
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use of force however is very much a last resort. It should only be contemplated when 
all other options have failed , or when the threat faced by the country it is directed 
against is both real and imminent" (Goff, 2003 [4]) . For this reason New Zealand 
judged the situation in Afghanistan following the September 11 terrorist attacks to be 
a time of last resort justifying the use of force , as the Taleban Government had 
refused to act against AI Qaeda when that terrorist organisation had "very clearly 
demonstrated the threat it posed to international security and the lives of innocent 
people targeted by its terrorist attacks" (Goff, 2003 [4]) , meaning that from the New 
Zealand perspective there was "no option to the use of force in the circumstances" 
(Goff, 2003 [4]) . In regard to Iraq, however, New Zealand did not judge the situation 
to represent either a 'real and imminent threat' , nor one that could not be resolved 
diplomatically. As Goff sums up the New Zealand position : 
We were not persuaded the point had been reached that force could be 
justified as a last resort. In our view, the weapons inspection process 
still had some way to go ... And, especially in the absence of clear and 
immediate danger (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
New Zealand's judgement prior to the onset of war, therefore, was that since "we do 
not believe the point has yet been reached where there are no other alternatives" 
(Goff, 2003 [4]) , and "options other than military action are still available to achieve 
disarmament" (Goff, 2003 [4]) , "the threshold for the use of force had not been 
reached" (Clark, 2003 [2]) . The Iraq war was consequently considered to be 
unjustified, from the New Zealand Government's point of view, and this is a judgment 
that remains strongly held by the Government to this day. 
More broadly, this kind of perspective of the use of force being only justified in times 
of extreme last resort can be seen in New Zealand 's stance on force and terrorism. 
While New Zealand has acknowledged the need for force in the campaign against 
terrorism, as demonstrated in its unique triple deployment of NZ SAS personnel to 
Afghanistan to take part in the anti-terrorist campaign there, it nevertheless 
repeatedly emphasizes the point that military force is only "one facet" of countering 
terrorism and stresses international multilateral initiatives as the most important, 
effective and legitimate means for the world to combat terrorism (Goff, 2001 b, p. 12-
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13). In fact under the Labour-Alliance coalition government of 1999-2001 , the 
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Matt Robson , actually declared that 
the Alliance party in the Government Coalition supported patience rather than a 
military campaign against AI Qaeda and the Taleban in Afghanistan following 9/11 , 
stating that "there is no need to take precipitate action" since "Osama bin Laden has 
nowhere to go" (Robson, 2001c, p. 8). Moreover, New Zealand has rejected and 
condemned the new US doctrine of 'pre-emptive first strike'29 in the War on Terror, a 
new international military tactic developed by the Bush Administration in response to 
the 9/11 attacks, as "a new and dangerous precedent" in world affairs (Clark, 2003 
[2]) . This is despite explanations provided by the United States that such a strategy 
is now necessary since "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a 
terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of 
innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most 
potent protection is statelessness" and "we are menaced less by fleets and armies 
than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few" (The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America , 2002, cited in Kegley & Wittkopf, 
2004, p. 51 0) . 
Similarly, it is this attitude that force is not an option of 'last resort' and thus the 
wrong approach to terrorism that led the New Zealand Government to condemn 
Israel (and the terrorist organization Hezbollah) in their resort to force in the six-week 
Israel-Lebanon conflagration in 2006, since in New Zealand's view, Israel's use of 
force in this situation only constituted "extensive breaches of international 
humanitarian and human rights law" in an already volatile region ('New Zealand and 
the Arab/Israel conflict' , 2007) . This preference for a non-forceful approach to 
terrorism can also be seen in New Zealand's attitudes towards the Israel-Palestine 
problem and its condemnation of many of Israel's actions in the past eight years 
2
'J 'Pre-emption' is defined by Kegley & Wittkopf as "a quick first-strike attack that seeks to defeat an 
adversary before it can organize a retaliatory response" (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004, p. 510). First used by 
Israel in response to threats along its border in the 1960s ('Israel Country Brief, 2007), pre-emption was 
adopted by the US, UK and ;\ustralia as a valid military strategy for use against Saddam Hussein in 2003 
on the grounds that !ray, as a state sponsor of terrorism, had to be prevented from transferring weapons 
of mass destruction for use against the United States and because Saddam was considered too irrational 
for deterrence (Kegley & \'\iittkopf, 2004, p. 504) .. -\s the National Security .-\dvisor, Condoleezza Rice, 
summed up the American position: "\Ve do not have the luxury of doing nothing" (cited in Kegley & 
Wittkopf, 2004, p . 504). 
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where it has used force in order to protect itself from sustained terrorist attack and 
territorial incursions ('New Zealand and the Arab/Israel conflict' , 2007). In fact , 
according to New Zealand, slow progress on a 'just, enduring and comprehensive' 
solution to the Arab-Israel conflict is the result of just such a recourse to force and 
violent tactics against each other, a view which has led New Zealand to call on both 
Israel and the PLO to 'renounce violence' in the dispute between them ('New 
Zealand and the Arab/Israel conflict' , 2007) . 30 
4. Force Legitimate Only When Sanctioned by UNSC 
A fourth theme regarding New Zealand's view of force in international affairs 
concerns yet another consideration deemed necessary for the New Zealand 
Government to officially approve the use of force in international affairs. Not only 
must the impending threat be considered one of 'last resort ', as understood 
according to the definition held by the New Zealand Government, but it must 
furthermore be confirmed as such by the UNSC and the use of force subsequently 
authorized in an official resolution prior to the onset of military action. 
Indeed it is this strongly-held view regarding explicit UN authorization for force in 
international relations that can clearly be said to have contributed to New Zealand's 
position on the Iraq crisis and the war that ensued . Since the New Zealand 
Government could not "agree with military action unsupported by a specific United 
Nations mandate" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]} , it did not and could not "support military action 
against Iraq without a mandate from the Security Council" (Goff, 2003, February 19; 
Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, March 18). As Goff stated on the matter: 
If the point comes where it can no longer be progressed because of 
lack of Iraqi cooperation and force has to be considered , we believe that 
a further resolution by the UNSC should be moved to explicitly 
authorise the use of force. A further resolution would most clearly 
'
0 Additionally, the Government does not recot,mise Jerusalem as Israel's capital city - calling Israel's 
possession of Jerusalem 'illegal', considers the Golan Heights and the \~'est Bank to be occupied territory, 
and has opposed the construction of a security wall (' lew Zealand and the Arab/ Israel conflict', 2007). 
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provide the authoritative and sound legal basis for direct action (Goff, 
2003 [1]) . 
As he has stated elsewhere, it is New Zealand's belief in the necessity of UN 
authorization for force to be considered legitimate that "forms the basis of New 
Zealand's strong opposition to any military action - whether unilateral or in concert 
with approving states - taken without UN sanction"31 (Goff, 2006a). It is this 
departure from New Zealand's historical record of war contributions taken in the 
years since 1999 under the Clark governments which can explain why, despite 
having a record of collaboration and participation in every major military conflict 
involving the US, the UK and Australia since the end of the 191h century, the country 
absolutely refused to become involved in the unsanctioned US-led operation to 
overthrow Saddam in Iraq in March 2003. As Winston Peters has explained , "For 
New Zealand , collective action is imperative" and "the principle of collective security 
in world affairs can only be achieved through the UN" (Peters, 2006a). 
In fact, New Zealand's commitment to UN-authorized force is so strong , that even in 
scenarios where New Zealand does not agree that military force is justified in 
addressing any impending threat to world security, as a loyal and faithful member of 
the UN it will nevertheless submit to the decisions and edicts of the UNSC and 
comply with its orders. Goff makes this quite apparent in a speech made on 11 
February where he states: 
It is not acceptable that the procedures of the UN and the rules of 
international law should be observed only when it suits the purposes of, 
or has the agreement of, a particular party. A country , as a citizen , is 
bound by the law, whether they agree with it or not. ... A Security 
Council decision has the force of international law and must be 
complied with (Goff, 2003 [1]) . 
11 Or at the least, if not authorized by the UN, then sanctioned by a collective security organization or 
operation that is in accordance with the principles of the United ations Charter ('.Annual Report 2005', 




Indeed, recognising that "the Security Council must be able to authorize force as a 
last resort to uphold resolutions" (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; 
Clark, 2003, March 18), without which "compliance with its resolutions could not be 
secured, and it could never achieve the purpose for which it was established " (Goff, 
2003 [1] ; Goff, 2003 [4]) , New Zealand has pledged itself to always "uphold the 
Council's decisions" (Goff, 2003 [2]) , whatever is decided. According to Goff, this 
allegiance is based on New Zealand's strong support for multilateralism, the 
international rule of law, and our respect for the authority of the Security Council" 
(Goff, 2003 [2]) , but also comes with New Zealand's strong urging that the members 
of the Council "ensure that all available diplomatic means are used" to pursue 
adherence to UN resolutions (Goff, 2003 [2]) . 
Nevertheless, despite such a commitment to comply with the UN's determinations 
no-matter what the Government's own view may be, New Zealand reserves the right 
to make its own decisions regarding what form of deployment New Zealand's 
commitment will be. Goff makes this definite preference clear, emphasizing in 
reference to its support for UN resolutions that "it is ... up to each individual country as 
to what practical form that support takes" (Goff, 2003 [1]) . Today New Zealand's 
strong preference in any given conflict situation requiring a military solution - unlike in 
past times - is to participate for the most part only through post-conflict 
peacekeeping, rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance activities as opposed to 
traditional war-fighting and peace-making tasks. Goff neatly illustrates this point 
following the Iraq war, articulating that even once UN authorization was obtained for 
supporting military activities in Iraq, New Zealand would only be willing to be 
involved in Iraq through activities that are "likely [to] be confined to medical, 
humanitarian and logistical assistance" (Goff, 2003 [1]) . 
The Australian Perspective 
1. War Undesirable & Abhorrent to Australians- Diplomatic Solutions Preferred 
The first theme to appear in the Australian speeches concerning the use of force in 
International Relations regards the Australian Government's view of war as an 
abhorrent and most undesirable phenomenon of world politics. As Prime Minister 
Howard emphatically states time and again, "armed conflict is a terrible thing" 
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(Howard, 2003, March 14; Howard, 2003, March 18), "If it occurs the agony and the 
deaths of people are many" (Howard, 2003 [4]) , and "the death of innocent people-
especially children - should always shock and sadden us lest we lose our basic 
humanity" (Howard , 2003 [6]). In fact , Howard describes "a common abhorrence of 
war" as "the one thing that unites us all. .. every Australian" (Howard, 2003 [2]) . As 
Australians, he states, "we all hate the very thought of war in any form. Our natural 
instinct is to recoil from it" (Howard, 2003 [2]) . Indeed, later on Downer also cites the 
way that "many Australians - in legitimate, peaceful protest - have voiced their 
concern about a war with Iraq" (Downer, 2003 [2]) to be evidence of this national 
distaste for military conflict. 
It is for this reason that the Australian Government strongly prefers that all 
international problems, including that of Iraq, be resolved peacefully through 
diplomatic channels. Howard makes this point very clear in one speech in particular 
during the Iraq crisis , stating: 
I don't want to see military conflict. I hate the very idea of it. It's an 
abomination. I don't like it one bit. Anybody who thinks that this 
Government is keen to have military conflict has got rocks in their heads 
(Howard, 2003 [1]) . 
Instead, as both Howard and Downer affirm, "the most intense desire of us all is that 
this challenging issue is resolved without war. No one wants war. We all hope it can 
be avoided" (Howard, 2003 [2]) - "The Government shares the desire of Australians 
for a peaceful end to the situation in Iraq" (Downer, 2003 [2]) , "we want Iraq 
disarmed, we'd love to see it occur peacefully" (Howard, 2003 [3]) . Australia's 
inclination to employ multilateral diplomacy most extensively in the realm of security , 
and it's preference for a UN solution to the problem of Iraq are both examples of this 
belief affecting Australia's foreign policy behaviour in international affairs. 
2. Force Sometimes Useful. Can have Positive Effects 
In spite of this strong predilection against the use of force, however, the second 
theme in the Australian discourse is the Australian Government's conviction that 
though unfortunate, oftentimes the application of military force is a useful tool in the 
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complex world of foreign affairs. This argument, as expressed in the Australian 
speeches, can be divided into two main camps or lines of thought: the first pertaining 
to the usefulness of force above all as a means of coercing cooperation from non-
compliant or stubbornly resistant nations of the international community ; and second , 
alternatively as a measure that can alleviate human suffering through ousting 
abusive regimes and setting up democratic humanitarian ones in their stead . In 
short, war can have positive results . 
In regard to the former and Iraq, for example, Howard emphasizes the fact that it 
was through sustained military pressure on Iraq through the build-up of American 
forces in the Gulf that Saddam was coerced to allow the UN weapons inspectors 
back into the country to do their work (Howard, 2003 [1]) . As he attests: 
Kofi Annan has stated publicly that in his opinion if the Americans had 
not applied military pressure through the build-up of forces in the Gulf, 
the weapons inspectors would not now be in Iraq. There can be no 
stronger statement of the diplomatic value of the military deployment. .. . 
Like the Secretary-General , we recognise the value of this strategy 
(Howard, 2003 [2]). 
Hence, in understanding force to be "the only certain way to maintain pressure on 
Iraq" (Howard , 2003 [4]) and that "if those forces were withdrawn any Iraqi co-
operation ... would evaporate immediately" (Howard, 2003 [4]) , the Australian 
Government pre-positioned elements of its own ADF in the Gulf for a second time 
since the Gulf War (Howard , 2003 [2]) . By doing so, Australia believed it could 
reinforce and increase the chances of success for diplomatic efforts (Howard, 2003 
[1]), by adding to the pressure a military presence on the borders of Iraq would bring 
to bear on Saddam Hussein's decision-making (Howard, 2003 [2]) . Indeed, it is 
Australia's deep conviction on the power of force as a coercive agent that evoked the 
Government's strong criticism and accusation against its opponents - Dominique de 
Villepin , Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder in particular - for undermining its 
coercive power in that, while they recognise along with Hans Blix and Kofi Annan 
"the fact that had it not been for the American military build-up, the inspectors would 
not be back in Iraq" (Howard , 2003 [4]) and "that the threat of military action has 
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been the only way to elicit a positive response from Iraq" (Howard , 2003 [5]) , "yet 
they squander the leveraging power of a military force by clearly demonstrating they 
are never prepared to actually use it. This strategy not only is illogical but also 
ignores the practical reality" (Howard , 2003 [5]) . 
As far as the latter humanitarian argument is concerned , moreover, the Australian 
Government avers that force can similarly be useful in removing despicable regimes 
with terrible track records of human rights abuses. As Howard reiterates on the 
subject of Iraq, "the humanitarian arguments do not always hang on one side" 
(Howard, 2003 [4]) , "when you put human suffering into the balance on this issue, 
there is a very powerful case that human suffering in Iraq will , in fact, be greater if 
Saddam Hussein remains in power in that country" (Howard , 2003 [5]). And again , "I 
get a bit tired of the humanitarian argument all being on the one side. It's about time 
that the humanitarian argument was put into a better balance and people understand 
what a monstrous regime we are dealing with" (Howard , 2003 [4]): 
Perhaps it's become unpalatable or unfashionable to be reminded that 
the Iraqi people are oppressed by this current regime. There is no chance 
of normalcy in a nation where torture and rape and genocide and killing 
are standard practice (Howard, 2003 [4]) . 
Indeed, though as Howard determines the Australian government could not "justify 
on its own a military invasion of Iraq to change the regime ... Much in all as I despise 
the regime" (Howard, 2003 [4]) , nevertheless should military action be required to 
achieve Iraq's disarmament, making it "axiomatic that such action will result in the 
removal of Saddam Hussein's regime" (Howard, 2003 [5]), then Australia would give 
its unequivocal support for the removal of the regime. This support would be given 
in the strong belief that there would be "enormous humanitarian cost, not least to the 
people of Iraq, of Saddam Hussein remaining in charge" (Howard , 2003 [4]) and that 
a continuation of the failing policy of containment "would do nothing to relieve the 
suffering of the people of Iraq" (Howard, 2003 [4]) and "do nothing to provide them 
with a more hopeful , happy and peaceful life (Howard, 2003 [4]) . 
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As with New Zealand, Australia's views on the usefulness and potential positivity of 
war can also be linked to Australia's own experiences of war. New Zealand's 
Ambassador to the United States, John Wood , once said that those who know 
warfare best do not celebrate war but rather dwell on "the fundamental springs of 
action : courage; obligation to one's fellows; a sense of duty to country and to the 
beliefs one holds true; endurance and dogged determination to do the best once can 
through the most testing and frightening of trials" (Wood, 2002, p. 27 -28) . This is an 
accurate description of Australia's different perspective on war and its divergent 
attitude towards Anzac Day. Not for Australia is Anzac Day a day of gloom and 
doom, but rather a day of remembrance and gratitude, and a day on which 
Australians assert their love of country and offer their respect to those who have 
answered the call to defend it ('Values of the Anzacs serve Australia still ', 2005, p. 
1 0) . As The Australian newspaper proclaims, Anzac Day "serves a far greater 
purpose" than commemorating the Anzac's badly managed landing in Gallipoli 
during World War 1: "It is a day for us to remember the achievement of Australians on 
active service in Europe and Africa, Asia and the Pacific over 90 years . And it is a 
day to celebrate the values that have endured down the decades and serve us still" 
('Values of the Anzacs serve Australia still', 2005, p. 1 0). Indeed, for Australia war is 
a noble tradition in Australian history in which , through the valiant self-sacrifice for 
others and for their nation , the Australian 'diggers' of all generations have bought 
Australia its security, its freedom and its hopeful confidence in the future - "we are 
young and we are free" (Nelson , 2007). As the Australian historian , Charles Bean, 
states: "ANZAC stood and still stands for reckless valour in a good cause, for 
enterprise, resourcefulness , fidelity , comradeship and endurance that will never 
admit defeat" ('Ancient heritage, modern society', 2006). It is for this inheritance of 
values - courage, mateship, discipline, tenacious commitment and a willingness to 
risk all for the defence of a loved country and people - together with the 
"extraordinary sacrifice" and "heroic deeds" of their war dead , that Australia honours 
and remembers the Anzacs on Anzac Day each year around the world (Howard, 
2007). As for Australia 's lesson from its experience of war, which sharply contrasts 
with that learned by New Zealand , this is best summed up by the Australian Minister 
for Defence, Brendan Nelson, who stated at Anzac Cove this year: "They forged 
values that are ours and make us who we are, reminding us that there are some 
truths by which we live that are worth defending" (Nelson, 2007). 
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No occasion so aptly sums up this great difference in perspective between New 
Zealand and Australia on the subject of war than the 2005 Anzac Day dawn service 
held at Anzac Cove in Gallipol i. As an article in the Dominion Post expressed in 
regard to the vastly different conclusions Australia and New Zealand articulated on 
this occasion: "In thinking about the same shared battle, speaking from the same 
podium, inhabiting neighbouring countries with similar histories, these two countries' 
leaders drew plainly different conclusions" ('Two Different Dreams', 2005). On the 
New Zealand side PM Helen Clark and the Chief of the NZDF, Air Marshal Bruce 
Ferguson , used the occasion to emphasise Gallipoli 's significance as a warning 
against war, as a campaign that demonstrated not only the "folly" of the British High 
Command, under whom the New Zealanders served, but also the "tragedy" of the 
Anzacs sacrifice and the "squandering of life" ('Two Different Dreams', 2005). 
Indeed, according to the Government, New Zealand drew two lessons from the 
conflict: firstly, the importance of a small nation shaking off "the shackles of colonial 
dependence" and asserting its own national sovereignty and independence in its 
foreign and strategic policies; and secondly, the responsibility of New Zealanders, as 
the successors and descendants of the Anzac soldiers, "to work for a world in which 
future generations will not face the horror which these brave men faced with bravery 
and with honour'' ('Two Different Dreams', 2005). In stark contrast, when the 
Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, and his Defence counterpart, General Peter 
Cosgrove, stepped to the podium to commemorate Gallipoli , it was not to convey a 
message of the futility or tragedy of war. Indeed, from the Australian Government's 
perspective, the Anzac's demonstration of courage and sacrifice under tribulation 
had had positive effects for Australia : creating a lasting sense of national identity, 
sharpening "our democratic temper and our questioning eye towards authority", and 
attaining glory not only for themselves but also for Australia ('Two Different Dreams', 
2005) . In the same way, they proclaimed, the great "spirit of Anzac" now works as 
in the past to "ennoble Australia" through the "valour and sacrifice of Australia's 
young men and women who serve their country and fight on in the scrub in the 
Solomon's, in the villages of Timor, in the deserts of Iraq and the coast of Nias" 
('Two Different Dreams', 2005). Indeed, The Australian attacked New Zealand for its 
"sour note" on Anzac Day, especially Ferguson's "bizarre and puerile speech", as 
representing "a great arrogance of ignorance" reflective of New Zealand's opting for 
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"isolation, irrelevance and military irresponsibility" (Sheridan, 2005, p. 11 ). As 
Sheridan states: 
It's a sad commentary on New Zealand that this form of politically 
correct adolescent pouting finds expression at the top of its 
military ... [the cliche] that all war is futile, sounds profound but is really 
very stupid32 . . . the Anzacs did not die in vain , or in an unjust cause or in 
someone else's war. They died to protect Australia [and New Zealand] 
and everything we hold dear (Sheridan , 2005, p. 11 ). 
Perhaps this decidedly pessimistic attitude on the part of New Zealanders about the 
value of war, and the more positive outlook on its merits apparent amongst 
Australians, can be explained by different historical points of reference on the subject 
of war. For while the two nations participated in the same wars from the Boer War 
right through both World Wars to the Korean and Vietnam Wars, their experiences 
were different and came to reflect disparate connotations about war. For instance, 
Australia's more optimistic outlook may come from Australia 's experience of 
successfully battling the Japanese out of its own Pacific backyard in WWII , in 
tandem with the Americans - an experience which has no equal equivalent in New 
Zealand's modern history. Indeed, while the Australians victoriously fought for 
Australian interests on its home turf, New Zealand's 'boys' underwent the trial of 
being enmeshed along the grim and bloody front lines of France and Belgium or 
trapped in the islands and inlets of Greece, all in defence of primarily British 
interests. Perhaps on this subject of war, it is as Mclean so fittingly states - that 
"after a hundred years of federation , the gulfs in political experience are almost as 
wide as the Tasman sea" (Mclean , 2003, p. 245). 
32 As he argues, " If all war is futile, then it was futile to resist Adolf Hitler and we should have let the 
Nazis rule the world ... You might as well say all police work is futile because it's better to convince a 
murderer to act peacefully than to lock him up. And after you've locked him up, there are still other 
murderers, so you haven't solved the problem of murder. But if it's your family that's being murdered, you 
want the police there quick smart. .-\nd if they can save your family by the use of force you quickly cease 
being a pacifist . . .. War is certainly hellish but it is nonsense to say it is always futile" (Sheridan, 2005, p. 
11). 
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3. Force Sometimes Necessary & the Only Effective Option 
The third , and most extensively reoccurring theme of the Australian discourse 
regarding force , centres on the point that force is not only useful in international 
affairs, but also a necessary measure in some situations - even at times constituting 
the best or indeed the only real option for the resolution of grave international 
problems, incorporating as it does an ability to achieve definite and immediate 
objectives and being remarkably effective where diplomacy alone has failed to 
produce the desired result. As Howard has firmly avouched: "Peace-loving peoples 
must sometimes act forcefully if freedom is to be secured" (Howard , 2005). As the 
Australian Government enunciated on the issue of Iraq, "It is easy to say that we 
should disarm Iraq peacefully. But it hasn't happened, despite our best efforts 
[diplomatically] , for 12 years" (Downer, 2003 [2]), "In other words doing nothing 
about Iraq, potentially, is much more costly than using force, if necessary, to 
ensure ... Iraq's disarmament" (Howard , 2003 [4]) . 
This belief in the necessity of war in certain situations has been reflected in 
Australian's past and present actions in the realm of international peace and 
security, whether this be in regard to traditional state-to-state or intrastate conflicts . 
The Australian Government has not only designed its armed forces to possess war-
fighting capabilities but has shown a willingness to deploy the ADF to actual combat 
'peace-making' situations in the global security environment where the use of force is 
specifically required , as well as to the full range of other UN or NATO-sanctioned 
peacekeeping and peace support operations. To illustrate using the ADF's own 
record of participation in global security operations, in addition to traditional 
peacekeeping and peace-monitory activities in Kosovo, Bougainville, the Solomon 
Islands, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, Australia took part in 
combative peace-making activities in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia 
under UNPROFOR in 1992, as well as in the NATO-sanctioned IFOR force in the 
Balkans from 1994-1996, and in the Australian-led INTERFET intervention in East 
Timor beginning in 1999 ('The Australian Defence Force's Involvement in 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Operations 1947- Present' , 2007). 
In terms of terrorism generally, moreover, with regard to terrorism and the Middle 
East conflict, as a self-described "close friend and unapologetic supporter of 
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democratic Israel" (Howard, 2005), Australia has long defended Israel's right to live 
in security and at peace in its troubled region of the world , and "rejects 
unequivocally" the on-going use of terror against it in the form of Palestinian suicide 
bombings (Howard, 2005; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 1 06). Indeed, 
while "supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians, including for a 
Palestinian state" (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 1 06), Australia has 
supported Israel's right to take decisive measures in order to defend itself from all 
terrorists seeking to destabilize the state, including through the use of force and the 
construction of a security barrier along its Palestinian border ('Israel Country Brief , 
2007). In fact Hezbollah has been listed by the Australian Government as a terrorist 
organization since 2003 ('Country Brief Lebanon', 2007). Moreover, in direct contrast 
to New Zealand , in the Australian view failure to form a Palestinian state is blamed , 
not on recourse to force, but on the PLO's rejection of the 2000 Roadmap under 
Vasser Arafat and Hamas' unwillingness to recognise or fulfill conditions laid down 
by Israel and the Quartet -the US, UN, EU and Russia - in their 2002 Roadmap for 
Peace ('Israel Country Brief , 2007). 
Even more importantly, the War on Terror is another area which Australia considers 
will necessitate ongoing military force in its international affairs. Indeed, the 
Australian Government contends that force has become a necessity in confronting 
the present realities of the 21 51 century world in which the West is menaced by the 
destructive force of world terrorism. As Howard articulates on this point, "one of the 
difficulties of the world in which we now live is that it's not quite as black and white in 
terms of conflict as it once used to be ... we now live in a world where the threat of 
terrorism is borderless and it's different and you've got to confront it in a different 
way" (Howard, 2003 [3]) . And furthermore: 
The temptation to turn our backs on the problem and hope it will go 
away is great. Yet the realities of the world in which we now live do not 
permit us that luxury. We all know that history is replete with examples 
of the community of nations retreating from difficult decisions through 
fear of the immediate consequences only to find that those difficult 
decisions must ultimately be addressed and at an infinitely greater cost 
(Howard, 2003 [2]) . 
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Consequently, due to this belief in the necessity of force in defeating terrorism, 
Australia has not only built up its ADF to incorporate new anti-terrorist combat 
capabilities but has also officially endorsed the doctrine of pre-emption in the War on 
Terror. Indeed, Australia considers the use of military force to be at the 'hard-edge' 
of combating terror in the world and has developed the ADF to have new capabilities 
in fighting terrorists, which have been put to work in the military campaign against 
international terrorists in both Afghanistan and Iraq (Winning in Peace, Winning in 
War, 2004, p. 5; Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004, p. 79) . To 
illustrate, following 9/11 Australia deployed Australian Special Forces Teams (SASR) 
into Afghanistan to perform extensive air bombing campaigns against the ruling 
Taleban , in concert with British , German and the United States, with the aim of 
overthrowing the fundamentalist regime that was sheltering Osama Bin Laden and 
the deadly AI-Qaeda terrorist network there ('The Australian Defence Force's 
Involvement in Peacemaking' , 2007). Indeed, in employing such techniques against 
terrorists, the Australian Government considers its ADF personnel to be "truly a force 
for good" in Australia and the world (Winning in Peace, Winning in War, 2004, p. 24). 
As Australia's 2004 Transnational Terrorism document spells out: 
We make the choice to join our international partners in taking the fight to 
the terrorists to protect our country , our people, our way of life, our values 
and our freedom ... it is our only option for peace and security ... Protecting 
ourselves against terrorism is a fundamental human right- the right to life 
and human security (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia , 
2004, p. 76-77) . 
This different approach to the necessity of force as it relates to terrorism between the 
Tasman neighbours might also be explained in reference to the two nation's 
disparate experiences of terrorism: it is Australians - not New Zealanders - who 
have suffered and been impacted most by terrorist attacks whether in New York 
2001 , Bali in 2002 and again in 2005, Jakarta in 2003, or the London tube bombings 
of 2005. As the records show, 88 Australians were killed in the Bali Bombings of 
October 2002 compared with 3 New Zealanders , thus leading Howard to take a more 
aggressive stance on terrorism in response to the fact that "we know the threat to our 
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country is very real" (Howard, 2005; Mulrooney & Watkins, 2003; Kelton, 2006, p. 
240). As Doig et al. assert, though post-2001 Australia had already accepted the 
new US pre-emption doctrine, the Bali bombings gave it new meaning and gave the 
Government a greater sense of urgency in the war against terrorism (Doig et al. , 
2007, p. 32). 
Looking at the case of Iraq from this position on terrorism, then, it is evident that 
Australia saw the alternative option to force - on-going containment of Iraq - as not 
only "a false historical comparison" to the way it was successfully employed during 
the Cold War between two well-armed nuclear superpowers, but also one that 
"misstates completely the character of the threat that the world now faces" and the 
"fundamentally different world we now live in as a result of the 11th of September 
2001" (Howard, 2003 [4]) . For whereas containment was the preferred and only 
sensible option in dealing with the Soviet Union at that time, as the cost of engaging 
the USSR in nuclear conflict would have been much greater than the cost of doing 
nothing and working on the principle of containment (Howard, March 14), in Iraq's 
case "now you have a completely reversed situation where the cost of nothing is 
potentially much greater than the cost of doing something" (Howard, March 14). 
Perhaps it is Howard's own concluding statement on 18 March - two days before 
military action commenced - that best summarises the Australian position on the 
ensuing war in this regard: 
This decision has been taken by the government in the belief that it is in 
the long-term interests of this country. It has been taken against a 
background of a world environment changed forever by the events of 11 
September. The world now faces new and previously unknown 
menaces. Old notions of aggression and responses to aggression do 
not necessarily fit our new circumstances. Yet one thing remains 
constant - the responsibility of governments to protect its citizens 
against possible future attacks, wherever they may come from. It is in 
that spirit, against that background and in that context that the 
government has taken the decision it has, and I commend the motion to 
the House (Howard, 2003 [5]) . 
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4. Force Only as a Last Resort 
Linked to this concept is the fourth theme in the Australian speeches regarding the 
use of force, a concept that serves to act as a restraint or check on the strongly-held 
views described above. This theme concerns the notion that even when force is 
deemed necessary, nevertheless it is the Australian Government's view that force 
not be resorted to until all diplomatic options have been attempted and seen to fail in 
achieving the desired objective. Or in other words, force should only be used as a 
'last resort' and only when it becomes clear that no other method will succeed in 
securing the international community's set objective. 
This belief can be traced throughout the Australian Government's Iraq speeches -
often side-by-side with those formerly expressed about the usefulness and oft-times 
necessity of force. Consider, for example, Downer's statement that "war of course, 
remains an option of last resort. We are still working with our allies to avoid such a 
course" (Downer, 2003 [2]), or likewise Howard's relation that "military action is 
always a last resort and one that we all hope can be avoided" (Howard, 2003 [1]) . 
Indeed, in recognition of the fact that "there is no more serious decision for any 
government than to commit its forces to military conflict abroad" (Howard, 2003, 
March 18; Howard, 2003, March 1 0) , Howard expresses this evident Australian hope 
of a peaceful resolution to the Iraq crisis stating : 
We, all of us, hope that it will still prove possible to find an outcome 
acceptable to the international community without military force being 
used. The government will not make a final decision to commit to 
military conflict unless and until it is satisfied that all achievable options 
for a peaceful resolution have been explored (Howard , 2003 [2]) . 
Unfortunately, however, from the Australian vantage point all diplomatic options 
attempted to achieve Iraq's "immediate and unconditional and total disarmament" 
(Howard , 2003 [3]) were indeed seen to fail and prove ineffective in disarming 
Saddam's regime, thereby rendering the situation one of 'last resort' and validating 
force as the only option left to obtain the required goal set by the international 
community through the UN. As Howard articulates on this point, "we have tried 
sanctions and containment. Sanctions can be a very powerful instrument of 
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persuasion but have little influence over a dictator who cares nothing for the 
wellbeing of his people" (Howard , 2003 [2]) , "for 12 years the United Nations sought 
to cajole and coerce Iraq into compliance" (Howard, 2003 [6]) , but "let's face it, we've 
got nowhere" (Howard, 2003 [4]) . As Downer likewise echoes on this point: "The 
diplomatic effort to ensure Saddam Hussein disarmed peacefully is now over. .. All 
avenues for a peaceful resolution have been tried and have failed . Iraq must now be 
forced to comply with its obligations" (Downer, 2003 [3]). 
Indeed, from the Australian Government's point of view, force was considered 
necessary to achieve Iraq's disarmament as a particular case for two reasons: firstly , 
because of the type of threat Iraq posed in the world ; and secondly, because Iraq's 
past behaviour had shown that it is susceptible only to the threat or actual use of 
military force. As Howard states in reference to the former, "if Iraq is not effectively 
disarmed not only could she use chemical and biological weapons against her own 
people again, [but] other rogue states would be encouraged to copy her" (Howard, 
2003 [4]) and "the spread of those weapons would multiply the likelihood that 
terrorists would lay their hands on them" (Howard, 2003 [4]) . And similarly as to the 
latter: "There is only one form of pressure that Saddam Hussein understands - the 
threat of military force ... the most effective, and perhaps the only, means of 
attracting President Hussein's attention" (Howard , 2003 [2]) : 
The events of the last four months, Iraq's history, and its 12 years of 
defiance have convinced the government that the only way to deal with 
this challenge is by force. Sadly, the government is not surprised that it 
should have come to this. Force has been the only language that 
Saddam Hussein's regime has ever understood (Howard, 2003 [5]) . 
As a consequence, in recognizing both that "Iraq has failed to comply with its 
obligations in Resolution 1441 for immediate, unconditional and active compliance 
with the UN weapons inspectors" (Downer, 2003 [3]) and that "if Saddam Hussein 
was to be disarmed - we had to be prepared to resort to force" (Howard, 2003 [6]) , 
Australia pledged its support and joined the Coalition in a final bid "to bring this long-
running conflict to an end once and for all" (Howard , 2003 [5]) . As Downer explains 
the Australian position: 
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The international community has been left with no choice but to disarm 
Saddam Hussein by force. To step back from dealing with Saddam 
Hussein now, would be the easy option . And it would leave the greatest 
risks and the toughest decisions for others to make after us -when the 
consequences could be far more damaging ... We will support the brave 
Australians who play a professional role in what seems to be inevitable 
- a regrettable but necessary military action (Downer, 2003 [3]) . 
It is of some importance to note here, however, that in opting for force as the last 
resort to finally disarm the Iraqi regime, Australia considered the blame for such a 
measure to fall fully and squarely on the shoulders of the despot leader Saddam 
Hussein himself. This is illustrated by the following statements: "there is one country 
in the world that could solve all of this, and that's Iraq. Iraq is the only country acting 
alone that can guarantee a peaceful outcome to this" (Howard, 2003 [1]); "we have 
arrived at this day because Iraq has continued to defy the international community in 
its pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons" (Downer, 2003 [3]) ; "this was 
Iraq's choice and it has turned its back on a peaceful outcome" (Downer, 2003 [3]) . 
Nevertheless, despite this, it was not Australia's intention to punish the Iraqi people 
for their leader's mistakes. In fact, from the outset the Australian Government 
declared their hope that "if a military conflict occurs that civilian casualties are the 
absolute minimum, we all hope and pray for that" (Howard , 2003 [3]) and expressed 
their resolution to assist the Iraqi people in rehabilitating the country following military 
action there and "stand ready" to provide humanitarian assistance in the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict (Downer, 2003 [3]) . 
5. Force & Authority- Explicit UN Sanction Desirable. But Not Necessary 
The fifth and final theme in the Australian discourse concerning the use of force in 
International Relations concerns the way that, unlike its small neighbour, Australia 
has shown itself to be supportive not only of the usual UN or NATO-sanctioned 
peacemaking operations stemming from a multilateral centre, but also of the use of 
force undertaken either unilaterally by a single state or by a coalition of like-minded 
nations - without authorization by a collective security organization - providing the 
state or group of nations involved are considered by Australia to have reasonable 
grounds for resorting to force. In fact , Australia rejects the notion that the UN 
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organization is the sole determinant of how and when force can or should be used in 
international affairs, and has reserved the right to enter into bilateral , multilateral or 
even unilateral decisions to commence combat action concerning security matters 
(Advancing the National Interest, 2003). Consequently, in being compelled to resort 
to force in order to disarm Iraq, a new UN resolution authorizing military force under 
the UN banner - though highly desirable - was not in itself considered necessary or 
required by the Australian Government to legitimate military action against Iraq by a 
group of nations. As Howard stresses: 
We supported , and would have preferred , a further Security Council 
resolution specifying the need for such action. We did so to maximise 
the diplomatic, moral and political pressure on Iraq, not because we 
considered a new resolution to be necessary for such action to be 
legitimate (Howard, 2003 [5]) . 
This difference in attitude on the part of the Australia Government in comparison with 
the views held by New Zealand can be explained in the way that the Howard 
Administration is much more cautious about relying on the international system to 
achieve international security, and a lot less trusting of the abilities of the UN 
(McElhattan, 2006). As Howard stated in 2005: "Australia recognises that there are 
cases where the United Nations can leverage effective cooperation for peace and 
security, as was demonstrated successfully in East Timor. But we also know that 
there are times when this is not possible, as we saw in the Balkans" (Howard , 2005). 
Indeed, as the 2000 defence White Paper makes explicit, it is the Australian belief 
that when "swift and decisive action is needed to deal with threats to international 
order" and "the United Nations has not been able to respond, as in the case of 
Kosovo", coalitions formed by concerned countries will continue to play a central role 
in ensuring global security (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 46). In these 
situations, the Paper concludes: 
it has fallen to states with the capacity and the willingness to take action 
to preserve peace and security . In deciding whether to participate in 
such coalitions, the Government will be guided by whether an 
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Australian role will advance Australia's national security and our global 
interests (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 46). 
Indeed, in circumventing the UN and participating in the 'Coalition of the Willing ', 
Australia did not- unlike New Zealand - regard itself or the other Coalition members 
to be either acting in a 'new' unprecedented manner that set new and dangerous 
standards of behaviour on the world stage, or in participating in either an 'unjustified' 
or 'illegal' war. As regards the former, for example, Howard cites the previous 
precedent of the NATO countries' bombing attacks against Serbia in 1999 which was 
an action undertaken without any kind of direct Security Council authorization 
(Howard, 2003 [2]) . Similarly to the Iraq scenario, he states, "that authority was 
never sought because of an apprehended Russian veto" (Howard, 2003 [2]) and yet 
later on "the Security Council was taken to have acquiesced in the NATO action" 
(Howard, 2003 [2]) . As to the latter, Australia considered the Iraq war to be fully 
justified , firstly , because diplomatic measures had failed to achieve the objective 
therefore rendering it necessary that force be applied , and secondly, due to the 
nature of the threat Iraq posed to the world in being an inherently dangerous rogue 
regime with access to WMDs and connections to terrorist groups. This conclusion 
on the justness of the war against Saddam was strongly emphasized on two 
separate occasions in Howard's speeches. As he states, "The cause is just. The 
action is legitimate" (Howard, 2003 (5]) : 
Australian military forces participated with just cause, in an action 
properly based in international law, which resulted in the liberation of an 
oppressed people ... Through its actions in Iraq the coalition has sent a 
clear signal to other rogue states and terrorist groups alike - the world is 
prepared to take a stand . We do not for one moment regret that 
decision . It was right, it was lawful and it was in Australia's national 
interest" (Howard, 2003 (6]) . 
Furthermore, in acting in this way the Australian Government did not consider itself 
to be behaving in an illegal way, but rather considered the Coalition's actions to be 
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completely legal under international law. As Downer accentuates on the subject, 
following extensive national and international legal advice provided to the Australian 
Governmene3 
Such action is consistent with international law. Let there be no mistake, 
an 18th Security Council resolution is not necessary to provide a legal 
basis for action to enforce the previous 17 resolutions. Our legal advice 
is unequivocal. The existing United Nations Security Council 
resolutions provide for the use of force to disarm Iraq and restore 
international peace and security to the area (Downer, 2003 [3]) . 
As Michael Costello, a former Secretary of DFAT, concluded: "This is not unlawful, 
this war, if it takes place. It is already authorised by the UN. This is the simplest 
international legal issue I have ever seen . It is clear, uncomplicated, straightforward , 
the legal authority is there" (Costello, cited in Downer, 2003, March 18). Indeed, as 
Howard underscores, it was under the belief that "adequate legal authority existed 
for that deployment and any subsequent military action under then existing 
resolutions of the Security Council" (Howard, 2003 [2]) and "that existing Security 
Council resolutions clearly allow for the use of military force" (Howard , 2003 [5]) that 
Australia deployed troops to the Gulf in 1998. Just as it was on the same 
understanding that the Clinton Administration , much like the current Bush 
Administration, undertook Operation Desert Fox to push Iraq back out of Kuwait -an 
operation in which Australian servicemen and women took part (Howard, 2003 [5]). 
Equally it was in this same spirit, argues Howard, that the present Australian 
Government decided to commit elements of the ADF to the international Coalition of 
military forces in 2003, with the purpose of enforcing "Iraq's compliance with its 
international obligations under successive resolutions of the United Nations Security 
Council, with a view to restoring international peace and security in the Middle East 
region" (Howard , 2003 [5]). 
Jl Provided by d1e head of the Office of International Law of the Australian i\trorney-General's 
Department, the senior legal adviser to the Department of Foreign .-\ffairs and Trade, a former Secretary 
for the Department of Foreign .-\ffairs and Trade and former leader of the opposition l\ lr l\ Iichael 
Costello, and additionally, by the UK .-\rtorney General Lord Goldsmith. 
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Chapter Five 
Fundamental Difference 3: Relations with the United States 
The third and final area of crucial importance in the separate directions New Zealand 
and Australia seem to be travelling in their International Relations concerns each 
country's relationships with the world 's only superpower in this monopolar global age 
-the United States of America. The US, Australia and New Zealand are often said 
to share much in common: they are each nations of the Pacific; they incorporate 
similar societies founded on the 'pioneer spirit'; embrace the same values and beliefs 
such as freedom and democracy; and they have each undergone similar 
experiences not only in their early colonization but also in participating together in 
the same ways throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, so close were the bonds 
between the three nations that during World War II , when the Americans were 
considering whether or not to abandon the Antipodean nations to the advancing 
Japanese, advisors to President Roosevelt made the case that: "We cannot, in 
honour, let Australia and New Zealand down. They are our brothers, and we must 
not allow them to be overrun by Japan" (cited in Gustafson, 1997, p. 105). As a 
result the United States adapted its strategy to protect its Pacific allies, making 
Australia its main base and New Zealand its South Pacific headquarters, meaning 
that at least 150,000 American personnel were stationed in Australia in 1943 and a 
further 200,000 stationed in New Zealand at some time between 1941-1945 
(Gustafson , 1997, p. 107; Dunn, 1984, p. 139). Following Japan's defeat and the 
end of the war, these three countries had become such close allies that they 
cemented their friendship and security commitments to each other in a formal 
security treaty known as the 1951 ANZUS alliance. It was chiefly owing to this 
alliance, in addition to shared security interests and fears regarding the spread of 
Communism in the Asia-Pacific, that Australia and New Zealand sent their 
servicemen to fight together with American forces in Vietnam in following decades. 
This close record on three-way inter-cooperation came to an abrupt end in the mid-
1980s, however, when New Zealand banned US ship visits on the basis of its new 
anti-nuclear policy. The United States reciprocated by suspending its security 
commitments to NZ under ANZUS, and New Zealand was officially demoted from the 
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status of American "ally" to just a "friend". In the years that followed US and 
Australian Governments nursed the hope that the small nation would eventually 
reverse its anti-nuclear legislation and thereby reactivate its part in the security 
alliance (Gustafson, 1997). However, such a reversal never came, rendering the two 
remaining ANZUS partners noticeably uncomfortable with New Zealand's position on 
defence ever after (Gustafson , 1997). While on the one hand, Australia has worked 
from this time forward to maintain a strong bilateral defence relationship with its 
small neighbour at significant cost to itself (Gustafson, 1997, p. 113), the American-
New Zealand relationship has been hampered and weakened by the nuclear issue 
ever since. This has meant that, while the three countries have at times come 
together again to cooperate militarily such as in the Gulf War and today in the War 
on Terror (primarily in Afghanistan) , New Zealand and Australia remain at odds not 
only in the degree of closeness in their relations with the US, but also in their 
respective attitudes and policies towards the superpower too with tangible 
consequences in the international sphere, especially in the realms of intelligence and 
defence (Calvert, 2003). Indeed, according to the former New Zealand Defence 
Force Chief, Bruce Ferguson , New Zealand's strained military relationship with the 
US is not only impacting negatively on the NZ-US relationship, but also hurting its 
defence links and military cooperation with Australia (Marshall , 2005). 
Much like a photo snapshot that captures one moment in time , the Iraq speeches 
provide an interesting glimpse into the tone, breadth and depth of each Tasman's 
relationship with the United States as they were in the early years of the 2000s. 
There are five themes that appear on th is subject in both the New Zealand and 
Australian speeches on Iraq, each of which reflect the distinctive and varying type of 
relationship the two have with the world 's only superpower. These themes will be 
discussed in the following in the hope of providing a broad overview of the important 
factors and areas of symmetry and difference in Washington's relationships with the 
Antipodean nations today. 
Wellington & Washington: the NZ-United States Relationship 
It is one of those interesting paradoxes that New Zealand , the country which its early 
settlers believed would "daily Americanise" to develop a similar society with similar 
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traits (Sinclair, 1986, p. 15), and which had more contact with America than its larger 
neighbour right up until the 1980s (Biainey, 1987, p. 329) , would eventually become 
the Tasman nation with the weakest relationship with the US. As McElhattan neatly 
describes the current state of affairs between the two Tasman nations and the 
superpower: "Australia is firmly committed to the United States as a strategic partner. 
New Zealand is not" (McElhattan, 2006). There are five different dynamics of the NZ-
US relationship which are addressed in the Iraq speeches, all of which together paint 
a fuller picture of where exactly Wellington stands with Washington today. 
1. New Zealand & the United States - "Friends" 
The first theme in the New Zealand discourse concerning New Zealand's relationship 
with the US centres around the idea that the two countries are "friends" (Goff, 2003 
(1 0]) , who share a "longstanding friendship" (Goff, 2003 [3]) and a mutual sense of 
respect (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . This friendship in turn is based on a long tradition of 
shared values, history, and common threads. As Goff states, it is "important to 
remember how many values we share" with the United States (Goff, 2003 [1 0]): "We 
share many common threads with our traditional partners formed over many years of 
shared history and values. These are partnerships that have endured . They will 
continue to do so" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]). Indeed, as PM Clark stresses, "the shared 
values based between Australia , and New Zealand, and Canada, and Britain , and 
the US, could not be closer" (Clark, 2003 [1]) , "it is ... important to emphasise our 
strong sense of shared values with all western democracies" (Clark, 2003 [2]) . 
Perhaps it was this sense of friendship and common heritage that enabled New 
Zealand , in Clark's words, to "fully understand the frustration , impatience, and 
outrage felt by the United States" and New Zealand's other traditional allies during 
the Iraq crisis , "at Iraq's slowness to comply and resistance to complying with UN 
resolutions. I do believe that Iraq would strain the patience and tolerance of a saint" 
(Clark, 2003 [2]) . Indeed, New Zealanders share many values with Americans, such 
as democracy, the rule of law, economic liberty and freedom of expression as well as 
admiration for the same qualities of independence, confidence and freedom 
(Swindells , 2005; Anderton , 2005). As Colin James states: "While not allied, we are 
aligned- by dint of history, heritage and kin" (James, 2006a). 
108 
Nevertheless, despite these assertions there is no denying the weakness of New 
Zealand 's relationship with the US, in contrast with Australia , nor the noticeable note 
of strain in New Zealand discourse wherever the relationship is mentioned. One 
good illustration of this reality is the way that when the incoming Labour Government 
released its Defence Policy Framework in June 2000 the defence document was 
conspicuous for its exclusion of any mention of the United States at all , while making 
reference to many other states with whom New Zealand cooperates militarily such as 
Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and even some Pacific Island states 
(McElhattan , 2006). When this fact is considered in light of not only America's 
defence of New Zealand during World War II , but also New Zealand's dependency 
on American protection during the Cold War and its history of participation in US-led 
operations such as in Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf, this is, as another has phrased it, 
"a startling , and telling, omission" (McElhattan, 2006). Indeed, as McElhattan points 
out, even where the United States does appear, such as in the New Zealand's 2000 
Foreign & Security Policy Challenges paper, references to the superpower are made 
"in a detached and vaguely hostile manner" and characterised by "a subtle apathy, 
almost a desire to see American power diminish" (McElhattan, 2006), which of 
course is hardly the kind of tone or attitude one would expect to find between 
"friends". Even today in September 2007, moreover, the official Government 
website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade omits the United States as a key 
country, instead lumping the superpower into a vague 'North America' category, and 
even neglects to provide a basic historical overview of the NZ-US relationship and 
the main areas of cooperation and disagreement. When compared with Australia 's 
close relationship with the United States, this difference between the Tasman pair is 
stark indeed. 
2. NZ-US Clashes -A Regular Phenomenon 
The second theme of the speeches is illustrative of this state of affairs between 
Wellington and Washington and concerns the way that, despite this long tradition of 
friendship (of sorts) , New Zealand and America often find themselves at odds with 
each other over issues on the international agenda. These clashes stem from acute 
but genuine differences of view and opinion, usually concerning not aims or desired 
outcomes but rather the means or appropriate methods used to achieve them. 
These differences, when they appear, tend to have the result of souring the 
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relationship and producing manifold negative effects. Indeed, differences of view 
between New Zealand and the US have a tendency to result in heightened emotions 
on both sides, as well as a predilection to concentrate only on the aspect of the 
relationship where the point of difference exists between them. Goff highlights this 
aspect of the relationship, manifestly apparent over Iraq, in his statement that "there 
is currently a disproportionate focus on one issue on which we have disagreed" 
(Goff, 2003 [1 OJ) stemming from the way that on both sides "emotions focus on our 
points of difference" (Goff, 2003 [1 OJ) . 
The nuclear issue is one such area of difference that has become a highly-charged 
matter and a major obstacle between New Zealand and the US in furthering the 
relationship. The former American Ambassador, Charles Swindells, for instance, 
called the nuclear ban "the main stumbling block" to improving the relationship, while 
his new successor recently announced that New Zealand would have to move first 
by relaxing the ban in order to bring the two-decade stand-off to an end, stating that 
"the ball is in your court" (Swindells & McCormick, cited in Kay, 2005). New 
Zealand's reaction , as epitomized in PM Clark's response to such comments, has 
long been that responsibility for improving relations rests on both sides and that such 
a reconciliation between the two countries had to be done "within the framework of 
the nuclear-free legislation" (Clark, cited in Kay, 2005). Exacerbating this stalemate 
in NZ-US relations , moreover, is the list of international issues on which the two 
nations likewise disagree in the international sphere. In the last decade, particularly , 
New Zealand has increasingly been at variance with American foreign and security 
policy on issues such as UN reform, the ABM treaty, the creation of an International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the "Star Wars" National Missile Defence umbrella project, the 
Kyoto Protocol, and America's intention to develop new types of nuclear weapons . 
In the last two years, however, there seems to be greater movement towards 
reconciliation by both parties on the nuclear issue at least, even with the prospect of 
New Zealand's nuclear policy remaining unaltered. Primarily the "pivotal" reason for 
such a change of heart by the United States, as explained by US State Department 
official Randy Schriver, is the way that the New Zealand National Party has adopted 
a bipartisan stance on the nuclear policy, meaning that the policy is likely to stay 
intact regardless of future changes in government as something now deeply 
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ingrained in the psyche of New Zealanders (Young , 2007). Additionally, however, the 
United States is increasingly in need of friends in both the War on Terror and in 
maintaining global security and order in areas such as the Pacific. Consequently, 
though outgoing US Ambassador Swindells intimated in his parting speech that the 
US is "starved of trust" in its relationship with New Zealand 34 , a problem that could 
only be addressed through a "comprehensive dialogue" between the friends, the new 
American Ambassador, William McCormick, has asserted that the United States 
would no longer press for a change of New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, thus 
indicating a new attitude within the American Administration to 'let bygones be 
bygones' in the NZ-US relationship. As McCormick states: "You are a sovereign 
nation. You have made the decision. It is carved into law for the last 20 years. I'm not 
here to change that" (cited in Kay, 2005). 
The matter of Iraq was likewise an issue of heated dispute and contention between 
New Zealand and the United States. Just as in the past and equally today "there 
remains an issue of difference between us on nuclear policy" that both sides openly 
acknowledge (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) , the issue of Iraq's disarmament revealed another 
difference of view between New Zealand and the United States on "how to handle the 
Iraq crisis" (Clark, 2003 [2]) . Indeed, the two nations' divergent perspectives and 
actions on the matter injected even more strain into an already rather fragile 
relationship, made worse by PM Clark's back-handed derogatory comments about the 
US President and Commander-in-Chief, George W. Bush - for which she was forced to 
apologise in Washington - in addition to further criticisms to the effect that "Iraq was 
not a haven for terrorist prior to the war there. It certainly is now" (Houlahan , 2006b). 
Some New Zealanders believe it was these earlier comments that were responsible for 
the way that New Zealand's bid for an FTA with the US was scuttled in Washington 
later that year, especially given Ambassador Swindell's remarks that 'trade could not 
be separated from foreign and security policy'. For America's part, Washington's 
attitude towards such comments and New Zealand's policy of non-involvement in Iraq 
can probably best be summarized by new US Ambassador William McCormick's 
comments that "it is always disappointing when there isn't participation by a freedom-
·
1
• See Gustafson's article 'If you ever need a friend, You have one', in Patty O'Brien & Bruce Vaughn 
(eds.), Amongst Fn.wds: Australian and J\'e1v Zealand IJOtces.from A111e1ica (2005), for a blow-by-blow account of 
the ,-\NZUS affair and how Lange's flip-flopping and false promises to American .-\mbassador Schultz 
over the USS Bucbana11 resulted in the impression in \Xfashington that the New Zealand Prime l\linister had 
lied and his country was not to be trusted. 
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loving country ... in a very important matter'' (cited in Kay, 2005). The central matter of 
dispute between these two nations was of course the judgement made by the United 
States, Britain , Australia and Spain , following weeks of political wrangling within the 
UN that: firstly , force - in the form of an allied military invasion - was necessary to 
achieve Iraq's disarmament; and secondly, that the provision of more time to the 
weapons inspection process would not result in more cooperative behaviour from 
Saddam. These were two perspectives which the New Zealand Government 
thoroughly opposed. 
Evidence of this can be clearly seen in New Zealand's Iraq speeches. For instance, 
while New Zealand articulates its shared desire with the US, the UK and Australia to 
bring about the disarmament of Sad dam's regime (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) , nevertheless the 
two friends were divided over the means and timetable for the attainment of such an 
objective. This fact can be seen in Clark's statements that while New Zealand is one 
of many who have shown "overwhelming support" (Clark, 2003 [2]) for the core 
objective of disarming Iraq, there is a "difference of opinion and approach aris[ing] 
over the means and the timetable for meeting the objective" (Clark, 2003 [2]) . Or in 
Goff's words, "all members of this Council share the same objective: the 
disarmament of Iraq. Debate has raged not over the objective, but over the timetable 
for and means of achieving it" (Goff, 2003 [3]). More specifically, this difference of 
opinion , from the New Zealand standpoint, concerned the Government's two 
oppositional beliefs that: firstly , "options other than military action are still available to 
achieve disarmament" (Goff, 2003 [4]) - namely "that Iraqi compliance could be 
achieved by force of international opinion" (Goff, 2003 [4]) ; and secondly, that since 
the mid-February Blix Report "suggests that Iraq has moved at least in part to 
accommodate some of the inspectors' requests" (Goff, 2003 [2]) , the international 
community could still hold out hope that with more time "the inspection process will 
be able to keep up traction and keep momentum" (Clark, 2003 [1]) to achieve Iraq's 
disarmament. 
In addition, judging from New Zealand's Iraq speeches, it seems the New Zealand 
Government considered an Iraq in possession of WMDs to be more of a serious 
problem than an imminent threat, as maintained by Australia and the US. As Clark 
stated at that time "Iraq is a problem, Iraq has been a problem for rather a long time" 
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(Clark, 2003 [1]) . Indeed, if Iraq was considered a threat at all by the New Zealand 
Government, it was more in the sense of it being a threat to world peace and to the 
multilateral fabric of international society today (Goff, 2002 [1]) , rather than to the 
West or global security at large as the US and Australia contended. Thus in choosing 
to refrain from any Iraq War (and equally in maintaining a policy of non-involvement 
since 2004), New Zealand has considered itself to be not only opting for peace as 
opposed to war, and the maintenance of a stable status quo within the international 
community, but also to be occupying the moral high ground within the international 
community . However, from the US, Australia and Britain's point of view, such a 
stance was not a position of strength but of weakness, and one based more on 
na"ivete rather than wisdom in refusing to face facts. Indeed, in considering that such 
a position did not take into account either the type of person Saddam Hussein was 
and the kind of regime he ruled over, or the proven failure of a policy of patience 
towards Iraq, or indeed the risk to the world inherent in the provision of more time, it 
was rejected outright as a valid option in the Iraq Crisis by New Zealand's traditional 
allies, foremost among whom was the United States. 
As usual, the outcome of yet another "great division" (Clark, 2003 [2]) between New 
Zealand and the United States on an important international issue was a great deal 
of strain and tension between the two countries. Indeed, the resultant divide between 
New Zealand and the US stemming from divergent points of view over Iraq was then , 
and is still today, distressing but very real. As Goff admitted in a speech in May 
following the war, "the Government's position on Iraq has led some to question our 
relations with our more traditional partners. Our difference of view over how to deal 
with Iraq was real and principled" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . Certainly both Goff and Clark 
refer to the deteriorating state of affairs between New Zealand and America in their 
speeches from the time of mid-March 2003 onwards. To illustrate, while Goff 
indicates that "it is distressing to my government that the debate has strained 
longstanding friendships between nations. That strain will be magnified if the next 
steps taken to resolve the crisis do not have broad international support" (Goff, 2003 
[3]) , Clark goes so far as to publicly and officially "note our concern at the strain this 
division over Iraq has placed on longstanding friendships and alliances between 
western democracies" (Clark, 2003 [2]) . 
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3. Despite Differences. New Zealand Keen to Maintain Friendship with US 
Nevertheless despite stark differences such as these on issues within the 
international arena, it remains New Zealand's wish that the friendship it shares with 
the United States not be damaged in the long-term by any short-term differences of 
opinion between them. As a statement by Clark well illustrates over the Iraq split, 
"our government is determined that this difference of opinion, substantial as it is, will 
not damage longstanding friendships which we value" (Clark, 2003 [2]) . Or as Goff 
is similarly seen to assert, at the official end of the Iraq war signalled by the US 
declaration of the cessation of hostil ities : 
It is time to move on. Democracies and friends can have differences of 
view, sometimes quite fundamental differences, but still respect one 
another and work closely on the many points of shared interest. New 
Zealand has already signalled its willingness to play its part in meeting 
humanitarian needs and in the reconstruction of Iraq (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
Indeed, despite their occasional differences, New Zealand and the United States 
share many points of common interest and cooperate closely together wherever the 
two find shared goals or objectives. One former New Zealand diplomat, Michael 
Powles, has commented on this fact, stating that "although we have differences with 
the US on some issues addressed in multilateral forums, on others we seek the 
same results, and support each other's efforts (cited in Goff, 2005) . Or as Goff has 
similarly stated, it is "important to remember how many values we share and the 
extent of our on-going co-operation" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) , "there are many areas where 
we cooperate closely, which do not make headlines" (Goff, 2003 [10]) . This 
cooperation is particularly forthcoming and observable in the international sphere -
and frequently alluded to in the speeches - in regard to three particular areas in the 
realm of global politics: the War on Terror; the non-proliferation of WMDs; and the 
stability of the Pacific Island region . 
As regards the first area , following the horrific attacks on New York and Washington 
D.C. in 2001 , in which two Kiwis were among the 3000 killed , the New Zealand 
Government responded to President Bush's declaration of war on AI Qaeda and 
global terrorism by pledging "a solid contribution" to the US-led campaign, in pursuit 
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of the shared goal of closing down the terrorist network AI Qaeda and its affiliates 
through diminishing and removing their key sources of support and supply, 
especially in terms of finances and arms (Patman, 2005, p. 57) . As Clark has stated 
on the matter: "In New Zealand, we saw the attacks as attacks on humanity. We 
resolved to work with the United States and other nations to make a stand against 
this evil and those responsible for it" (Clark, 2002). Indeed, the New Zealand 
Government considers the emergence of international terrorist groups as a 
"significant event" whose actions have shocked not only the US - "the primary victims 
of the attack" (Goff, 2002 [1]) - but also the entire international community at large 
(Goff, 2002 [1 ]). According to Goff, such a demonstration of "premeditated and 
callous mass murder of 3000 people from 79 different countries" as took place on 
9/11 by AI Qaeda, in addition to "their willingness to use weapons of mass 
destruction - biological , chemical or nuclear, - should they gain access to them" 
(Goff, 2002 [1 ]) , has made terrorist groups one of the most serious threats in the 
world today and "made our world a more dangerous place" (Goff, 2002 [1]) . 
Consequently, in the years immediately following the attacks, the Government 
deployed a New Zealand Special Air Services (SAS) unit and an air force Hercules 
aeroplane to Afghanistan , an ANZAC frigate and an Orion surveillance aircraft for 
use in patrolling the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, and an additional 242 NZDF 
personnel to a Canadian-led force patrolling the region (Patman, 2005). In later 
years , moreover, New Zealand has continued to show its support for anti-terrorist 
measures, as shown in the deployment of two additional rotations of NZ SAS squads 
and 60 post-conflict reconstruction army engineers to Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) in Afghanistan, the latter to work in combination with its naval frigate in the 
Gulf of Oman, in addition to peacekeeping forces to assist in humanitarian 
assistance and nation-building activities (Clark, 2002; Goff, 2006b). These 
measures were taken because, as Helen Clark stated, "we wanted to ensure that 
Afghanistan could not provide a base for terrorists to operate from" (Clark, 2002). 
Furthermore, following the declaration of a cessation of hostilities in Iraq in 2003, 
New Zealand initially deployed a team of 20 NZDF personnel to Iraq to assist in 
clearing landmines, setting up medical programmes and rebuilding sanitation 
services (Goff, 2006b), though these were later withdrawn . 
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The way that this kind of terrorism has been brought into New Zealand's own 
neighbourhood of the Asia-Pacific, moreover, beginning with the Bali Bombing of 12 
October 2002, seems to have reinforced the nation's commitment to the international 
campaign (Goff, 2003 [4]) and strengthened New Zealand's determination "to play a 
role in the wider campaign against terrorism; eliminating AI Qaeda, and 
strengthening regional counter-terrorism efforts" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . As a 
consequence New Zealand has joined with the US and Australia to assist Pacific 
Island Countries (PICs) to raise and strengthen their counter-terrorism capabilities 
(Clark, 2002). Indeed, in seeing 9/11 as "a sharp warning to us" (Goff, 2002 [1]) of 
the destructive potential of such groups and the threat they pose to global peace and 
security, the New Zealand Government has quite substantially supported its strong 
verbal commitment to the US-led War on Terror in being "very active in the campaign 
against terrorism" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . In fact , as a small nation New Zealand prides 
itself on such a record of sustained and successful contribution to Afghanistan . As 
Goff asserts, New Zealand's contribution to the War on Terror has "set us apart as 
one of a relatively small group which made that contribution" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
Certainly, New Zealand's commitment to the War on Terror has become so 
significant as to now be considered one of the most "important developments in New 
Zealand's foreign relations" from 2002 onwards (Goff, 2003 [4]). Nevertheless, while 
these commitments have eased the strain in the relationship somewhat, it has not in 
fact altered the perception within the US that New Zealand is not a "full participant" in 
the War on Terrorism. Indeed, there has been criticism from several quarters on this 
point to the effect that by parting ways with its traditional allies over Iraq, New 
Zealand has indulged in "a frivolous moral exercise that needlessly jeopardized New 
Zealand's national interests" (in Patman, 2005, p. 58). As Patman states: "According 
to the government's critics, the terrorist bomb blasts in Bali in October 2002, killing 
three New Zealanders and 190 Australians, and the reluctance of the Bush 
administration to negotiate a free-trade deal with New Zealand, confirmed that the 
government was not doing enough in the war against terrorism" (Patman, 2005, p. 
58). 
The second area cited in the speeches, where New Zealand cooperates well with the 
US on a matter of common interest, concerns the non-proliferation of WMDs. These 
weapons in themselves are of great concern to New Zealand, perhaps tying in to the 
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country's identity and status as one of the few self-declared nuclear-free nations in 
the world. However, the fact that international terrorist groups seek to gain access to 
such weapons to use in attacks against the US and the West (Goff, 2002 [1]} , as well 
as North Korea's "own provocative stance on weapons of mass destruction" (Goff, 
2003 [4]) , have together served to make the issue of greater concern and higher 
import on New Zealand's foreign policy agenda (Goff, 2003 [4]) . This being the 
case, New Zealand continues to work on the matter of non-proliferation and is 
especially active in "situations where weapons of mass destruction threaten the 
peace and stability of our region, such as North Korea" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
Lastly, the third area of mutual interest and cooperation between the United States 
and New Zealand regards the Pacific Island region itself. As two Pacific nations -
both situated on the fringes of the Pacific -this is a natural sphere of mutual interest. 
A trend of increasing instability in the Pacific Islands, as well as encroaching terrorist 
networks and crime rings, have served to make the region of even greater interest 
and concern to each nation in recent years, especially so in the case of New Zealand 
as the region's nearest neighbour and benefactor (Goff, 2003 [4]). Indeed, New 
Zealand considers Pacific instability to be one of the key "questions of concern in the 
world today" (Goff, 2003 [4]). Consequently, New Zealand has been working along 
with the US to stabilize the region and has been making efforts towards the shared 
goal of progressing towards a more stable and peaceful Pacific in the hope of 
ensuring "a more secure, just and harmonious world" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . This 
significant New Zealand contribution and concern to Pacific affairs has been noticed 
and appreciated by the United States, and indeed, seems to have signalled a 
rapprochement in NZ-US ties in the years since. As the US Assistant Secretary of 
State, Christopher Hill , said at the US-NZ Partnership Forum in Auckland this month : 
"There is no question that the United States has a good partner in New Zealand , and 
it is widely recognized and appreciated throughout the government, from the very 
top, that New Zealand makes valuable contributions to peace, stability, and 
economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region" (Hill, 2007) 
4. Improving NZ-US Relationship of Vital Concern 
The fourth theme of New Zealand's Iraq speeches that sheds light onto the country's 
relationship with the US concerns the importance to New Zealand of a good working 
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relationship with America. In fact, obtaining and maintaining such a relationship with 
the US is described in one particular speech as being of "vital concern to New 
Zealand" (Goff, 2003 [1 0]). As Goff elaborates on this subject: 
Relations with the US are important. Our links are broad-ranging . We 
have extensive people-to-people contacts . The economic relationship is 
very significant for New Zealand (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
As a result of this predicament, it is considered to be in New Zealand's interests that 
progress be made towards the end of nurturing good US relations (Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
Indeed the speeches disclose the great extent of New Zealand's commitment to 
such an endeavour and the substantial amount of energy expended in pursuit of it , 
as the following statement by Goff well illustrates: 
This Government is committed to a sound relationship with the US. It has 
worked hard to advance New Zealand's interests with Washington. In the 
past twelve months not only has the Prime Minister visited Washington , 
but also the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Sutton on several occasions, and I 
have been there to hold discussions with colleagues in the Administration 
(Goff, 2003 [1 0]) . 
Indeed, it seems in recent years that New Zealand has come to the belated 
realization that relations with the United States - in every sphere of politics, 
economics and defence - are of fundamental importance to this country, requiring 
the same attention and energy as that invested into deepening the trans-Tasman 
relationship (Anderton , 2005). So much so, in fact , that NZ Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Winston Peters, announced in November 2006 that ameliorating the NZ-US 
relationship had become the government's top priority (Peters, 2006c). As he 
himself states on this foreign policy shift: "It is increasingly evident that there is a 
growing awareness of the fundamental importance of New Zealand's relationship 
with the United States" and consequently a "renewed commitment made by both 
sides to review our cooperation across a broad spectrum of engagement to ensure 
we are working together as effectively as we can be" (Peters, 2006i). It seems New 
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Zealand is eager to restore the relationship to that of being "very, very, very good 
friends", as Colin Powell once rather optimistically described the two countries prior 
to their falling-out over Iraq (cited in Bassett, 2003). Certainly, as a result, there have 
been many tentative steps made on both sides towards an improved NZ-US 
relationship. 
For instance, due to New Zealand's contribution to the War on Terror, especially in 
Afghanistan, the US showed its gratitude by lifting a ban on joint exercises and 
training of NZ SAS troops on three separate occasions in 2005-2006, raising hopes 
that the ban might be permanently waived (James, 2006b). PM Clark later 
reciprocated by extending an invitation to President Bush to visit New Zealand after 
attending the APEC summit in Sydney in 2007 ('Clark invites Bush to visit' , 2005). In 
July 2006, moreover, New Zealand Foreign Minister, Winston Peters, visited 
Washington where he had talks with US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and 
other leading US politicians - hoped to be the first of a regular series of annual get-
togethers reminiscent of the annual New Zealand-Australia/Australia-United States 
dialogues (James, 2006a). During these meetings it was indicated that the US - like 
New Zealand - would like to "move forward" and expand the bilateral relationship 
beyond the 20-year nuclear impasse ('US 'has welcome mat out' for Peters' , 2006 ; 
Houlahan, 2006a), an olive-branch substantiated with an invitation to New Zealand 
to participate in the informal five-plus-five grouping on North Korea (Peters, 2006). 
Finally , in March this year, PM Clark made the third formal visit by a New Zealand 
Prime Minister to the White House in 24 years (Young, 2007a) , where she met with 
President Bush and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Nevertheless, while 
the meetings confirmed the happy prospect that New Zealand's nuclear policy would 
no-longer be "a rock in the road" in the relationship , but rather a matter for the two 
countries to work around in future , New Zealand still remains "a friend" rather than 
ally, continues to have sanctions imposed on it in terms of joint exercises with the US 
military, and the likelihood of an FTA seems still very remote (Llewellyn, 2007; 
Young , 2007b) . As journalist Audrey Young has observed , the friendship is limited 
(Young, 2007c). Even so, there is more hope now for a more amicable relationship 
between the Pacific pair than at any time since the ANZUS split. New Zealand's 
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signal for US help in dealing with the troubled Pacific35 , the United States decision to 
render ANZUS "a relic of the Cold War" in regard to New Zealand, and the pair's 
decision to concentrate on areas of positive cooperation such as in Afghanistan , the 
Pacific and Antarctica , bodes well for a more positive working relationship in the 
future , as exemplified perhaps in the new US-NZ student OE scheme struck 
between the two Pacific nations a few weeks ago on 11 September (McCormick, 
cited in Kay, 2005; Anderton , 2005; Espiner, 2007; Watkins, 2007c; Small , 2007). At 
last it seems a new era in NZ-US relations is in the air. 
5. NZ Concerns & Criticisms of US Behaviour Still Ongoing 
Nevertheless, despite such intentions and the way that New Zealand is now 
committed to "a sound relationship" with the superpower on the basis of respect for 
each other's individual democratic decisions, the fifth theme of the Iraq speeches 
reveal that there is still likely to be trouble ahead for the NZ-US relationship. This is 
because New Zealand has on-going concerns and criticisms with regard to the 
United States and its policies and behaviour in the international sphere, not least its 
opposing stance on matters such as the Kyoto Protocol , National Missile Defence, 
the creation of an ICC, the pre-emption doctrine, Guantanamo, and the legitimizing 
authority of the UN for the use of force in ensuring global security. 
Indeed, as shown in the Iraq speeches, America's attitude towards and position 
within the UN organisation - an organisation that has come to occupy such a 
preeminent and central place in New Zealand's foreign policy outlook - is one crucial 
area of most noticeable disapproval and annoyance on the part of the New Zealand 
government towards the US. New Zealand seems to have three criticisms in 
particular on this matter: first , "the enormous influence and pressure that the United 
States as the world 's super-power is able to exert on other countries" within the UN 
(Goff, 2003 [5]); second , its willingness to act outside the UN whenever deemed 
necessary; and thirdly, America's criticism of the UN organization as "not being a 
responsible body" (Goff, 2003 [5]) . In reference to the first criticism lodged here 
most especially, New Zealand seems to express more than a nod towards the view 
that, had the second resolution proposed by the UK, the UK and Spain passed within 
» :\ more diplomatic reyuest than Peter's outburst to the US in 2006 to 'give us credit we deserve' in the 
Pacific as New Zealand is "doing out bit" (Young, 2006; Kay, 2006) . 
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the UNSC on the Iraq issue, "many around the world would have dismissed that 
outcome" (Goff, 2003 [5]) as an example of America 's overwhelming power to 
influence within the UN, and that consequently, "it would not therefore have been 
regarded by some within the international community as properly legitimising the use 
of force or of being a genuine exercise in multilateral decision-making" (Goff, 2003 
[5]) . Additionally , the United States' track record of "opting out of the multilateral 
process" (Goff, 2003 [5]) and its receptiveness to the idea of using force to solve 
problems in International Relations - as demonstrated in the way that it was 
determined with the Coalition "that Iraq should be disarmed by force if after a short 
period of time it failed to comply with Resolution 1441 " (Goff, 2003 [5]) - constitute 
two other areas in International Relations on which New Zealand finds itself 
continually at odds with the United States. 
Issues like these will inescapably continue to be sources of tension and strain in the 
relationship, especially if any future challenge arises to call UN authority into 
question in the years to come. Additionally , if the NZ-US relationship is to become 
stronger and more of a central feature in New Zealand's foreign and security policy, 
then New Zealand will need to address the matter of rising anti-Americanism in New 
Zealand , especially among those who, in McLean's words, being small "do not like 
being pushed around by the large and are even more resentful of being told that the 
exigencies of the 'real world ' present no alternatives" (McLean, 2003, p. 185). In fact 
anti-Americanism has been a feature of the Left of the political spectrum in this 
country since the Vietnam War, and residual strains are still evident now and then 
among the many Vietnam-generation members of the present Left-wing 
Government. Unavoidably, this destructive force within New Zealand society will 
need to be addressed on both social and political levels if a fuller more developed 
relationship with the US based on common values and interests is ever to eventuate 
between the two nations. 
Canberra & Washington: the US-Australian Relationship 
Similarly, examination of Australia's Iraq speeches provides an interesting overview 
of the unique and rather full-bodied relationship that Australia shares with the United 
States at the time of the Iraq Crisis. 
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1. Australia and the United States "Close Allies" 
The first theme in the Australian discourse concerns the more intimate type of 
relationship Australia has with the superpower. As a close ally of the United States, 
rather than just a "friend", and one that has maintained a strong working relationship 
with the superpower for over sixty years, Australia has a very close relationship with 
the United States. As Howard emphatically declared in early 2003, "we have a 
close relationship with the United States and I don't make any apology" (Howard, 
2003 [1 ]) , "Australia is a close ally of the United States" (Howard, 2003 [2]) . 
Indeed, Australia considers itself to have a 'special relationship' with the United 
States. Not only does it have a shared sense of heritage as well as common values 
and interests with the United States, exemplified in a long record of cooperation and 
shared sacrifice in common causes on the battlefield , but it also has a very strong 
trade relationship36 , a shared strategic outlook, and a security alliance that has 
lasted over fifty years (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86). As Australia's 
2003 DFAT publication Australia in Brief expresses: 
Australia's alliance with the United States is founded on a long tradition of 
defence cooperation, shared liberal democratic values, extensive 
economic ties and other common interests. The relationship remains 
fundamental to Australia's security and prosperity - and complements 
and reinforces Australia's practical commitment to the wider Asia-Pacific 
region (Australia in Brief, 2003, p. 1 0) . 
Indeed, this intimacy of connection extends back as far as 1908 when the then 
Australian Prime Minister wrote to the US diplomatic representative , "I doubt whether 
any two peoples are to be found who are in nearer touch with each other or likely to 
benefit more by anything that tends to knit their relations more closely" (Deakin cited in 
Downer, 1996a). Or as Theodore Roosevelt once said, "Australia and the United 
States are the warmest of friends" (cited in Downer, 1996a). More than fifty years on , 
this sentiment is still being expressed, for instance, by Dick Cheney who stated on his 
4-day visit to Australia this year that as "people who speak plainly and honestly" 
·
16 Strengthened even further since Australia's attainment of an FTA with the United States in 2004, a deal 
that ensures "-\S20 billion economic gain for "-\ustralia over the next 20 years and is expected to boost 
.-\ustralia's GDP by about 4 billion (0.4%) by 2010 and by S31 billion in rwenty years time (Advancing tbe 
l\"ational Interest, 2003, p. 91). 
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Australia and America are "natural friends" (Cheney, 2007). As he expressed: 
"Australia and America see the world from similar perspectives ... We were born in the 
same era, sprang from the same stock, and live for the same ideals. Australia and 
America share an affinity that reaches to our souls" (Cheney, 2007). 
This means that, owing to the great strength and closeness of this relationship, 
Australia possesses a formidable advantage that neither New Zealand nor many 
other nations in the world can profess to enjoy - the ability to influence US policy 
decisions. In a speech given on 4 February 2003, Downer speaks explicitly of this 
Australian power to influence Washington and the consequent benefits to Australia in 
the international sphere, stating: 
Let us be clear. Australia and the United States share alliance 
commitments and obligations, and we benefit greatly from the influence 
we have in Washington, which enables us to help shape international 
approaches" (Downer, 2003 [1]) . 
Indeed, when the Iraq issue re-emerged as a matter of concern to the Bush 
administration and first began to make waves in the international political circuit, 
Austral ia tangibly demonstrated its influence at the heart of the US , by encouraging 
the American Administration to take the matter of Iraq's non-compliance and the 
need for its disarmament to the UN. That the United States heeded Australia's 
advice is evident in the way that President Bush did indeed shortly afterwards go to 
the UN General Assembly, presenting America's ten concerns regarding Iraq to the 
Assembly on 12 September 2002 , as a first port of call in its efforts to deal with Iraq's 
recalcitrance ('President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly', 2002). 
Howard recounts this intervention by Australia to influence the Bush Administration's 
course of action on Iraq in the following statement: 
The [Australian] government has consistently argued that the United 
Nations needs to deal with Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of the 
Security Council's authority. This was the view I put to President Bush 
shortly before his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
in September last year. I then argued to him the merits of working through 
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the United Nations. That has been the steady theme of a strong 
diplomatic effort by Australia, ably led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(Howard, 2003 [2]) . 
As he accurately concludes: "our close relationship and our ready access to the US 
administration has meant that our views are heard and respected" (Howard, 2003 
[2]) . 
Indeed, the closeness of the relationship between Australia and the United States is 
so great between the Pacific pair, that during those tumultuous days when Iraq was 
a highly inflammable issue, the Australian Government was willing to not only 
publicly support the US in its position on Iraq, but also speak out in defense of its 
major ally. As Howard stated , for instance, in February 2003: "Mr Speaker, over the 
past few months there has been sustained criticism from some quarters, both here 
and abroad , regarding the role of the United States on this whole issue. So much of 
that criticism has been either wrong , unfair or downright prejudiced" (Howard, 2003 
[2]) : 
The issue of Iraq is now before the Security Council precisely because 
of the actions and pressure of the United States. For almost four years 
the Security Council had left Iraq in the too hard basket. .. Unless, 
therefore, it is regarded as provocative and contemptuous of the United 
States to charge the United Nations with the obligation of enforcing its 
own decisions, this allegation against the United States is without any 
substance (Howard, 2003 [2]). 
Or as Howard argued again later on: 
No criticism is more outrageous than the claim that US behaviour is 
driven by a wish to take control of Iraq's oil reserves. Self evidently, if 
cheap oil supplies were America's dominant motive, then years before 
now the United States would have done a deal with Iraq to lift the 
sanctions in return for plentiful supplies of low-priced oil. I have no doubt 
that the driving force behind American policy towards Iraq now is that, in 
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the wake of the events of 11th September, they have a justifiable concern 
that the twin evils of weapons of mass destruction , in the hands of rogue 
states, and international terrorism come together with horrific 
consequences (Howard, 2003 [2]) . 
2. A Close US-Australian Relationship Essential for Australia 
The second theme relating to the Australian-American relationship, as discernable in 
Australia 's Iraq speeches, concerns the way that a close US-Australian bilateral 
relationship is considered to be essential to Austral ia, a notion expressed not only by 
the present Howard Government but also by a long line of preceding Australian 
Governments extending back into history as far as the Second World War. Howard 
expounds on this subject in the course of his Iraq speeches saying , "Australians 
should always remember that no nation is more important to our long-term security 
than that of the United States" (Howard , 2003 [4]) , as Australia's relationship with the 
United States is: 
one of the most important relationships we have and , in an increasingly 
globalised and borderless world , the relationship between Australia and 
United States will become more rather than less important as the years 
go by (Howard , 2003 [5]) . 
Indeed, no nation in the world matters more to Australia than the United States -
strategically, economically, and politically - which is why the US alliance is 
considered so vitally important to Australia . As Howard explains: 
Our long-standing security alliance with the United States provides a solid 
and rel iable basis for us to cooperate on addressing these [world] issues. 
The shared intelligence and the access to cutting edge defence and 
security technologies that the alliance facilitates are vital to ensuring 
Australia's security, and will only become more important in the future 
(Howard , 2003 [6]). 
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It is for these reasons that Australian Government's have traditionally factored the 
US alliance and America's position on any international issue of the day into any 
major governmental decision concerning Australian foreign affairs. As Howard 
relates on the matter, "Australia has a long standing association with the United 
States and whenever these [international] issues are under consideration the nature 
of that relationship should be factored in" (Howard, 2003 [1]) , "the crucial long-term 
value of the US Alliance should always be a factor in major national security 
decisions taken by Australia" (Howard , 2003 [2]) . Moreover, he states, this has 
been: 
the policy of successive governments in Australia of both political 
persuasions. It's not only Coalition governments in office [that] have paid 
regard to the American alliance. So have Labor governments and that's 
good because there's no association which is more important to 
Australia's permanent security than our association with the United States 
(Howard , 2003 [1]) . 
In understanding this fact , it becomes more understandable why the US alliance 
played such a significant role in Australia's decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003. 
Proof of this consideration in the Australian decision-making process can be found 
throughout the Australian Iraq speeches. Before the war, for instance, Howard 
alludes frequently to this aspect of the US-Australian relationship: stating in January 
of 2003 "We have a close relationship with the United States and ... It's not the 
dominant reason, it's not the major reason but it's an important consideration in this 
whole issue [of Iraq] (Howard, 2003 [1 ]) ; in February furthermore that "Australia's 
alliance with the United States has been and will remain an important element in the 
government's decision making process on Iraq" (Howard, 2003 [2]) ; and in March, 
just prior to the war, "Of course our alliance with the United States is also a factor, 
unapologetically so" (Howard, 2003 [4]). Indeed, Howard's statement to the House 
in the final hours before the commencement of hostilities against Iraq on March 18 
proves beyond doubt the impact of the US-Australian alliance on his Government's 
decision on Iraq. As he emphasises: 
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Our alliance with the United States is unapologetically a factor in the 
decision that we have taken. The crucial , long-term value of the United 
States alliance should always be a factor in any major national security 
decision taken by Australia (Howard, 2003 [5]) . 
Or as Downer likewise confirmed to the House that day: 
We make no apology for our strong alliance relationship with the United 
States. The ANZUS alliance is the bedrock of our security. American 
leadership and military power contributes to a stable security environment 
in the region (Downer, 2003 [3]) . 
In point of fact, the ANZUS alliance is considered to be not only fundamental to 
Australia's national security, in both securing its own defence and ensuring stability 
within the Asia-Pacific region (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 88), but is also 
considered the bedrock of Australian foreign and defence policy (Kelton , 2006) . As 
Australia 's Defence 2000 document spells out, Australia's alliance with the US is "one 
of our great national assets" (cited in McElhattan, 2006), a long-held view made 
apparent in the way that Australia has had such a long history of solidarity with the 
US, fighting alongside the US in every one of its major conflicts since World War I 
(Devine, 2006). 37 The alliance is of vital importance to Australia not only because it 
symbolizes and formalizes a close alignment of enduring strategic values, interests 
and 'balance of power' thinking between the nations (Downer, 1996a; O'Brien, 2001 ), 
however, but also because it forms the basis for Australian-American military 
cooperation and interoperability involving military exercises and facilities (i.e. Pine 
Gap), personnel exchanges, the sharing of intelligence and strategic assessments, 
annual meetings between Australian foreign and defence ministers with their US 
counterparts (AUSMIN), and access to valuable logistics and unrivalled military 
technology - all of which enable the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to maintain its 
"qualitative edge" (Calvert, 2000; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 87 -88) . As 
Defence Update 2003 states, "Australia's defence capability is enhanced through 
17 Including in Somalia, "-\fghanistan and !ray, in which wars New Zealand did not take part. 
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access to US information and technology" , which not only increases Australia's ability 
to contribute effectively to coalition operations, but also "adds further weight" to the 
alliance owing to America's current military and political dominance in the world, 
enabling the two countries to "jointly benefit from, and contribute towards, global 
stability and prosperity" (Defence Update 2003, 2003, p. 9) . Indeed, by the new 
millennium the two countries' respective security policies were considered to be so 
close as to be "virtually indistinguishable" (O'Brien, 2001 , p. 33). As Howard explains: 
Our long-standing security alliance with the United States provides a solid 
and reliable basis for us to cooperate on addressing these [world] issues. 
The shared intelligence and the access to cutting edge defence and 
security technologies that the alliance facilitates are vital to ensuring 
Australia's security, and will only become more important in the future 
(Howard, 2003 [6]) . 
These security linkages between the two states are set to become even tighter in 
future years, moreover, thanks to Australia's agreement in February this year to host 
a new US military satellite communications base at Kojarena, Western Australia , and 
to store US weapons and supplies in the north of Australia ('Australia to host US 
signals base' , 2007; 'Australia okays US military base', 2007). This is in addition to 
their new US-Australian treaty, announced at the Sydney APEC summit this month, 
which will allow improved access to United States defence equipment and 
technology and bolster US-Australian personnel exchanges with 15,000 Australians 
able to travel to the US annually under the new deal ('Aust, US agree to defence 
deal', 2007). In fact, in 2004 Howard's determination to keep close ties between 
Australia and the Bush Administration during his tenure as Prime Minister has even 
earned him the nickname in Asia of America's "deputy sheriff', a notion reinforced in 
the years in light of Howard's refusal to withdraw its troops from Iraq on the basis 
that such an act would be "the biggest threat" to Australia's alliance with the US 
('Storm erupts over Howard's Obama views', 2007; 'Australia to host US signals 
base' , 2007). Australia therefore remains in 2007 a "valuable and respected partner" 
of the United States with the US-Australian alliance considered by both parties to be 
"as important now as it has ever been" (Cheney, 2007; 'Strengthening our alliance 
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with the United States', Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86) . The contrast 
between Australia and New Zealand in this regard could not be plainer. 
3. Australia & the US- Common Worldview. Values & History 
The third theme in the Australian Iraq speeches centres around the many 
commonalities and similarities of perspective between Australia and the United 
States, which are said to form the basis of their close friendship. Predominant in 
this list of shared features , as articulated in the Iraq speeches, are the two nations' 
shared view of the world , their shared values, and their common history - with the 
latter being inherently connected to both the former. 
Firstly, for instance, Australia and the United States are declared in the speeches to 
have a common view of the world . Howard emphasizes this point saying that "the 
friendship between us is based above all else on a commonality of views. We share 
a view of the world that values freedom and individual liberty" (Howard, 2003 (6]) . 
Indeed, it seems that it is this commonality of views, this quality of like-mindedness, 
that has caused Australia to so often join forces with the United States both 
diplomatically and militarily whenever international crises have arisen in world 
history. Secondly, Howard and Downer both refer to shared values between 
Australia and the US in the speeches. Howard states, for example, that "our value 
systems - while far from identical are nonetheless similar. We share common 
democratic values" (Howard, 2003 (2]) , while Downer likewise reiterates the same 
point saying that "we also share common values and interests - and we value US 
global leadership in defending and promoting them" (Downer, 2003 (1]) . 
It could be argued that this mutual set of values is also linked to the third aspect of 
similarity between the pair, their record of common historical experiences, much of 
which concerns their joining together in times of war to defend these deeply-held 
values and their shared worldview. To illustrate, in one of the Australian Iraq 
speeches PM Howard expresses his nation 's gratitude to the US stating "Australians 
will never forget the vital assistance we received from the United States during World 
War II " (Howard , 2003 [2]) in reference to that great global value-struggle in which 
Australia and the United States both participated in the fight for freedom and 
democracy, and in order to defeat the policies of oppression, aggressive expansion 
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and brutality enforced by both Imperial Japan and the Hitler's Nazi regime in Europe 
at that time. Historical liaisons between the US and Australia are not solely limited to 
the twentieth century however. In the modern era too Australia and the United States 
continue to create history together in frequently making common cause towards 
common interests. For instance, Howard outlines that the two nations not only "have 
made common cause in the fight against terrorism" (Howard, 2003 [2]) but also that 
"Australia and the United States have a common interest in preventing the spread of 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons" (Howard, 2003 [2]) -causes that are still 
on-going at this time. Australia's joining with the United States as a major 
participator in the Coalition of the Willing, that would ultimately wage war against 
Saddam and lead to that dictator's downfall in 2003, is another example of the two 
nations forging common national histories in an historical event. 
In fact this combination of shared worldview, values and defining historical moments 
have together served to form two rather like-minded Western nations over the 
decades, as well as nations that work well together. This has meant, in turn , that 
Australia and the United States have tended to see world issues and problems in a 
similar - if not the same - way, and to be in sync in many of their perspectives on 
major actions or decisions taken in the international sphere. Indeed, there is a 
strong argument that it is this quality of like-mindedness that has given rise to 
Australian agreement and support of many US actions, tactics or viewpoints on 
international affairs. Certainly there are many examples of this Australian tendency in 
the international sphere. In terms of foreign policy, for instance, Australia and the 
United States share many of the same perspectives and positions on issues in the 
international sphere which is a trend that extends back to the 1970s (Ansley, 2001). 
For instance, on the one hand, both countries have supported UN reform, the 
National Missile Defence (NMD) project, the development of new nuclear technology 
and the logic of nuclear deterrence, while on the other hand, the two nations have 
both opposed the creation of an International Criminal Court, have been slow to 
respond to calls to address the issue of climate change, and have refrained from 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, Jim George has gone so far as to call Australian 
support for US policy the nation's "traditional mantra", reflective of the prevailing view 
that "Australia's national interests are best served when integrated with those of our 
'great and powerful friend"' (George, 2003, p. 235). 
130 
4. Similarity in Threat Perception 
The fourth theme of the Australian discourse on the subject of US-Australian 
relations , and one related in many ways to the idea of shared perspectives above, 
concerns the two nations' many similarities in the realm of threat perception . Indeed, 
both countries not only share a strong sense of vulnerability, but the two states are 
also - as a result of this vulnerability - noticeably alive to the major threats in the 
world today, with a shared view of what these main threats to global security actually 
are, and shared perspectives and judgments concerning them. 
Firstly, in regard to vulnerability , in the post-9/11 world both the US and Australia 
have come to feel keenly their own national vulnerability and susceptibility to attack. 
As the storm clouds gathered within the international circuit over the Iraq issue, 
Downer spoke of this new sense of vulnerability , saying : 
On September 11 , terrorists turned civil aircraft into missiles and 
brought a new and threatening challenge to our security and to our way 
of life. This change has inevitably brought with it a new sense of 
vulnerability. A sense that is not unique to the United States, but applies 
equally to countries such as Australia . For Australia is not immune from 
the threats posed by irrational actors and new and devastating 
categories of weapons (Downer, 2002, 17 September). 
Or as Howard more poignantly expressed on the matter several months later: 
The atrocity in Bali demonstrated something Australia had never fully 
understood until then - that we are truly vulnerable. In light of this we 
have reappraised the way we view and deal with the threat of terrorism. 
We understand the danger of leaving threats unaddressed (Howard, 
2003 [2]). 
Chiefly , this pervasive sense of vulnerability stems back to that fateful day of 9/11 
2001 , when twenty-two Australians and 3,000 Americans were killed when terrorists 
flew planes into the Twin Towers of the commercial World Trade Centre, as well as 
the Pentagon in Washington D.C. (Williams, 2002 , p. 17). Indeed, due to the fact 
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that PM Howard happened to be in the United States at the time on an official visit , 
the horror of 9/11 impacted the Australian Government more deeply than might 
otherwise have been the case. As Amin Saikal comments on this fact: "[Howard] 
was not only shaken but also moved to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with what he had 
been promoting as Australia's number one ally" (Saikal , 2002 , p. 29). This sense of 
vulnerability in Australia and the United States has only been augmented in the 
years since, through shared experiences of further terrorist attacks in Bali, Jakarta 
and London , as well as by consequence of on-going suicide bombings in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Secondly, as a result of this awareness of national vulnerability , Australia and the 
United States have both been noticeably alert to the threat of attack in the post-9/11 
years and have subsequently come to share the same perspectives on what the 
main menaces are on the world stage today. Indeed, there are ample illustrations in 
the Iraq speeches pointing to the fact that Australia and the United States are united 
in what they consider to constitute the greatest and most pressing threats in the 
world in the 2000s - namely, terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and ambitious 
rogue states. As Howard states, "both our nations recognise the threat posed to our 
communities by international terrorists. We understand the dangers of leaving the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction unchecked" (Howard, 2003 [6]). Or as 
Downer asserts "Today, terrorism and the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons pose the greatest threat of all to our security" (Downer, 2003 [2]) , and 
"today, the thought that rogue states might use nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons has become a new public fear" (Downer, 2003 [2]). Indeed, in frequently 
being referred to in Australia's speeches, these three threats seem to truly loom 
large in the minds of both Governments on either side of the Pacific. 
This symmetry between Australian and American perspectives on world threats 
extends much further, however, than mere consensus on their name or number. The 
two nations additionally also seem to possess a shared outlook on each individual 
threat and have made the same judgments concerning them and how they ought to 
be addressed . 
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Terrorism 
In regard to terrorism, firstly , Australia and America agree that the kind of 
international terrorism so vividly and destructively demonstrated in New York and 
Bali is a phenomenon that originated in the ethnic fragmentation and envy of western 
prosperity so prevalent after the fall of the Berlin wall at the close of the Cold War 
(Howard , 2003 [4]) . As hostility towards the West and its values grew, international 
terrorism also rose "in strength and incidence and activity through the 1990s" 
(Howard, 2003 [3]), manifesting itself firstly in an attack on the World Trace Centre in 
1993, then later in numerous attacks on American facilities worldwide, such as those 
that took place in East Africa that claimed over 300 lives (Howard, 2003 [4]) , and 
"culminating in the horrific attacks in New York and Washington" (Howard , 2003 [4]) . 
Both nations also believe Islamic terrorism to be a movement that "is based on a 
blind hatred of western civilization and western values" (Howard , 2003 [3]) and 
motivated by "a detestation of western values" (Howard, 2003 [4]} , meaning that 
those who use terror "seek to undermine free societies, the values we share and to 
harm our citizens" (Downer, 2002 , 17 September). Indeed, in the minds of the 
Australian and American Governments these terrorist jihad-ists feature as ruthless 
killers who will use any and all means at their disposal in this global struggle for 
domination. As Downer affirms, "they care not a whit for innocent lives: they are 
happy to kill and maim as many civilians as they can in pursuit of their extreme 
agendas" (Downer, 2003 [2]) . Or as Howard likewise concludes, "the events of 11th 
September 2001 and the atrocity in Bali have clearly demonstrated that international 
terrorists have no regard for human life" (Howard, 2003 [6]) . This being the case, 
Australia considers international terrorism to be not only an imminent threat, but one 
that is particularly grotesque in being "contrary to all civilized values" (Downer, 2002 , 
17 September). 
Indeed, according to Australia and the US, the fact of this new and disturbing reality 
of global terrorism has had two effects: it has "changed the world and changed the 
way in which the world must look at terrorism" (Howard, 2003 [3]) . As Howard states 
in regard to the former: 
We now understand, after the events in Bali and those of 11th September 
2001 , that we are living in a world where unexpected and devastating 
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terrorist attacks on free and open societies can occur in ways that we 
never before imagined possible. There is a new dimension to 
international relations and we cannot ignore it (Howard, 2003 [2]) . 
As to the latter, Howard underscores the subsequent change within the policy-
making communities of the US and Australia after 9/11 in the broadening of security 
outlooks from a more localized scope in the pre-9/11 years , to one that now takes in 
the entire globe to include all worldwide terrorist networks and their sponsors and 
benefactors, and the adoption of new military methods and tactics such as pre-
emption . As Downer expounds on the matter: 
On September 11 , terrorists turned civil aircraft into missiles and brought 
a new and threatening challenge to our security and to our way of 
life ... Responsible governments, Mr Speaker, are compelled to respond 
and address this vulnerability. We must identify those who use terror and 
those who have the capacity and the motive to acquire and use weapons 
of mass destruction ... . We need to challenge those who challenge 
international order. As the Prime Minister has emphasised , we can no 
longer afford to leave such threats unattended. (Downer, 2002, 17 
September) 
Illustrations of such a recognition for the value of military action in combating 
terrorism are plentiful in the international sphere. For instance, Australia and the 
United States have frequently used force to quash terrorists in Afghanistan , in the 
caves along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and in Iraq. As Howard expresses on 
the subject, "we now live in a world where the threat of terrorism is borderless and 
it's different and you've got to confront it in a different way" (Howard, 2003 [3]). In 
fact , since the extreme type of terrorism demonstrated in New York, Bali and London 
is based on a blind hatred of Western civilisation and Western values, the Australian 
and American Governments concur that any "calibration of responses to that will not 
automatically buy immunity" (Howard , 2003 [3]) . This understanding of the nature of 
the terrorist threat, the way that terrorist extremists know no compromise and are 
totally committed to one destructive end - the destruction of the Western way of life -
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provides another explanation for Australia and America's adoption of such a hardline 
on terrorists and terrorist supporters. To their mind , any other tactic, any other softer 
option -whether this is diplomacy, negotiation , mediation or even patience -would 
be self-defeating and absurd. For to the Australian and American way of thinking , 
this battle is nothing other than a fight to the death - either of the terrorists or the 
United States and its allies. 
The Proliferation of WMDs 
The second matter considered by the US and Australia to constitute one of the 
greatest threats to the world today is that of WMD proliferation. Prior to 9/11 
Australia had been a staunch advocate of non-proliferation and non-proliferation 
regimes in the international arena for some time. This fact is made evident in 
Howard's declaration that Australia has a "powerful desire to stop the spread of 
chemical , biological and nuclear weapons" (Howard , 2003 [2]) and is "vehemently 
opposed to the proliferation of chemical , biological and nuclear weapons" (Howard , 
2003 [2]) . As he explains, "we do not possess these weapons and we wish to 
ensure that they do not become an acceptable part of every nation's arsenal" 
(Howard, 2003 [2]). Indeed, since "successive Australian governments have worked 
long and hard to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction , on the basis 
that they pose a fundamental threat to our national security" (Downer, 2003 [3]} , 
Downer considers opposition to the spread of WMDs to be an Australian tradition in 
foreign policy. However, since the onset of the global War on Terror the proliferation 
of such treacherous weapons has become an even greater matter of concern to both 
US and Australian governments. 
There are six main reasons for this augmented fear regarding WMDs in Australia's 
Iraq speeches. The first concerns the destructive potential of the weapons being 
proliferated around the globe. As Howard stresses: 
They are too dangerous. Their destructive power is hundreds of times 
greater than conventional weapons - terrible as they may be. Their 
destructive force is not easily contained or controlled and their effects can 
span the generations. These are no ordinary weapons (Howard , 2003 
[2]) . 
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The second reason relates to the way that as WMDs spread, the potential and 
possibility for their use becomes much greater. As Howard states on the matter: "We 
know the lessons of history: the more nations that have these weapons, the more 
likely they are to be used. That is why we fear proliferation" (Howard, 2003 [5]) . 
Lastly, the third concerns the fear that if proliferation is allowed to become 
widespread , state possession of WMD arsenals will become the norm among nation-
states in the international community. As Howard has expressed on this point, "we 
should all be deeply concerned about a world in which weapons of mass destruction 
become the norm" (Howard, 2003 [2]) , "that these weapons may become 
commonplace in arsenals of sovereign states is frightening" (Howard, 2003 [5]) . The 
fourth factor, that likewise serves to increase the threat potential of WMD 
proliferation for Australia as well as for the US, is the real possibility that as WMDs 
proliferate and become the norm, they will spread to America and Australia's own 
regions to become a neighbourhood menace. Both Howard and Downer highlight 
this point in their speeches, Howard stating "we are very concerned about the 
potential for the proliferation of these weapons in our own region (Howard, 2003 [5]) , 
and Downer likewise articulating that "if we allow countries in other parts of the world 
to develop weapons of mass destruction , then these weapons will turn up in our own 
neighbourhood" (Downer, 2003 [1 ]) . Fifth , the spread of WMDs in itself will raise the 
stakes of global politics and will across the board "make the world a much more 
dangerous place for all of us" (Howard , 2003 [2]). As Howard elaborates, "every 
time a nation is allowed to undermine the international treaties and agreements put 
in place to restrict or prohibit the spread of chemical , biological or nuclear weapons, 
the world becomes more dangerous for all nations" (Howard, 2003 [2]). Lastly, the 
sixth and final factor concerns Australia's "greatest fear", shared equally with the 
United States, that these weapons will find their way into the hands of terrorists 
(Downer, 2003 [2]) . As Downer relates in one of his speeches on Iraq , "those same 
weapons now risk spreading further, beyond rogue states, to terrorist groups" 
(Downer, 2003 [2]) , "and because nuclear, chemical or biological weapons might fall 
into the hands of terrorists, we have even more reason to be fearful" (Downer, 2003 
[2]) . 
Indeed, the rise of international terrorism in recent years and the potential spread of 
these weapons to terrorists groups have made support for non-proliferation of even 
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greater - in some respects critical - importance to the United States and its allies. 
Certainly, the combination of WMDs with terrorist extremists is a frightening and 
deplorable proposition, as the US and Australia and many other nations of the world 
are well aware. When married to the Australian-American understanding of terrorist 
motivations, however, the possibility of such a thing takes on even greater meaning 
and becomes all the more appalling and calamitous to the Western way of life that 
these great democracies enjoy. Howard speaks of this grim reality in his Iraq 
speeches saying, "that these weapons may become commonplace in arsenals of 
sovereign states is frightening enough , but it would be a nightmare for the 
international community if they were to find their way into the hands of terrorists" 
(Howard , 2003 [5]) . This is because, as Downer explains: 
Unlike states, terrorist groups do not want nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons for prestige, power, or for deterring others. Terrorist groups 
want nuclear, chemical and biological weapons so that they can use 
them. They want to tear down the structures of civil society -government, 
industry, community- in liberal democracies such as ours (Downer, 2003 
[2]) . 
Indeed, as the Australian Government has expressed: "After the terror of September 
11 in New York and October 12 in Bali we can clearly see that the only encumbrance 
on the atrocities of these terrorists will be the weapons available to them" (Downer, 
2003 [2]) . Indeed, the fact that terrorists are actively seeking to gain control of these 
weapons to use against the West in this War on Terror has been such an 
unthinkable possibility of even greater concern. As Howard avers, "terrorist 
organisations like AI Qaeda want these weapons. And make no mistake - if they 
obtain them they will use them" (Howard , 2003 [6]) : 
We know as a matter of fact that terrorist networks such as ai-Qaeda 
want to obtain weapons of mass destruction. They are actively seeking 
them and they desire them because of their potency. With such weapons 
at their disposal , terrorists could target entire cities or regions. Their 
victims would not number in the hundreds or the thousands but potentially 
even more (Howard , 2003 [5]) . 
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Consequently, since the "possession of chemical , biological or nuclear weapons by 
terrorists constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and its people" 
(Howard, 2003 [5]), as well as to the US and its citizens all over the world , the two 
nations remain adamant that "the world must take decisive and effective steps" 
(Howard, 2003 [5]) to prevent proliferation . 
Rogue States 
Thirdly, the US and Australia are in complete agreement concerning what is 
regarded as the third great threat on the world stage today - rogue states. As 
insular states usually governed by despotic dictators and characterised by 
dismissiveness towards the outside world , while oppression and repression is on-
going within its state boundaries, rogue regimes are in themselves a grave matter of 
concern in international relations, and rightfully so, though not generally of the kind 
that inspires radical corrective action by the international community. Australia and 
the United States have long shown a marked dislike for such regimes in International 
Relations. However in recent times rogue states have begun to feature even more 
prominently than usual in the discourse of both nations due to the augmented risk 
potential of these volatile states in terms of their status as concerns WMDs and 
proliferation , and additionally, as concerns their real or potential links with terrorist 
networks in the war against terrorism. 
As far as the connection between rogue states and proliferation is concerned, firstly , 
in light of the fact that a number of rogue states on the world stage have either 
expressed a strong desire to acquire WMDs, are in active pursuit of such weapons, 
or have already acquired WMDs, it is rather self-evident why Australia and the 
United States consider these states to be of such concern in the twenty-first century 
world . As Downer emphasized during his Iraq speeches: 
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are now in the hands of 
maverick states - states that have little regard for the clear international 
consensus against such weapons established since World War II. If we 
don't act, we face a 21st century afflicted by dangerous and 
unaccountable dictators armed with nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons (Downer, 2003 [2]) . 
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Or as Howard likewise reiterated: 
There has always been a fear that the more nations that possess these 
weapons, the more likely they will eventually be used. This fear is 
compounded when they are in the hands of regimes that show a total 
disregard for common humanity and the rule of law, aggressive and 
belligerent regimes like that overseen by Saddam Hussein (Howard, 2003 
[6]). 
Add to these scenarios of unease a second consideration - and one worse than the 
first - the fact that some rogue states are already known to have links with terrorist 
networks, making the prospect of WMDs being passed on into the hands of AI 
Qaeda-type terrorists a real possibility, and one can see why such a recipe for 
disaster has become of utmost priority to the Australian and American governments, 
especially in the context of the global War on Terror. Indeed, the fear that rogue 
regimes might form the 'middle-link' with both the ability and inclination to pass their 
weapon stockpiles on to anti-Western terrorist groups has evoked strong rhetoric 
and action against such regimes by Australia and the US, as well as Britain and 
other concerned allies, as the Iraq war can well attest. As Howard states: "We must 
do everything we can to contain the capacity of rogue states to possess chemical 
and biological weapons because amongst other things they may give those weapons 
to terrorists" (Howard, 2003 [3]) . It is in this vein of thought that the Australian Prime 
Minister, like President Bush of the United States, declares himself to have "the 
strongest possible belief that the world must confront the twin evils of the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction to rogue states" (Howard , 2003 [4]) , since "the danger 
of those would be to me and to my Government the ultimate nightmare. It is a new 
and sobering reality" (Howard, 2003 [4]) . 
From this understanding then, it is clear that it was these areas of convergence in 
threat perception which motivated the two Pacific powers go to war together twice in 
the early years of the twenty-first century, Australia invoking the ANZUS treaty for the 
first time in 2001 , in committing 1 ,500 Australian troops to take part in the war against 
the Taleban of Afghanistan as well as the wider anti-terrorism campaign (Saikal , 2002, 
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p. 29) , and again in 2003 when it formed part of the US-UK-AUS "Coalition of the 
Willing" invasion of Iraq. Similarly, it has also been these shared views and shared 
vulnerabilities that have seen Australian and American personnel work together to 
nurture Iraq's first experience of democratic government in the years since 2003, a 
collaboration that is not expected to end for some time. Indeed, in reference to the 
Iraq War specifically, through understanding what comprise the three most grievous 
threats to the United States and Australia , it becomes clearer why Iraq was of such 
concern to these Governments and considered to pose a 'grave and gathering' threat, 
not only to these nations themselves, but also to the wider world . The speeches show 
that the Coalition members' main fear about Iraq was in fact this prospect that the 
three greatest global threats - terrorism, WMDs and rogue regimes - could actually 
"sooner or later come together" (Howard , 2003 [2]) into one single attack either against 
their own homelands, or those of their allies and friends -what Howard has called the 
ultimate nightmare scenario "with terrifying consequences for the world" (Howard, 
2003 [2]) .38 It is for this reason too that the Australian and American Governments 
considered the war to be part of the wider War on Terror. As Howard confirmed in a 
speech made early March during the Iraq Crisis: 
I see disarming Iraq as being part of the wider war against terrorism 
because of Iraq's past and continuing assistance to terrorist 
38 Firsdy, Saddam's Iraq had for 20 years already been a key concern for the international community 
because of its maintenance of an illegal stockpile of weapons, including \X!riiDs, in direct disobedience to 
UNSC resolutions. Secondly, Saddarn's Iraq was considered to not only be armed with \'Vl\IDs, but what 
is worse, was also ar the same time - by definition - a rohrue regime in itself. ;\s the ;\ustralian 
Government articulated on this point "Iraq is demonstrably, to use my language, a rogue state (Howard, 
2003 [4]), "all agree that the Iraqi regime is one of the most repressive and cruel in the world" (Howard, 
2003 [5]), and one in which WMDs are considered by Saddarn to be "essential both for internal repression 
and to fulfill his regional ambitions" (Howard, 2003 [5]). Thirdly, in regard to the global fight against 
terrorism Iraq constituted a threat because it not only had "clear" and "proven links to terrorism" 
(Downer, 2003 [3]; Downer, 2003 [2]), but also was "a strong backer of terrorist organizations" (Downer, 
2003 [1]) with "a long history of state-sponsored terrorism" (Downer, 2002 [1]) . As Downer explains, 
"Saddam Hussein has consistently used terror as a key instrument of his regime's policies and has 
supported its use by others. The Iraqi regime has long supported, hosted, funded and trained Palestinian 
and other terrorist groups" (Downer, 2002 [1]), including the Abu Nidal Organisation, responsible for 
major terrorist attacks in twenty countries (Downer, 2002 [1]) and ~lujaheddin-e-Khalq which was 
responsible for a terrorist attack against Iranian diplomats in Canberra, .-\ustralia, in 1992 (Downer, 2002 
[1]) . .-\s Downer concluded, "the international community is without doubt confronted with a grave 
threat" (Downer, 2002 [1]) : "Iraq, through its efforts to amass nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, 
threatens its neighbours and the ~liddle East region . • -\nd by thumbing its nose at the repeated efforts of 
the international community, through the United Nations Security Council, Iraq is undermining global 
security" (Downer, 2003 [2]) . 
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organisations. And because if chemical and biological weapons ever got 
into the hands of terrorists we could have even more horrific outcomes 
than occurred in Bali. .. One day you will have the fatal cocktail of those 
weapons being given to international terrorists. So that is the ultimate 
nightmare and that is the reason why I believe the world has to act firmly 
and bring about the immediate and unconditional and total disarmament 
of Iraq (Howard , 2003 [3]) . 
5. Australian Independence Still Paramount 
Lastly, the fifth and final theme of the Iraq speeches regarding Australia's 
relationship with Washington concerns another aspect of this bilateral relationship -
and one that may in fact work to balance out any excessive preponderance of 
American positions in the Australian decision-making process - that of Austral ian 
independence. For though it is apparent that the US alliance is factored into every 
major decision on Australian foreign policy, and that the two nations often share 
similar perspectives, this does not automatically equate to Australian concord or 
conformity with any stance taken by America. Australian decisions are still 
independent decisions, formed on an independent basis. As Howard states on the 
matter, "alliances are two-way processes and our alliance with the United States is 
no exception" (Howard, 2003 [4]) , "neither nation seeks to promote this relationship 
at the expense of another" (Howard, 2003 [6]) . 
Indeed, even on the issue of Iraq, an issue over which Australia has borne the brunt 
of much criticism in following America's lead , Howard fiercely defends Australia's 
independent choice on the matter. "Well we haven't been lent on rather heavily by 
the Americans", he declares in one speech in January. In fact, "we haven't been 
'leant on' at all" (Howard, 2003 [1 ]). Or as Downer firmly enunciates on this point: 
But the idea that our position on Iraq reflects some kind of blind loyalty to 
the United States is wrong . Equally I do not assert that all those who 
oppose the position the Americans have taken on Iraq are driven by a 
blind hatred of the United States. This Government will always act in 
accordance with Australia's national interest (Downer, 2003 [1 ]) . 
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It seems clear from this then, that though the security alliance with the US was "an 
important consideration" in the decision to commit Australian troops to a war in Iraq, 
it was not the only, nor the dominant consideration in the matter (Howard, 2003 [3]) . 
As Downer stresses, "there are other compelling reasons behind why we feel so 
strongly about this issue" (Downer, 2003 [1]). In reaching its final decision the 
Australian government is described by Howard as being influenced not only by 
Australia 's alliance with the US, but also by "our powerful desire to stop the spread of 
chemical , biological and nuclear weapons" and "also importantly by the past practice 
of nations which have taken collective military action in the interests of world or 
regional security" (Howard, 2003 [2]) . Indeed, even in reference to the decision to 
participate in a second Iraq war, Howard describes his Government's independence 
in arriving at a decision. According to Howard, his Cabinet debated and discussed 
the matter together, weighing everything up (Howard, 2003 [3]) , before coming to the 
conclusion that Australian involvement was "the right decision in the Australian 
national interest" (Howard, 2003 [3]) since "we cannot walk away from the threat that 
Iraq's continued possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes to its region 
and to the wider world" (Howard, 2003 [5]) . 
There are other indicators in the speeches of Australia's independent attitude in its 
decision-making too. Consider, for example, Howard's remark that "we do what we 
do because we judge it to be the right thing for Australia to do. Other countries do 
what they do because of judgements they make" (Howard, 2003 [1]) . This point is 
reiterated later too when he says "we made our decision based on our own 
assessment. I mean, as to what the British do is a matter for Britain . What we do is a 
matter for us" (Howard, 2003 [4]) . In fact , even after the ADF deployed to the Gulf 
Australia's desire to preserve its independence can be seen in the way that 
Australian forces operating in conjunction with the Americans and British were to be 
subject to uniquely Australian rules of engagement and would fight "under separate 
national command", something "that has been the case in the past and it will be the 
case in the future" (Howard, 2003 [4]) . As Howard emphatically declares: 
In the past, and I can assure you it will be the same in the future, the rules 
of engagement under which any Australian forces might fight in the future 
in any conflict, will be our own. They will not be dictated to by any country . 
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There will be separate Australian rules of engagement in any conflict, and 
indeed there would be separate targeting policies (Howard, 2003 [4]). 
In this way Australian independence would be safeguarded even during military 
operations as "we would have our own say in relation to what we would be involved 
in and whether that coincided with the policies of allies, well we'll just have to wait 
and see" (Howard, 2003 [4]). Perhaps the best example of Australia's attitude of 
independence in the Iraq speeches though is Howard's press conference quip, in 
speaking of out-dated views on aggression and the new and different menace that 
has changed the world since 9/11 : 
I've given, I believe, a clear enunciation of why we're adopting the policy 
we have ... I'm not going to adopt yours or anybody else's language. I 
choose my own. I've explained the reasons. I hope they are clear and 
compelling (Howard, 2003 [4]). 
The veracity of these statements regarding Australia's independence of thought and 
action can be seen in the way that it is likewise apparent, not just in the 
Government's rhetoric, but also in the tangible foreign policy sphere too. Indeed, 
Australian independence has given rise to several areas of disagreement and 
frustration between the Australia and the US in their foreign affairs in past years. For 
instance, Australia disagrees with the US over America's reluctance to implement 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and strengthen the Biological 
Weapons Convention, its economic protectionism especially in terms of agricultural 
trade, and the United States China-Taiwan policy (George, 2003; Advancing the 
National Interest, 2003, p. 86; Kelton , 2006). Equally, the US is not particularly 
happy about Australia's commitment to intensify ties with Beijing in parallel with the 
US - called Australia's 'US plus' approach , nor with Australia's refusal to support 
American opposition to the European's Union's relaxed arms embargo to China, or 
indeed Australian non-participation in the Halibut talks where US allies discussed the 
rise (and threat) of China (Kelton, 2006, p. 231 ). However, though Australia affirms 
that, like New Zealand , it "will continue to stand up for our interests where our views 
differ from US views" (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86}, Australia prefers 
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to employ 'quiet diplomacy' with Washington on these matters (Patman, 2005), 
emphasizing that "we have never been better placed to put our views to the United 
States -and have them heard" (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86). 
In sum, as Maryanne Kelton has observed, "the centrality of the US in the floor plan 
of relations in foreign policy" have remained in place over the last few years (Kelton , 
2006, p. 229). In fact , due to the two nations' mutual agreement on the principle of 
force in International Relations and the specific necessity of promptly applying force 
to achieve Iraq's complete disarmament, along with their subsequent military 
collaboration in the invasion of Iraq, the relationship between Australia and the 
United States has been bolstered further to unprecedented new heights in recent 
years. Howard describes this development in a speech given in May that 
proclaimed the end of military hostilities in Iraq. As he states: 
My talks last week with President Bush underlined the deepening and 
strengthening relationship between our two nations. The relationship 
between Australia and America has never been stronger. This 
relationship is not forced or contrived. We are all ies because we are 
friends- close friends (Howard , 2003 (6]) . 
Or as Dick Cheney said of the Australian-US relationship earlier this year: "Over 
time, that deep affinity has grown into a great alliance. Yet the United States and 
Australia do not take each other for granted. This alliance is strong because we want 
it to be, and because we work at it, and because we respect each other as equals" 
(Cheney, 2007). Indeed, today Australia prepares for the future with the great 
satisfaction of not only having its "closest alliance" with the world superpower, ('Aust, 
US agree to defence deal', 2007), but also as a nation standing shoulder-to-shoulder 
with the US as two Pacific powers that are "strong allies" and fully-fledged partners 
on the world stage that "stand together in the decisive struggle against terrorism" 
(Cheney, 2007). In Cheney's words: "Once again, we choose to face challenges 
squarely. And once again , we go forward - as allies, as comrades-in-arms, and , 
above all , as friends" (Cheney, 2007). 
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Chapter Six 
Explaining the Divergence: Two Orthodox Theories 
This chapter seeks to explore possible explanations for these substantial differences 
between the Tasman neighbours in their different perspectives, judgements and 
actions in world affairs today. At present there are two orthodox theories in 
mainstream academic discourse that according to conventional wisdom offer the 
best explanations for trans-Tasman divergence in their international relations . The 
first is Hugh White's theory of divergent 'strategic perception', and the second David 
McCraw's theory of contrasting political ideologies among successive governments 
on either side of the Tasman. However, though both explanations form logical and 
compelling arguments, and do succeed in explaining particular aspects of trans-
Tasman divergence, they nevertheless fall short in some way since they each fail to 
account for the full range of government policies or actions on either side of the 
Ditch. Indeed, when tested against historical scenarios over the past thirty years , the 
explanations seem in some cases to be contradicted entirely by history, while in 
other instances the underlying constructs that form the basis of their arguments fail 
to hold up altogether. This chapter will provide a brief summary and critique of these 
two orthodox explanations, and then offer a third alternative way of explaining trans-
Tasman difference and divergence in their foreign affairs. 
Hugh White's Theory of Strategic Perception 
According to Hugh White , a Professor of Strategic Studies and Head of the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University (ANU), the deep 
seated differences in New Zealand and Australia's foreign and security policy, and 
respective defence postures in particular, can be explained with reference to their 
contrariety in what he calls 'strategic perception' - namely, the way they think about 
their strategic environment (White, 2003). White considers this strategic 
geographical environment or 'geopolitical context' to be comprised of two elements 
'physical geography' and 'political geography', the former referring to the factors of 
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geographical location and size, and the latter referring to 'threat perception'39 and a 
country's 'national psychology', which involves historical experiences of military 
aggression and war in addition to population size and diversity (White, 2003). 
In terms of political geography, firstly , like Paul Dibb who argues that a country's 
geography "is the mother of strategy and one of the most important factors driving 
military posture and force structure" (Dibb, 2006, p. 247), White argues that 
differences in geographical location and size form one component of the Tasman 
pair's aptitude to think differently about their strategic environments and adopt 
disparate defence postures. Australia is the hot, wide, brown continent with an empty 
heartland, thirty times the size of its tiny neighbour and located nearer to Southeast 
Asia and particularly to the southern end of the Indonesia archipelago (Mclean, 
2001 b, p. 21 ; Mclean, 2003, p. 31 , 35). White argues that this, combined with the 
fact that large divergent Asia lies close by and is easily accessible while the 
Polynesian Pacific is further away and therefore of less concern , has meant that 
Australia 's strategic focus is more Asia-oriented while also involving much wider 
interests and a broader focus in its strategic outlook than New Zealand (White, 
2002b; White 2002c). Moreover, as a nation of large size Australia looks to 
Indonesia as its closest neighbour of significance and to the United States as the 
most similar nation with whom to form a close alliance, while also tending to wield a 
greater ability to influence decision-makers in the region through the projection of 
power than does New Zealand , thus explaining its employment of coercion rather 
than simply diplomacy in advancing its national interests (White, 2002c). New 
Zealand , by contrast, a small narrow finger of "steep green isles" with a cooler 
climate and empty shores (Mclean, 2001 b, p. 21 ; Mclean, 2003, p. 31 , 35}, 
surrounded only by vast areas of ocean , is remote not only from the events of Asia in 
being situated closer to the South Pacific region but also even from Australia itself 
(1200 miles separate the Tasman nations and the distance between Wellington and 
Canberra is the same as between Paris and Moscow} , causing it to have a much 
narrower and more limited strategic outlook and sphere of influence (White, 2002c) . 
This has prompted the nation to withdraw from the wider world , and more particularly 
the wider Asia-Pacific region by focusing more on the issues and concerns affecting 
~~ Rtferring to the presence or perceiveJ likdihooJ of emergent military attacks on either national territory 
or Interests. 
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the South Pacific and its resident populations there, in addition to creating a 
tendency among New Zealand governments to rely on diplomacy to advance its 
interests in the world rather than the power projection of its larger neighbour (White, 
2002b; White , 2002c) . 
Secondly, White argues that trans-Tasman divergence in their foreign and security 
policies can be explained by profound differences in threat perception . Australia's 
huge territory is considered to generate a great deal of anxiety about its protection 
and security among Australian governments. As Australian Prime Minister Paul 
Keating once glowered revealingly: "We've got a continent of our own down there 
you know Mate, you don't pick up one of those everyday so we aim to look after it" 
(cited in White , 2003). According to White, this anxiety is generated not only from 
Australia's size, however, but also from the reality that due to the predominant ethnic 
heritage of Australia's population of 20 million people, the country is a bastion of 
Western Anglo-Saxon culture located in "a sea of Asian cultures" (Dalrymple, cited in 
Templeton, 2004). In fact , the way that Australia lies in an impoverished , resource-
poor, densely populated region (White, 2002a) while being itself a prosperous 
society inhabiting an under-populated, resource-rich continent, has created what 
Dibb calls a kind of "strategic paranoia" (Dibb, 2006) . This is especially the case in 
view of Australia's near 'indefensibility' in the region (owing to its vast size) when 
contrasted with its exceedingly well-armed Northern neighbours40 . Indeed, unlike in 
Europe, defence spending in Asia has risen by about one quarter in real terms since 
the mid-1980s, meaning that "things that no longer seem credible in Europe are still 
possible here" (White, 2002a). Indeed, as Gerald Hensley and Colin James point 
out, today Australia considers the Asia-Pacific region to comprise a mass of 
countries that may be sources of terrorism, transnational crime, pandemics, and to 
be a region prone to conflict and rivalry (as between China and Taiwan) as well as 
potentially or actually failed states (Hensley, 2001 , p. 97; James, 2006d) . 
In comparison , possessing a small population size (of approximately 4 million 
people, equivalent to the population of Melbourne41 ) and one of increasingly 'Pacific 
~ 11 In the mid-1980s for instance, while rhe armed forces of Indonesia, \'iernam, Japan, India and the 
Philippines each boasted three million persons, Australia's defence force could muster only 80,000 (Mack, 
1985, p. 69). 
~ 1 (McKinnon, 1993). 
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orientation ' in its demography, while also enjoying the protection of distance and 
remoteness from the affairs of Asia , New Zealand has developed a pervasive feeling 
of security in its isolation and correspondingly quite a different rationale of threat 
perception . Indeed, the presence of a large friendly Australian neighbour to its near 
north, that tends to act like a buffer zone between the small country and the wider 
world , has only served to augment the sense of protection among New Zealanders 
(White, 2003). For not only can Australia always be relied on to be secure, being so 
committed to its own security throughout its history and also tending to deal with any 
emerging threats as a matter of course through attending to its own interests, but 
also the likelihood of war between the Tasman neighbours is so unthinkable as to 
make the chance of a military attack on New Zealand territory very slim indeed 
(White, 2003) . Furthermore, due to the fact that New Zealand is considered by many 
to be too distant, small and insubstantial to be of strategic interest to any of its other 
more powerful neighbours in the region (James, 2006d), it is the absence rather than 
the presence of threat that has come to characterize New Zealand's strategic outlook 
in recent decades. As White's take on the Japanese proverb makes clear - "Same 
bed, different nightmares": while New Zealand's nightmare is economic insecurity 
and insignificance, Australia's is of a threat to its territorial integrity, national interests 
or way of life. 
Augmenting and reinforcing these differences in threat perception and 'national 
psychologies' regarding security between the neighbours, moreover, are disparate 
historical records in terms of experiences of foreign aggression and warfare in the 
region . While New Zealand remained on the periphery of Pacific events during the 
Second World War, Australia was a major participant in the fighting that went on in 
the region and was brought up against the realities of power in Asia in a way that 
New Zealand has never experienced (McKinnon , 1993, p. 34). In fact Australians 
possess bitter memories of the war with Japan. Not only were Australian servicemen 
extensively and dramatically involved in fighting the Japanese in the region , during 
the course of which many servicemen were interned in notorious Japanese Prisoner 
of War camps across occupied-Asia, but the country also underwent an experience 
of feeling acutely vulnerable to attack with the Australian town of Darwin being 
repeatedly attacked and bombed by the Japanese and Imperial submarines prowling 
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Australian waters42 (White, 2002b; White, 2002c; Sutton, 2001 ; Mclean, 2003). By 
contrast, New Zealand has never undergone the trauma of foreign bombardment or 
attack and has limited experience of having to defend oneself against military 
invasion from a foreign aggressor. In fact New Zealand's experience of foreign 
infiltration into the country's territory or affairs in the past century can be boiled down 
to German mine-laying off Auckland and Wellington harbours during the Second 
World War and French sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior, that killed one man, in 
1985 (Mclean , 2003, p. 257). As for the Pacific War, New Zealand's moment of 
danger was very brief and the sense of its own vulnerability faded away very quickly 
- much more quickly than it did for Australia - causing the war's main impact on the 
country to be not a heightened sense of threat in the Asia-Pacific, but rather a 
reinforcement of the notion that "foreign relations was something that someone else 
looked after, the Americans if not the British , better still the United Nations, if one 
didn't want to be forced to choose" (McKinnon, 1993, p. 32). Indeed, according to 
Malcolm McKinnon, New Zealand has had little if any experience of peril in the 
twentieth century - the country has never been invaded, nor undergone sustained 
aerial bombardment, war fought across its territory, unconstitutional or violent 
transfer of power, revolution , civil war or insurrection, famine , or hyperinflation 
(McKinnon, 1993, p. 26)43 . In fact New Zealand's history is a story of continual 
protection and security, whether as a sheltered and protected Dominion of the British 
Empire, a member of the Commonwealth and then ANZUS, or as a state greatly 
involved in a range of international organizations committed to making war 
inconceivable as an instrument of policy (McKinnon, 1993, p. 27). 
All this has meant that the threat of war against New Zealand hardly ranks as a 
possibility among New Zealanders, while across the Ditch Australians tend to be a 
~ 2 : \ recent documentary by 60 Minutes screened on ew Zealand television in September this year 
revealed that three Japanese midget-submarines, designed specifically for use in Sydney Harbour, were 
found patrolling the harbour during the war, one of which to rpedoed and destroyed a ferry docked at 
anchor in the harbour killing around ten people. 
~ 3 ~-\ s journalist David Groves wrote on the subject in 1993: "New Zealand has not been a fascist state; has 
not been invaded very recently; has not, this century, had armed warfare between its citizens; has not 
kicked out a monarch; has not had a huge communist part around which ir was impossible to form an 
alternative collation; has not lived in close proximity ro left and right dictatorships; has not had to 
withstand a massive terrorist assault on its institutions; has not had an entrenched l\ Iafia; has not had 
unemployment and internal migration on anything like the same scale [as Italy and o ther countries)"( cited 
in l\ IcKinnon, 1993, p . 26). 
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great deal more wary, suspicious and fearful of future aggression against Australia, 
its people or its interests. It is these differences in threat perception, White argues, 
that have motivated Australian governments, on the one hand, to continually request 
a greater scale of ADF protection capability across all three air, sea and land forces 
and to invest such hefty sums in upgrading their combat capabilities , while on the 
other hand, New Zealand has not maintained a defence force of high combat 
capability across land, air and sea, nor spent large sums on military defence, since 
such protection to New Zealand's vital interests of territorial security is not required 
(White, 2003) . 
According to White then , it is owing to these two factors of political geography and 
threat perception that New Zealand and Australia have become so disparate in their 
international affairs. As White concludes, "different adjustments to different realities 
explain the divergence" (White, 2003). As a consequence, trans-Tasman security 
cooperation has been hampered by an inability to have close integration on defence 
postures, since "we didn 't in the end believe enough in the same things" (White, 
2003). 
Criticisms 
Despite the convincing character of White's explanation for trans-Tasman 
divergence, there have nevertheless been many criticisms lodged against this theory 
of strategic perception that together reveal the gaps and weak points in such an 
account. There are five main criticisms in particular which will be discussed in the 
following . 
1 . Geography 
The first major criticism of White's theory concerns the factor of geography. Mark 
O'Neill argues that the assertion that a nation's geography is the mother of strategy 
is completely false. Not only are there many other factors that are equally relevant to 
the formation of a state's strategy, including those of national wealth , development, 
population , culture, religious beliefs, alliances, and systems of government (O'Neill , 
2006a, p. 360), but also the idea of strategic planning based on geography is often 
contradicted by history or the fact of current realities. For instance, while inhabiting 
entirely different strategic and geopolitical environments, Australia and the United 
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States have formed foreign and national security policies that are "virtually 
indistinguishable" (O'Brien, 2001, p. 33). New Zealand and Australia too have 
always been located in the same Asia-Pacific region and impacted by the same 
variables, such as proximity or distance from foreign neighbours, yet it has only been 
in the last three and a half decades that the Tasman pair have been seen to diverge. 
This leads one to conclude that it can not be external factors that influence trans-
Tasman policies, but rather internal factors , such as the way the two countries view 
the external world. As O'Neill sums it up in reference to Australia over the past 
twenty years: "Our geography has not changed, but what it means to Australian 
security has changed" (O'Neill, 2006a, p. 359). 
2. Size & Population 
The second criticism involves a rejection of White's assertion that national size is a 
driver of security policy. This is because national size is in reality partly illusion. For 
instance, although it is true that Australia is almost thirty times the size of New 
Zealand , much of the inner heart of the country is empty uninhabitable desert, and 
therefore can not be said to impact Australia's strategic outlook. As Blainey states: 
"The bulk of the Australian continent is so dry and so far from efficient transport that 
it has had small effect on Australian history - except perhaps on the emotions" 
(Biainey, 1987, p. 317). Indeed, even in regard to the size of resident populations, 
although the Australian population is about five times the size of New Zealand's, it is 
not well dispersed and is actually concentrated on the South-Eastern rim of the 
country in a curve that virtually mirrors that of New Zealand's population (Mclean, 
2003, p. 26, 77). Moreover, according to Terence O'Brien and Allen Behm, it is no 
longer dangerous to be a small country with many small nations now able to 'punch 
above their weight' in international affairs (O'Brien , 2001 ). Consider Ireland, Norway 
and Singapore, for instance, which "do not use size as an excuse for inaction or 
irrelevance", but rather have each respectively become one of the IT hubs of Europe; 
a leader in the international effort to find a solution to the controversial Palestinian 
question ; and one of the strongest economies in southeast Asia (Behm, 2002 , p. 99-
1 00). Indeed, in the twenty-first century it is the large countries, as opposed to the 
small ones, that are having to confront internal disruption, threat from terrorism and 
economic recession (O'Brien , 2002, p. 110-111 ). As Behm states: "Size is not the 
point. Capacity to influence events is" (Behm, 2002, p. 1 00). 
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3. New Zealand & Isolation 
The third criticism relates to the idea of New Zealand's isolation as a key determinant 
in the way it views the world and forms its more limited defence posture. As O'Brien 
writes "New Zealand's physical situation is one of remoteness not isolation. Isolation 
is not a mere geographical definition; it describes a state of mind and as such is 
totally alien to New Zealand's vital needs and global interests" (O'Brien, 2002, p. 
110-111 ). Indeed, New Zealanders have throughout their history never been 
isolationist, and successive New Zealand governments have continued over a 
century to participate constructively in international affairs and to show their support 
in both foreign and security policy to the international quest to find collective 
solutions to international problems (O'Brien , 2002). Furthermore, in a world that is 
continually globalizing and in which modern technology have served to make ideas 
accessible to millions over the Internet, while at the same time modern transport 
systems are transforming once long journeys into overnight affairs, the old precept of 
isolation can certainly no longer be relevant in the twenty-first century (O'Neill, 
2006a). 
4. Threat Perception 
The fourth criticism contends that since White's theory does not hold up when 
compared with the full historical record , threat perception based on perceived risks 
posed to a nation by its surrounding security environment can not provide an 
accurate explanation for trans-Tasman divergence in their security policies. For 
instance, according to O'Neill, while White's strategic perception theory implies that 
Australia's important fights should only occur in its region of local strategic interest, 
such an assertion "does not stand up to scrutiny of the historical context within which 
Australians have fought" which includes the Boer War of South Africa, the First 
World War fought in Western Europe or even the 2003 Iraq War in the Middle East 
(O'Neill, 2006a, p. 360). Likewise in reference to New Zealand, the isolation and 
seemingly 'benign environment', that White now considers to be one of the principal 
reasons for New Zealand's downgrades to the combat capability of the NZDF, is 
contradicted when one considers that these same factors have been used to justify 
completely opposite actions in the security sphere. To illustrate, the reality of having 
no pressing security concerns on the home front was considered a 'unique freedom 
and opportunity' for New Zealand to make significant contributions to the First and 
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Second World Wars, and to provide strong support for its allies in the Asian wars of 
the Cold War (Mclean , 1980). Indeed, in 1961 the lack of any immediate threat to 
New Zealand was used to justify expenditure on the NZDF and the development of 
large ground forces in order that it might play its part in combating the communist 
threat in southeast Asia by 'plugging the gaps' of allied forces (who were strong in 
naval and air capability but weak in land forces) (Henderson, 1980a, p. 42) . 
Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, when divergence between the Tasman 
neighbours first began to appear, New Zealand did not at all see its strategic 
environment as benign nor was it inclined to see its defence force as being of low 
priority, due to an acknowledgement among New Zealand governments of a simple 
fact: "Should their strength and influence be removed, New Zealand would be unable 
to defend itself against attack from outside, or to maintain its national independence 
and way of life" (Henderson, 1980a, p. 41-43) . On considering these facts one must 
conclude then that strategic environment can not be the sole guiding principle of 
nations' force structures, nor explain New Zealand's divergence from Australia in its 
external policies. 
5. Strategic Perception Approach 
Finally, according to Beath, White's theory of strategic perception is "hopelessly 
outdated" (Beath, 2002, p. 118). This is because strategic geography has been 
generally discarded in Australian defence circles over the past few years, with the 
recent Minister of Defence, Senator Robert Hill, proclaiming that "geography is no 
longer relevant" (Dibb, 2006, p. 248). For example, in the years since the publication 
of Australia's 2003 'Defence Update', bids for expensive military projects have been 
made without any reference at all to strategic necessity or force structure 
requirements , and changes in Australia's strategic environment have not been 
mirrored by fundamental alterations to the size, structure or role of the force structure 
(Dibb, 2006, p. 248). Indeed, even Australia's deployment of 'Operation Astute' to 
East Timor in May 2006 reflected a flexibility made possible only by a defence force 
that had been structured around the likely nature and scale of required military 
operations, rather than just geography (O'Neill , 2006a, p. 361-362). In New Zealand 
too, contrary to White's claims, globalization and the rise of East Asia has resulted in 
New Zealand taking a much broader perspective in its foreign and security policy 
than White's theory would have predicted (O'Brien , 2001 , p. 32). As Dibb and Beath 
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have concluded, "the nexus between strategic geography and force structure 
priorities is now broken" (Dibb, 2006, p. 248), "it is strategic guidance that is out of 
step, not reality" (Beath , 2002, p. 127). 
In fact , White's theory has been criticized not only for being outdated, but also in 
being in some ways incomplete in failing to include many other factors that are 
argued to be either central or in some way involved in the growing divergence 
between New Zealand and Australia in their foreign and security policies. As Dibb 
asserts, in the years since 2003 some Australian policymakers have come to believe 
that the contrasting defence postures of the Tasman pair stem more from a variance 
in devotion to and reliance on strong allies and alliances, than it does on strategic 
geography (Dibb, 2006). This implies that there are more factors involved in trans-
Tasman divergence than White's theory of strategic perception allows. 
David McCraw's Theory of Disparate Political Ideologies 
David J. McCraw, an academic with expertise in Political Science, provides quite 
another theory to explain the growing divergence in external policies between the 
Tasman neighbours over the last three and a half decades. According to his 
argument, New Zealand's retreat from Australia through the formation of disparate 
foreign and security policies has been caused by oppositional political philosophies 
or ideologies at work among successive New Zealand governments under the 
leadership of the two dominant political parties - National and Labour. This is 
because the National and Labour parties' conflicting philosophies motivate disparate 
values, global outlooks, and approaches to foreign affairs, leading National- and 
Labour-dominated governments to not only form distinctively different foreign and 
security policy priorities and objectives when in power, but also establish fixed intra-
party traditions of external policy behaviour (McCraw, 2003) . 
For instance, as a party established by the trade union movement and founded on a 
liberal internationalist philosophy, the Labour party incorporates an optimistic- if not 
idealistic - view of the world . In believing that nations of the world have more 
commonalities than differences, thereby making the potential for international 
cooperation high, Labour advances both humanitarian and internationalist ideals and 
154 
advocates a large role for New Zealand in world affairs, believing rather radically that 
the country can be part of 'changing the world' for the better (McCraw, 1994; 
McCraw, 2006a). Consequently, because the Labour party embraces the foreign 
policy values of anti-militarism, internationalism, human rights , and liberal 
democracy, Labour governments have developed foreign policy traditions of 
behaviour that champion independence over military or political alliances with 
traditional allies, morals over trade, diplomacy and peacekeeping over the overt use 
of military force, and broad outlooks in its foreign affairs over narrow ones (McCraw, 
1994 ). This has resulted in New Zealand not only being highly active in the 
international sphere under Labour governments but has also lead to its 
championship of causes like multilateralism, disarmament, human rights , and the 
centrality of international organizations like the UN and international law in its 
international relations (McCraw, 2002; McCraw, 2003) . By contrast, as a 
conservative party founded on a philosophy of realism or 'realpolitik' with a broad 
support base composed of large sections of the farming and business community, 
the National party not only exhibits a more pessimistic view of the world , in the belief 
that the international system is more prone to conflict than cooperation as states 
pursue their own national interests, but also considers New Zealand to have a more 
limited role in the world owing to its small size and power on the world stage 
(McCraw, 1994; McCraw, 2006a). As a result, National governments have formed 
foreign policy traditions that emphasise maintenance of traditional alliances over 
assertions of independence, trade over moral concerns, openness towards military 
solutions to international problems as well as diplomacy (expressed through a 
willingness to contribute to traditional warfare and peacemaking ventures as well as 
non-combative peacekeeping operations) , and finally a more conservative role for 
New Zealand in world affairs as a small country on the world stage (McCraw, 2000). 
Consequently , under National governments New Zealand tends to be less active in 
the international sphere, though on better terms with its traditional allies Australia , 
the US and the UK, with priority given to the realms of trade, security and the pursuit 
of New Zealand's national interests in its external policies (McCraw, 1994). 
These are all observations which McCraw has exemplified through multiple 
illustrations drawn from New Zealand 's record in foreign and security affairs over the 
past five decades. For instance as a recent example , McCraw has shown that it is 
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Labour's ideology of humanitarianism, multilateralism and the anti-militarism, in the 
belief that "security can be achieved primarily by non-military means", that has driven 
Labour's decision to reorganize the NZDF, downgrade its war-combat capabilities 
and disband the combat air wing of the Air Force (McCraw, 2006a; McCraw, 2006b, 
p. 23-25). Moreover, the Labour government's strong condemnation of Speight's 
anti-democratic coup in Fiji in 1999 (and again in 2006-2007 against General 
Bainimarama) can be ascribed to Labour's tradition of upholding democratic values 
and human rights (McCraw, 2002), and Labour's refusal to participate in the Iraq war 
can be attributed to its traditions of anti-militarism and multilateralism. In a similar 
way, it can be argued that it is National's tradition of emphasising strong 
relationships with traditional allies that has led Bill English to call for New Zealand's 
reengagement and realignment with Australia , the United States and the United 
Kingdom (English, 2002).44 Indeed, according to the National party, New Zealand 
needs to shed Labour's tradition of UN worship and "'selective reliability" by repairing 
our relationships with Canberra, and supporting our allies in ridding the world of 
menaces like Saddam Hussein (English , 2002) . "We need to realign and reintegrate 
with the international friends whose lot we will share as long as we exist as a nation", 
he stresses, and the 'proper path' back to both reliability and trustworthiness as a 
small ally , and healthy strong relationships with Washington and London , "goes 
through Canberra" (English , 2002). Indeed, McCraw's theory forms a strong and 
convincing case for New Zealand's disparate handling of foreign affairs under 
different governments being the result of divergent political philosophies. 
Criticisms 
Nevertheless, despite the compelling nature of McCraw's argument when matched 
with the examples he provides, a more extensive look at his theory when compared 
with a fuller account of New Zealand's behaviour in international affairs, especially in 
recent times, reveals many contradictions between the two parties' rhetoric and 
practice when in government. As one of McCraw's strongest critics , Michael 
H As English argues: ""-\s important as the United Nations is as an international forum, there are other 
international relationships that for us are more strate!,riC. \ ' ita! is an even better word. The United Nations 
is like a Justice of the Peace who signs off le!,>al acts and statements. "-\ustralia, on the other hand, is more 
like a sibling, and the United States is more like an older, bigger, much more worldly cousin. The United 
Kingdom, I suppose, is our saintly white-haired mother. Those three countries in particular, and in that 
onler, are the ones with whom we can ac t most effectively . .. O ur priorities are still not properly 
ordered"(English, 2002). 
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Bassett, states: "The trouble with such categories is that objects in real life don't 
always fit their boxes" (Bassett, 2002). Indeed, despite rhetorical evidence to the 
contrary, Bassett argues that factual practice actually paints a different story. 
Indeed, a closer examination of Labour and National's foreign policy behaviour in the 
last three decades reveals the truth of this observation . 
To illustrate, the fact that morality and human rights concerns do not always trump 
trade incentives within Labour governments is clearly illustrated in the Clark 
government's full pursuit of an FTA with China since 200545 "despite China's 
determination to reincorporate Taiwan and its continuing widespread human rights 
abuses" (James, 2006a). As the Green co-leader, Rod Donald , has complained 
about New Zealand's pursuit of a "quick and dirty deal" with China: 
New Zealand was the first Western country to recognise China as a 
market economy when it clearly isn't a market economy. Now we're 
negotiating a preferential trade deal with China when it doesn't deserve 
preference ahead of more civilised countries. We're turning a blind eye to 
a range of abuses that China perpetuates on its people and somehow we 
say we should ignore that in the pursuit of trade (cited in Espiner, 2005a). 
Moreover, following 9/11 New Zealand pledged its support to the United States in the 
War on Terror - its most estranged traditional ally - and has deployed NZDF troops 
to assist the Americans in Afghanistan every year since (Bassett, 2002), a fact that 
does not line up with McCraw's assertion that Labour governments will advocate its 
own independence over support for traditional allies. Indeed, even McCraw has 
called this action a "Realist about-face" on the part of Labour (McCraw, 2002). As 
Bassett explains, 9/11 and the Bali bombings "revived a sense of realpolitik" in 
Labour's foreign policies, which occurrence contradicts McCraw's conception of 
Labour's 'anti-nuclear, anti-militaristic, independent New Zealand' ideology. But 
then , as Bassett states in reference to Labour, "each bold assertion of idealism has 
~ s By the end of l\ Iay 2005 three phases of negotiations for a New Zealand free trade agreement with 
China had been completed estimated to be worth 5450 million ZD) (Espiner, 2005b). Indeed, it is said 
that Helen Clark wants lew Zealand to be the ftrst developed nation in the world to attain an FL\ with 
" the world's faste st growing economy", a desire perhaps demonstrated in Clark's visit to Beijing in late 
May 2005 in a move " to court the new powerhouse of the world economy", during which she vowed to 
push for a "comprehensive agreement"' (Espiner, 2005a; Espiner, 2005b) . 
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usually been accompanied by an insurance policy" anyway (Bassett, 2002): global 
events do and always will undermine ideology, "even in remote places" (Bassett, 
2002). Additionally , it has been the Labour-led governments of the 2000s that has 
been most active in emphasizing New Zealand's small size and small abilities to play 
a large role in world affairs, as numerous speeches by Clark, Goff, Burton and 
Peters amply illustrate. 
As for National's foreign policy traditions, a closer examination likewise exposes 
many contradictions to McCraw's theory. Academic and politicians of the centre-
right often underline the fact that it has been under Labour governments that New 
Zealand has diverged most radically from Australia in its foreign and security 
policies,46 a prime example of which is of course the Lange Labour government's 
imposition of the nuclear-ban which led to New Zealand 's expulsion from ANZUS.47 
However, even under National governments throughout the 1990s, namely the 
Bolger and Shipley governments of 1990-1999, New Zealand remained nuclear-free 
and did not rejoin ANZUS despite announced intentions to the contrary. Indeed, this 
remained so in full knowledge of the fact that the country's nuclear legislation was 
the major irritant and hindrance to closer relations with New Zealand's traditional 
allies, resulting in New Zealand's exclusion from regular military exercise with the US 
and Australia and reduced access to high-level intelligence (Bassett, 2002). As 
Bassett comments , in reality National governments have preferred "to follow public 
opinion on ship visits rather than lead it" (Bassett, 2002). Indeed, this maintenance 
of policies advancing independence over its traditional cooperation with traditional 
alliances, and a larger role rather than a traditionally smaller one for New Zealand, 
can be traced even further back into history to National governments of the 1970s, 
when National Prime Minister Keith Holyoake advocated the idea that New Zealand 
needed to show "self-reliance and independent initiative" in its foreign affairs and 
needed to develop a "larger scope" in its international outlook (cited in Kennaway, 
1991 ). Moreover, in terms of defence, despite National's supposed tradition of 
open-mindedness towards militarism and the use of force, it was actually under 
4r• (See E ng!i,h, 2002; Prebble, 2002, Yang, 2003) 
47 The Lange government's rejection of port vi,it, by the ,hip, of an ally wa, an act considered by Labour 
to be one of national virtue and moral leadership that won admiration around the world. "So it did", 
writes McLean, "among the many of diverse political stripes whose principal rationale is to be opposed to 
the United States and all its' works" (McLean, 2003, p . 258). 
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National governments in the 1990s that defence spending underwent its worst 
decline with defence investment cut to a third in share-of-GOP, which impacted badly 
on the trans-Tasman 'Closer Defence Relations' (CDR) agreement and led to 
Australian complaints of Kiwi "freeloading" (James, 2006b).48 
Even more recently, John Key's recent announcement that New Zealand's nuclear-
free status will remain intact under any future National government indicates a rather 
different view of New Zealand's foreign policy under both Labour and National 
governments than McCraw advocates. Not only has Key asserted "I do not intend to 
blindly follow an ideological path"49 , as leader of the National party, but he has also 
alluded to the fact that since the Vietnam War there has been largely bipartisan 
support for the broad direction of New Zealand 's foreign policy, with the differences 
between the parties being mostly rhetorical (Kennaway, 1991 ; James, 2006b) . As 
Key has stated: "Frankly when it comes to foreign policy Labour and National share 
a fairly bipartisan view to that", "as a general rule, it's in the best interests of New 
Zealanders that both major political parties approach [foreign affairs] on a bipartisan 
basis" ('Downer: Don't beat up on Bush', 2007; Houlahan, 2006c) . Indeed, this is a 
reality echoed by the Labour-led government too. As Winston Peters has said : 
"Historically, the broad direction of New Zealand's foreign policy has received 
bipartisan support. In our recent past almost all foreign affairs legislation presented 
to Parliament has received near unanimous support" (Peters, 2006f). In addition, he 
states, "the people of New Zealand also have generally supported the main thrust of 
foreign policy, under successive governments. This is because New Zealand values 
and principles and unique New Zealand perspectives are reflected in our foreign 
policy" (Peters, 2006b). Indeed, as Bassett likewise argues, it is in truth New 
Zealand public opinion , made more powerful by the fact of the country's remote 
location, that has both in the past and in the present served to influence and 
constrain New Zealand's foreign policy decisions (Bassett, 2002). 
~H In fact it has been Helen Clark's Labour administrations since 1999, which, though initially deepening 
the despair in \'\!ashington and Canberra by disestablishing the fighter wing in 2000 and freezing at two the 
number of frigates, have set in train an extensive re-eyuipment of the army and of naval and air force 
lohristical support capacity and in 2005 committed the country to a 10-year programme of modest year-by-
year spending increases that should lift army numbers to two full battalions Qames, 2006d) . 
~'JKey: "I do not intend to blindly follow an ideological path without ever challenging the concept or 
considering its appropriateness in our unique New Zealand setting" (Berry, 2006b) . 
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To go one step further, even when applied more extensively to trans-Tasman 
divergence McCraw's theory fails to be convincing. Following his argument one 
would expect, for instance, that it is the divergent political composition of successive 
governments on either side of the Tasman , and the dissimilar traditions and 
philosophies that the dominant political parties in these governments represent, that 
is the crucial factor in whether a pattern of convergence or divergence results in New 
Zealand and Australian external policies. Along this vein of thought one would expect 
to find the greatest convergence between Australian and New Zealand external 
policies and the most harmonious relations between the neighbours during periods in 
which governments of both countries have embraced either the same or a similar 
variant of one particular pol itical ph ilosophy (i.e. when the New Zealand Labour party 
and the Australian Labor Party50 , or conversely the New Zealand National party and 
the Australian Liberals or Australian Nationals, have both held majority power in their 
respective governments) and the greatest divergence in external policies and the 
most tempestuous relations between governments of opposite political orientation on 
the political spectrum are simultaneously in power across the Ditch . Yet, this does 
not seem to be the case - the record contradicts such an argument. As the former 
Australian High Commissioner, Allan Hawke, has pointed out, relationships between 
trans-Tasman heads of governments have been most fraught "especially where the 
leaders have shared the same political philosophy" and cites the strained relations 
between Conservative/Realist Prime Ministers John Fraser (1975-1983) and Robert 
Muldoon (1975-1984) , and Socialist/Liberal Democratic Prime Ministers Bob Hawke 
(1983-1991) and David Lange (1984-1989) as prime examples (Hawke, 2006). In 
addition, where one would expect conflict to occur, such as between the Australian 
;o ;\]though the Australian Labor Parry (,-\LP) has never been run by the Left, does not promote a welfare 
state, and contains strong Irish Catholic influences, it nevertheless shares a common history with the New 
Zealand Labour party in being a social democratic party committed to a 'just society for workers', founded 
by the trade union movement and influenced by the doctrines o f Liberalism and Marxism with a long 
history in national politics (created in the 1890s the ALP is the oldest political party in ,-\ustralia, even 
forming part of Australia's first federal government of 1901) (Salmond,1987, p . 305; Carley, 2001, p. 15; 
'Political Parries', 2007) . Similarly to the ew Zealand Labour party, moreover, the ALP has nor only 
come to represent the urban working class and a growing proportion of the middle class sector of society, 
but also tends towards independence and support for internationalism as opposed to the Liberals 
emphasis on traditional alliances and bilateralism (Carley, 2001, p. 15; 'Political Parties ', 2007; 'ALP', 2007). 
For instance, new party leader Kevin Rudd has recently announced that the next .-\LP government will 
adopt a more 'independent approach' towards Australia's alliances with traditional allies especially the 
US.-\, and will consider multilateralism and support for the UN as being of the utmost importance in an 
.-\LP government's approach to International Relations (Banham, 2007) . 
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Prime Minister and leader of the Australian Liberals , John Howard, and the New 
Zealand Prime Minister and leader of the Labour party , Helen Clark, at the opposite 
end of the political spectrum, instead good relations seem to result. Indeed, the 
smooth rapport between the Clark and Howard governments, with the relationships 
between the Costello/Cullen and Downer/Goff duos likewise being "in good shape" 
since 1999, has caused this period of antipodean political history to be dubbed "the 
golden era" of trans-Tasman relations, and this despite the obvious and volatile 
schisms between the pair over PM Clark's dismantling of the NZDF and the issue of 
Iraq (Hawke, 2006). 
In fact, as the former Australian ambassador to New Zealand Allen Hawke asserts, 
the fundamental divergence between New Zealand and Australia in the way the two 
nations view the world and their own place in it, as reflected in their disparate 
external policies, has been a trend that extends back to the Second World War and 
has continued under successive governments of Australia and New Zealand 
irrespective of their political persuasion (Hawke, 2006). This leads one to conclude 
that there are greater forces are at work concerning New Zealand's external policies 
and the country's divergence from Australia in its foreign affairs than merely 
conflicting political party philosophies. 
Alternative Explanations 
Besides Hugh White and David McCraw's theories, then, what other explanations 
have been proffered amongst the intell igentsia that might better explain New 
Zealand and Australia's divergence and difference in International Relations? John 
Henderson has submitted that the trend can be explained through traditions of small 
state-craft within New Zealand and middle-power statesmanship in Australia , owing 
to disparate levels of power, strength and wealth (Henderson , 1980c; Henderson, 
1991 b). 51 However, differences in power and wealth can not explain New Zealand's 
dramatic changes in international behaviour. After all the country has always been 
small yet in the first half of the twentieth century it was highly involved with the great 
\ I See Robert Kagan's 2002 article entitled 'Power and Weakness' (Poli9• Revie}/J, June-July 2002) for a fuller 
explanation of this approach, as applieu to the Uifferent behaviour exhibireu in the international sphere 
between the Uniteu States anu European countries. 
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Western powers and made an incredibly large contribution for its size to both World 
Wars, while in the latter part of the century it incurred the wrath of its traditional allies 
by distancing itself from their nuclear policies and exiting ANZUS . Peter Kennedy, 
meanwhile, has argued that it is in fact different economic motivations that drive 
trans-Tasman divergence (Kennedy, 2002; G. Hawke, 2001 ). However, the fact that 
New Zealand continues to opt for independence over political union with the 
Australian federation , even despite the potential for great economic advantages to 
the country, 52 would seem to contradict such an argument. Indeed, if economics 
drove New Zealand 's foreign policy decisions, the desire to attain an FTA with the 
United States would have motivated the country to join the Coalition of the Willing 
against Iraq - but that was evidently not the case. Terence O'Brien , Gary Hawke 
and Robert Ayson have suggested that external events and developments drive the 
differences between the Tasman pair in their international outlook (O'Brien, 2001 ; G. 
Hawke, 2001 ; Ayson, 2004). However, both countries rallied to the United States 
after 9/11 , and though the rise of East Asia has inspired a great emphasis on Asian 
engagement in both countries, in reality their respective prime regional focus - Asia 
for Australia and the Pacific for New Zealand - remains unchanged. Indeed, how 
can an external event like the end of the Cold War account for New Zealand and 
Australia's different reactions in developing divergent defence postures in the years 
afterwards? It would seem that it is not the external events themselves, but rather 
the countries internal perceptions of and reactions towards them that actually play 
the larger role in this regard . 
There are in fact multiple explanations circulating in academic circles that do indeed 
focus on internal differences between the antipodean neighbours as key motivators 
of divergent external policies. In addition to White's inclusion of 'national psychology' 
as a component in New Zealand and Australia 's divergent security policies, Gerald 
Hensley has asserted that trans-Tasman divergence stems from basic differences in 
judgment (Hensley, 2001 ), while David Dickens has argued that New Zealand and 
Australia have different ways of viewing war and dealing with conflict (Dickens, 
2001 ). Allen Behm, meanwhile, has argued that trans-Tasman divergence is not 
driven by strategic perception or strategic interests at all but rather by values, while 
;z See Bob Carley's speech to the 2001 NZIL\, entitled 'Politics', published in Bruce Brown (ed.). Ne1v 
Zealand and Australia - IVbere a1r we going?. 
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indicating further that it is differing national psyche's and differences in military 
tradition, myth and history between Australia and New Zealand which have caused 
this great divide in security policy over the last decades (Behm, 2002) . Lance Beath 
asserts that it is a variance in national ambitions or aspirations, combined with each 
country's different 'psyche' along with method and means of pursuing them, which 
has created the divergence between New Zealand and Australia . According to 
Beath, while the two countries do not see the region very differently, "one reflects an 
excess of ambition , and the other too little of it" and as a consequence both have 
very different ideas about the destinations to which they are headed, and the way in 
which they each intend to arrive there (Beath , 2002, p. 119-120). As he concludes: 
"Destination is everything" (Beath , 2002, p. 120). Similarly, Derek Quigley and Jim 
Sutton have suggested that it is separate understandings of the countries' respective 
destiny in the world which explains the divergence (Quigley, 2001 ; Sutton, 2001 ), 
while Greg Ansley and Ashton Calvert make the case for disparate "national 
personalities" between New Zealand and Australia (Ansley, 2001 ; Calvert, 2003). 
Finally, Denis Mclean argues the phenomenon can be explained through the forces 
of nationalism in both countries (Mclean , 2003). 
In reality, all these attempts to use internal factors as explanations for the Tasman 
nations' divergent behaviour in the international sphere can be summed up in one 
word: identity. Indeed it is Identity Theory that , in the author's opinion, represents 
the best alternative explanation for trans-Tasman divergence in international affairs. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Identity Theory & Trans-Tasman Divergence 
Over the last two decades the constructivist concept of identity has gained 
increasing importance and interest amongst the various social sciences and 
humanities disciplines, including that of International Relations. The growing 
consensus seems to be that identity plays a larger role in the domestic and 
international sphere of politics than previously acknowledged, a fact that is 
particularly relevant to the study of foreign policy which is, after all , the means 
through which states communicate their identities, interests and roles. In fact, 
according to Roger Smith , identities are now considered to be among "the most 
normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics" (cited in 
Abdelal , Herrera, Johnston & McDermott, 2005, p. 143), a statement echoed by 
James Fearon who likewise indicates that "a rapidly growing literature sees "state 
identities" as crucial for understanding both foreign policies and the overall tenor of 
international politics" (Fearon, 1999, p. 221). This is because, as David Capie and 
Gerald McGhie state, "before a state makes a calculation about what is or is not in its 
national interest, it must first make decisions about what kind of a state it is, or wants 
to be, and how it regards others. These decisions are necessarily claims about 
identity" (Capie & McGhie, 2005, p. 231 ). 
Indeed, a growing number of academics around the world have begun to view 
identity considerations as vital to an accurate understanding of state behaviour in 
world affairs. Alexander Wendt, for instance, has asserted that though the 
distribution of power and the anarchic nature of the international system will always 
affect a state's external policies and calculations, how it does so largely depends on 
the state's conception of itself and others on the international stage (Wendt, 1992, p. 
71 ). Adler and Barnett similarly argue that a state's behaviour can not be 
understood apart from how it sees itself in relation to others (Adler & Barnett, 1998, 
p. 47), while Huntingdon asserts that images of self are important since it is these 
self-images that shape a state's behaviour (Huntingdon, 2004, p. 22). Wallace, 
furthermore , claims that identity is the "grand strategy" through which foreign policy 
is framed and defined, arguing that "foreign policy is about national identity itself: 
164 
about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for 
and seeks to promote abroad" (Wallace, 1991 , cited in Aggestam, 1999, p. 318). 
Finally, Cooper proposes that since national interests are defined by what sort of 
country each wants to be in the world , it is in fact identity and a sense of purpose 
that actually drive foreign policy (Cooper, 2004, cited in Capie & McGhie, 2005, p. 
231 ). 
Indeed, whereas in former times conventional theorists tended to conceive of identity 
influencing foreign policy only through constraint , or when employed as ideological 
devices used by political elites to justify self-interested politics, constructivists are 
now exploring identity as an integral part of the cultural terrain that conditions what is 
possible and actual in foreign policy (Telhami & Barnett, 2002, p. 7). As Stephen 
Saideman states: "For constructivists, identities shape perceptions of oneself and of 
others, which in turn influence foreign policy. Identity defines a state's reality- who it 
is , who the threats are, and which policies are possible" (Saideman , 2002, p. 178). 
In recent years constructivist scholars have increasingly been able to demonstrate 
just how important identity is in the foreign policies of states , such as Japan, 
Germany, China, France and Israel, in issues ranging from the environment to 
national security (Saideman, 2002, p. 196). Thus identities have been shown to be 
not only actively affecting state policies in countries of disparate regions around the 
world , but also very important to the study of foreign policy, even capable of 
determining a state's potential allies and enemies in the international system 
(Saideman , 2002, p. 196). 
Though there are many details and points of interest in this approach to 
understanding foreign affairs, not least the idea that nations act like 'states-as-
persons' in the international sphere, using identity not only to define themselves but 
also to motivate and generate actions, national interests and external policies in 
foreign affairs (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999; Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein , 1996; 
Fearon, 1999), it is unfortunately well beyond the scope of this thesis to present 
them here. However, an examination of New Zealand and Australia's political history 
reveals multiple instances of identity motivating foreign policy behaviour in the 
international sphere. Indeed, identity is a constant theme in descriptions of the 
Tasman neighbours' disparate foreign and security policy choices, not only 
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throughout the past century but also today in the early 2000s, thus signifying the 
crucial importance of identity in contributing to - if not primarily driving - trans-
Tasman divergence in International Relations. 
Identity & Trans-Tasman Foreign Policy 1901-2007: An Overview 
Identity & New Zealand Foreign Policy 
In regard to New Zealand , evidence of the motivating force of identity as a crucial 
factor in the formulation of New Zealand's foreign and security policies can be seen 
scattered throughout government discourse on its foreign and security policies. 
Indeed, identity can be seen to have strongly influenced every major foreign policy 
decision taken by the nation since the turn of the last century. For instance, as 
regards the question of federation with Austral ia at the turn of the century it was 
actually a desire to maintain a separate identity, rather than those famous 1200 
miles53 , that motivated New Zealand to stand apart from the Australian 
Commonwealth of 1901 , a notion demonstrated in Prime Minister Joseph Ward's 
statement at that time that New Zealand's future destiny was as "distinct from that of 
Australia as the light to the dark" (cited in Mclean, 2003, p. 91 ). Indeed, in having 
already nurtured the idea of a separate and supposedly 'better' identity54 than their 
Australian counterparts, New Zealanders feared that federation would "swamp" this 
sense of difference and thus "preferred 'a destiny apart' as a means of aspiring to a 
grander, nobler future" (I. Grant, 2001 , p. 27; Mclean, 2003, p. 22). 
Since then New Zealand's sense of national identity has actually evolved and altered 
several times as the nation has grown older, and its population larger and more 
varied. For instance, New Zealand's national identity has evolved from being an 
Imperial nation and "Britain of the South" in the 1840s to the 1950s, to that of a 
"small, isolated, Western trading state" from the 1950s to the 1980s, to an 
53 Despite the popular argument then that the 1200 miles between New Zealand and Australia equated to 
1200 reasons why ew Zealand should not join ;\ustralia, l\IcLean aq.,rues that distance was really a good 
cover for New Zealand's desire to stay separate from Australia. As he states: "If there had been the will to 
join _-\ustralia, distance would have been no impediment" (McLean, 2003, p. 221). Today roo ew 
Zealanders still prefer to pretend that "a wide and stormy sea allows them to keep their distance from 
their neighbour and thus maintain their presumptions of self-worth" (McLean, 2003, p. 27) . 
>• By the turn of the century the New Zealand colonials thought themsdves far superior to the colonials in 
_-\ustralia, being 'free from the convict stain', descended of 90% of the 'best British' stock, and generally 
being "a superior breed of men" (Sinclair, 1991, p. 335-337). 
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"independent nuclear-free sovereign nation" from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, to 
a notion of New Zealand as an "independent, multilateral and Pacific nation" today. 
It is possible to trace these identity transitions throughout academic political 
discourse as well as in New Zealand's foreign policy record , dating from the 
nineteenth century to the present day. Nevertheless, despite this ongoing evolution 
in New Zealand's national identity, each with different influences on New Zealand 
foreign policy, there are three themes existing in New Zealand's identity today which, 
while rising and falling to different degrees of strength and weakness over the past 
century, have remained constant factors in New Zealand's sense of itself since the 
nation first became a self-autonomous Dominion in 1907. Indeed, though the 
themes have been present in various forms throughout New Zealand history, they 
have in fact combined together and manifested themselves in their strongest form 
over the last decade at the turn of the twenty-first century, thereby arguably 
becoming the fundamental underlying driving forces behind New Zealand's most 
recent divergence in foreign and security policy from that of Australia . These themes 
are independence, idealism and multilateralism, and their impact on New Zealand's 
external policy will be discussed in the following . 
Independence 
Historians all agree that New Zealand was probably one of the most reluctant 
Dominion's in the colony to seize its own independence as a nation on the world 
stage. For while New Zealanders revelled in being separate and independent of 
Australia and Australians, the nation at the same time nursed a strong attachment to 
its ancestral homeland - 'Mother England ' - and the Empire of which it was part. 
Indeed, perceiving itself to occupy a special place in the British Empire as not only 
the "Britain of the South" but also "the cream of the British Empire" (Sinclair, 1991 , p. 
213), New Zealand had a somewhat excessive devotion to Britain arising chiefly 
from a strong sense of emotional attachment to Britain, as well as for practical 
reasons with Britain being "principal trader, banker and insurer, defender and arbiter 
of standards in all aspects of public - and private - life" (Mclean, 2003, p. 64). 
Indeed, in considering the Empire much preferable to the "Australian embrace" (1. 
Grant, 2001 , p. 29), New Zealand's choice to identify with Britain , rather than its near 
but less genteel neighbour, led New Zealand to enmesh its external policies with 
British aims and interests from 1840 right up until the 1970s. This can be seen in 
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New Zealand's offer to annex several South Pacific islands and thereby extend the 
Empire into the South Pacific in the late 1800s, its declaration of war on Germany 
only hours after Britain 's proclamation in 1914 along with acceptance of British 
leadership and military discipline for New Zealand troops, and its decision during the 
Second World War to overlook its own security interests at British request by leaving 
its men in Europe to fight on the English front from Libya to Trieste - a move that won 
New Zealand little favour in Australia (Sinclair, 1991, p. 217; Kennedy, 2002; 
Brabazon, 2000, p. 36). 55 During this time independence was in many respects 
thought of as a dirty word in New Zealand's political circles. For though the 
Dominion gained full independence and the right to exercise an independent foreign 
policy in 1947, sixty years after its transition from colony to Dominion , the step was 
taken reluctantly and without enthusiasm ('New Zealand Sovereignty', 2007). Indeed, 
unlike Australia which discontent to stay "clinging to the skirts of the mother country" 
had signalled early on its intent to chart an independent course of its own and had 
begun loosening its British ties from the 1930s onwards56 (Sinclair, 1986, p. 96) , New 
Zealand "star-struck" by empire was more content "to ride on imperial coat tails" 
(Mclean , 2003, p. 88). As Mclean states: "The British period of global ascendancy 
had stamped them both in very similar fashion , but had not forced them into the 
same mould" (Mclean , 2003, p. 82-83) . 
It was not until the 1970s that New Zealand began to assert its independence from 
'Mother England' and a wish to control its own destiny in the world . Until this time 
the country independence had only been asserted in regard to Australia , a fact most 
" These actions can be attributed to a 'tradition of Empire' and a notion that the British were born "to 
expand and rule the civilised world" which were both deeply-rooted in the New Zealand psyche from the 
outset .. In addition, Government policy from the 1880s up until the First \V'orld \V'ar consistently 
supported the British campai1-,111 for imperial federation, which though supported by other colonial 
Governments, was whole-heartedly and persistently pursued by New Zealand alone (Sinclair, 1991, p . 
214). Indeed, New Zealand considered itself 'the most dutiful of Britain's daughters' in doing so (Sinclair, 
1991) . • \ccording to Keith Sinclair, this sort of 'hysterical imperialism', compounded of 'a crude and 
intolerant racial prejudice and militarism, as much as of love of the motherland', persisted in New Zealand 
society for a long time (Sinclair, 1991 , p. 219). 
56 Through imposing high duties on English manufactured goods; setting out 'Australian' rules concerning 
the execution of Australian deserters in \XIWI; breaking away from Britain's grand strategy in WWII; 
shifting irs primary military alle~-,riance to the United States of ~\merica, "free from any pangs as to our 
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom" (PM Curtin cited in Dunn, 1984, p. 141) from 1941 
onwards; divorcing the English pound in 1949; diminishing its reliance on English exports after the war; 
and finally, replacing England with Japan as its main trading partner, and the United States as its main 
supplier of technology and capital (Blainey, 1987, p.329; l\fcLean, 2003, p . 88; Dunn, 1984, p . 154, 162; 
Kennedy, 2002). 
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noticeable in New Zealand's foreign policy through its sustained opposition to 
federation as well as to forming combined 'Australasian' contingents (a term much 
disliked in New Zealand due to its inherent Australian bias57 ) when performing in 
concert with the Australian military from the time of the Anglo-Boer war on (Mclean , 
2003, p. 93, 101 ; I. Grant, 2002, p. 137). The shock of Britain's entry into the EEC in 
the early 1970s, however, forced the nation to distance itself from England and look 
for new trade markets elsewhere (Brabazon , 2000, p. 36; Mclean, 2001 b, p. 23; 
Kennedy, 2002). Consequently a national identity of 'independence' - not only from 
Australia but also the UK - became of even greater import than ever before, 
economically as well as politically. Notions of independence combined with necessity 
served to propel the country towards greater engagement with its Asia-Pacific 
neighbours and away from its traditional all ies in the North Atlantic, with a growing 
recognition and acceptance within New Zealand society of its true geographical 
position in the world , its "Asia-Pacific destiny" and its bi-cultural heritage (Woolcott, 
1993, p. 163; Villegas, 1996; Mclean, 2003, p. 251-253). 
Thus New Zealand first began to actively assert its independence in its external 
policy, an idea which would ever after maintain a strong hold on New Zealand's 
sense of itself and its conduct of foreign policy. This meant that by the time of the 
ANZUS dispute in the mid-1980s, New Zealand's sense of independence had 
become so highly developed that it inspired a push for independence from all its 
traditional allies, including not only the United Kingdom but also her replacement the 
United States. This can be seen in New Zealand's foreign policy not only in the 
introduction of anti-nuclear legislation in direct 'disobedience' to the wishes of its 
traditional allies, the US, Australia and the UK, but also in the way that the country 
soon afterward introduced legislation that "unilaterally revoked all residual United 
Kingdom legislative power" under the Constitution Act of 1986, making New Zealand 
a "free-standing constitutional monarchy whose Parliament has unlimited sovereign 
power" ('New Zealand Sovereignty', 2007). Indeed, it could well be said that New 
Zealand's behaviour over the ANZUS dispute was its own kind of 'declaration of 
independence' to the world , signalling an end to its legacy of dependence on 
S7 'Australasia' is a term that was coineJ by an eighteenth century French geographer, De Brosses, to 
Jenote ,-\ustralia and its outlying is lands, which accorJing to McLean, is exactly why New Zealanders do 
not like it (l\fcLean, 2003, p. 10). 
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powerful traditional allies and an assertion of freedom in the formulation of its own 
foreign and security policy. 58 
It seems an aversion to dependency is a notion that has continued to the present 
day in New Zealand's foreign affairs (unless of course one considers New Zealand's 
heavy devotion to the United Nations as a modern kind of New Zealand dependence 
on a more powerful partner). Today New Zealand remains fiercely independent, a 
fact demonstrated in repeated references to New Zealand's independent identity and 
actions in foreign and security policy discourse, a prime illustration being Gaffs 
statement in 2006 when speaking on defence matters that: "We are a sovereign 
country ... voicing an independent view. We reflect our own view of the world" (Goff, 
2006b). This strong and rather intoxicating independence has been observed by 
New Zealand commentators and historians who remark, like Mclean, that "an 
increasingly strong - even pugnacious - sense of national difference and an 
assertive independence has emerged" within New Zealand in the last few decades 
(Mclean , 2003, p. 231 ). Indeed, some have even suggested the nation has taken 
the notion too far in its foreign affairs. As Mclean states: "Having for so long 
struggled to find a voice, it is as though New Zealanders now need to use a 
megaphone to proclaim it" (Mclean, 2003, p. 231 ). Indeed, from this perspective 
one could consider New Zealand's refusal point-blank to join its traditional allies in 
the US-Australian-UK Coalition against Iraq as a contemporary example of the 
centrality of independence in New Zealand's nation identity motivating New Zealand 
behaviour on the world stage. 
Most fundamentally, however, today as in the past, New Zealand's legacy of 
independence is most muscular and visible in its continued refusal to endorse any 
notions of any kind of union with Australia . A prime example of this was the Clark 
Government's outright rejection in 2006 of a repeated Australian proposal for political 
union and New Zealand's adoption of the Australian currency, two measures which 
were advocated to New Zealand as "both desirable and realistic" by the Australian 
>H.-\ notion criticized in 1995 by a leading .-\ustralian foreign affairs commentator who said: "Real national 
independence involves dealing with reality, taking responsibility for your own situation, maximizing your 
effectiveness and pulling your weight. That New Zealand chose not to do this in the 1980s was a sibm not 
of independence but of insouciance and irresponsibility ... . -\n irreplaceable skein of [New Zealand) 
credibility and respect was torn in Washington and in Canberra" (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 259). 
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Federal Parliament Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs59 
(O'Neill , 2006b). The reason for such a refusal is that, just as a hundred years ago, 
New Zealanders fear the loss of its unique identity and sovereignty as an 
independent nation and once again prefer to be separate from their Australian 
neighbours as a means of preserving Kiwi sovereignty and independence.60 As 
Helen Clark summed up the general sentiment on the southern side of the Tasman : 
"I'm very happy with Kiwis having our own strong state and unique national identity. 
So [Australia is] a very close friend and cousin, but we've got our own place" 
('Aussies look at union with NZ', 2006).61 
Idealism 
The second recurring theme in New Zealand 's sense of self, as reflected in its 
external policies, is idealism. As Mclean states: "Idealism has been and is a major 
influence on public life, especially on foreign policy" (Mclean, 2003, p. 233). One of 
the strongest examples of New Zealand idealism impacting on the nation's foreign 
affairs is that of anti-nuclearism. Indeed, the Lange Government's 'principle before 
pragmatism' approach to ANZUS in 1985-1986, which saw New Zealand adopt a 
defiantly anti-nuclear stance, is a prime illustration of the motivating power of 
national identity and more particularly the strains of idealism and 
environmentalism62 within this identity - in the formation of New Zealand's external 
policies (I. Grant, 2001 , p. 36) . In fact, Richard Devetak and Jacqui True regard the 
non-nuclear issue in New Zealand as illustrative of "the power of a norm embedded 
in national culture to shape state identity through foreign policy regardless of the 
;~ .As a spokesman for the Committee stated: "If Europe is able to get its act together then surely it should 
be much easier for ;\ustralia and New Zealand who have shared history, shared culture, shared values, and 
I believe, a shared future" ('Aussies look at union with TZ, 2006). 
r.o Exemplified in 1\lichael Cullen's statement that just as the idea had been "mooted before and rejected 
before", unless .Australia advocated a new .-\ustralasian 'Anzac' currency "we are not going to do that" 
('Cullen rejects .Anzac currency idea', 2006; Dick, 2006). 
1
'
1 Reminiscent of Russell's comments as a New Zealand delegate at the Australian Federation conference 
at the turn of the nineteenth century (already described by the .-\ustralians as "one of those maddening 
New Zealanders') who concluded that federation with Australia would always be for ew Zealanders "a 
marriage of convenience" rather than one of mutual affection, and also David Lange's modern take that 
New Zealand would likewise be "always a mistress but never a wife" (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 79 ·80). 
62 New Zealanders aptitude for preservation of the New Zealand landscape and concern for the 
environment actually extends back to the early colonials in .-\otearoa. This helps to explain why as the 
Cold W!ar unfurled in the 1950s, anti·nuclear sentiment and concern in New Zealand about the effects of 
radiation on the environment, and particularly within the South Pacific, took strong hold of the New 
Zealand national consciousness, becoming one of the most defining characteristics of lew Zealanders 
from that time on (.-\lley, 1980; .-\lley, 1991). 
171 
geopolitical and political and potentially economic costs associated with it" (Devetak 
& True, 2006, p. 254). Today this idealism and anti-nuclearism still continues to 
influence New Zealand behaviour in the international sphere. Due to the fact that 
anti-nuclearism is still considered to be one of the most defining characteristics of 
New Zealand's "national personality" (Laidlaw, 2005), New Zealand remains strongly 
committed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes in its foreign affairs 
to date, as well as its opposition to America's National Missile Defence project, all 
pursued towards the ultimate - if idealistic - goal of 'ridding the world of all nuclear 
weapons'. In fact a 2003 poll found that 81 per cent of New Zealanders were still 
opposed to letting nuclear-armed ships into New Zealand waters (Gentles, 2005). 
Indeed this 'identity-influencing-policy' effect can be seen as recently as last month 
in September when the new National Party leader, John Key, announced that 
"independence on nuclear matters has become hard-wired into the New Zealand 
DNA," becoming "profoundly symbolic" and a "part of our collective psyche" (Key, 
2007). As a result of this recognition , Key's first important announcement as Leader 
of the National Party was to confirm that under a future National Government there 
would be no change to New Zealand 's nuclear legislation (Key, 2007). 
More generally, moreover, New Zealand's tendency towards idealism can explain 
the country's preference for an 'influence through persuasion ' rather than coercive 
approach to foreign affairs, especially in its dealings with its Asia-Pacific neighbours, 
since New Zealanders tend to believe that most problems can be solved through 
reason and negotiation (a belief frustrated however by realities such as Saddam 
Hussein's twelve-year defiance of the UNSC and Fijian coup-leader General 
Bainimarama's rejection of negotiations and New Zealand's efforts to mediate the 
crisis) . Certainly , it is also idealism, combined with negative historical experiences of 
war, that have caused the country to be so opposed to the use of force as a general 
tool in international relations , as well as idealism that has motivated such a positive 
outlook on New Zealand's strategic environment and the belief not only that New 
Zealand will never be attacked by anyone, even in the context of a global war on 
terrorism, but also that state-to-state warfare is in itself becoming obsolete. In the 
same way, it could well be argued that it is idealism in New Zealand's national 
identity that has caused the country to move away from a traditional defence 
structure and instead embrace the idea of becoming an expert international 
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peacekeeping force resulting in the drastic remodelling of the NZDF. It could also be 
argued to be this idealistic strain that continues to inspire New Zealand 's strong 
belief in the United Nations as "the hope for the future" and the one means through 
which war can be eradicated. Indeed, it seems that New Zealand 's national identity 
has become so vested with the affairs and reputation of the United Nations that any 
criticism of the UN organization is almost taken personally in New Zealand -
Australia, the UK and the United States' criticisms of the UN over the body's failure 
over Iraq and New Zealand's hasty defence of the UN organization in response 
being a prime illustration . 
One negative by-product of such idealism, however, has been the parallel 
development of a sense of New Zealand moral superiority in international affairs, 
sometimes referred to as Kiwi 'intellectual snobbery' or as Robert Ayson describes it, 
"a soap box sort of preaching mentality" (Robert Ayson in Debell , 2004). As the flip-
side of idealism, this tradition of superiority has likewise had a long tradition in New 
Zealand, as illustrated as far back in 1904 when one visitor commented that New 
Zealanders exhibited "a curious form of a patriotic vanity , which makes the New 
Zealanders believe that the world expects much of them and that they must not be 
false to their destiny", or as described a hundred years on , "a blend of a too practical 
outlook with a too exalted sense of apostleship" (cited in Mclean, 2003, p. 79). 
Indeed, today there is still , as Mclean states, "a strong impulse to believe [in New 
Zealand] that the world needs leadership on many of its most vexing problems and 
that its people are there to provide it" (Mclean , 2003, p. 184). In particular, this 
attitude of idealism-spawned superiority is directed towards Australia , a fact shown in 
New Zealanders scornful "best of the British" attitude towards their 'convict' 
neighbours in the early colonial years, most obnoxiously expressed in the assertion 
that New Zealand's Maoris were a 'better breed' of natives than the Aborigines being 
"proud, indomitable and courageous" and "better treated than any other native or 
savage race on the face of the globe" (Russell cited in Mclean, 2003, p. 79). Little 
has changed since then it seems. Confident in its own wisdom and proud of its 
achievements as a small and remote nation in the world , New Zealand seems to still 
exhibit a sort of smugness towards Australia , particularly where New Zealanders 
believe they are more "progressive" than Australians, such as in having rejected the 
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logic of nuclear weapons and ratified the Kyoto Protocol (Trotter, 2005).63 Once 'the 
best of the British' and Britain 's 'most loyal ally'64 New Zealanders are now content to 
be at least 'better than Australia'. 
Multilateralism 
The final and most recently asserted theme in New Zealand's identity under the 
Clark governments is the notion of multilateralism. Increasingly the emphasis in New 
Zealand's foreign policy today is on the country's small size and its consequent need 
to act multilaterally as a "good international citizen" on the world stage (Goff, 2006b). 
As Devetak and True have argued : "New Zealand under the Clark government sees 
its state identity as intimately tied up with a principled commitment to the 
international rule of law and multilateralism" (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 254) , thereby 
explaining not only New Zealand's strong commitment to the UN and multilateralism, 
but also to its practical expression of multilateralism in the form of peacekeeping 
operations worldwide. New Zealand's desire to work multilaterally can in fact be 
seen more than fifty years ago too, in New Zealand's presence at the 1945 San 
Francisco conference which created the UN in 1945, where it was one of the few 
nations in the world to sign the UN Declaration of Human Rights (a fact of which New 
Zealand is very proud). Indeed, the existence of a multilateral strain in the New 
Zealand identity is repeatedly emphasized in speeches given by Goff or Peters, who 
each assert that New Zealand's commitment to multilateralism today actually springs 
from "multilateral values" within the Kiwi cultural identity. These values are those of 
fair play, respect and just treatment of others, commitment to the rule of law, and 
peaceful means of conflict resolution - principles argued to have been constant 
factors in the formulation of New Zealand's foreign policies as far back as the 
Second World War (Peters, 2006a; Goff, 2005). Additionally, this emphasis on 
multilateralism could well be argued to be related to New Zealand's increasingly 
diverse society as its demography has acquired a greater Pacific character in recent 
r.> In fact this kind of om:-upmanship towards .-\ustralia (symptomatic of an on-going hangover from its 
colonial era of being "the best of the best") is frequently in appearance within New Zealand's foreign 
policy. It seems New Zealand derives great satisfaction in appearing to be not just a 'good international 
citizen' but 'the best' or 'better international citizen' - at least in regard to .-\ustralia. 
r.< .Another motivation behind New Zealand's decision to leave its troops in Europe during \V\XII I- New 
Zealand saw the decision as an opportunity to show how much 'more loyal' New Zealand was to the 
British Empire than .-\ustralia. 
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decades.65 Indeed, Colin James argues that with nearly a third of under-25s being of 
Pacific ethnicity, New Zealand's growing Pacific identity will be "a growing distinction" 
and point of difference between New Zealand and Australia in future years . As he 
states: "It will make New Zealand even more incomprehensible to Australians than 
the Anzus breach did" (James, 2005a), "Australia looks on the Pacific. New Zealand 
looks on the world from the Pacific" (James, 2006d). It could well be that diversity 
has created a greater awareness of the needs and approaches of other ethnic 
groups and fostered a greater desire for a conciliatory multilateral approach to 
regional and global problems and issues. As Winston Peters has said, "The Pacific 
Way" is increasingly "the New Zealand Way" - "We are a Pacific nation" (Peters, 
2005). 
Indeed, it is this weight placed on New Zealand's multilateral identity that could , with 
idealism, be argued to explain the Clark governments remodelling of the NZDF as 
well as its decision not to join the 'Coalition of the Willing' in Iraq. This is because an 
NZDF designed around a defence strategy centred on multilateral peacekeeping , 
and opposition to the Iraq war on the grounds of support for ru les-based 
multilateralism, were both actions considered by the government to better reflect 
New Zealand's sovereign and multilateral identity (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 253). 
With regard to the former, for instance, consider Allan Behm's observation that "New 
Zealanders do appear to mind spending much on defence" (Behm, 2002, p. 1 05) or 
the former Minister of Defence Mark Burton's reference to the new NZDF as being a 
better reflection of the "part we wanted , and were able to play, in regional and global 
security" (Burton, 2005b) and "New Zealand 's place in the world" (Burton, 2004c). 
Likewise, in reference to the latter, the fact of identity influencing New Zealand's 
decision on Iraq can be seen in Clark and Gaffs repeated references to 
multilateralism when explaining the New Zealand's position at the height of the crisis. 
As Clark declared at that time, "New Zealand's position on this crisis has at all times 
been based on its strong support for multilateralism and the rule of law, and for 
65 As the 2006 census revealed, the number of New Zealand Europeans residing in ew Zealand has 
dropped from 80% to 67% since 2001, with a corresponding rise in numbers of ..-\sian and Pacific island 
immigrants during the same period to 9.2% (48.9% increase) and 6.9% (14.7% increase) o f the total 
population respectively ('NZ population boosted by Asian and Pacific influx', 2006; Cheng, 2006). As 
Colin James argues: "I have often felt Australians have puzzled about New Zealanders in much the way 
Henry Higgins did about women in My Fair Lady: ''Why can't a Kiwi be more like an Oz?". The answer 
lies in the Pacific" Games, 200Sa). 
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upholding the authority of the Security Council" (Clark, March 18). Indeed, more 
generally, national identity could also explain New Zealand's view of terrorism and 
the fact that New Zealand's foreign policy "has remained relatively unchanged" since 
9/11 (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 253). This is because, as Campbell argues, "the 
government does not consider terrorism a reason to change its independent, 
nuclear-free stance [or identity]" (Campbell, 2005). 
In sum, New Zealand now sees itself as incorporating a 'non-nuclear', 'independent' 
and increasingly 'Pacific' identity which finds expression in an independent, nuclear-
free and multilateral foreign policy. 
Identity & Australian Foreign Policy 
Similarly, identity can be seen to be behind many major external policy decisions 
taken by Australia in the international sphere also. However, unlike in New Zealand, 
Australia's national identity has undergone fewer transitions over the last century, 
thereby rendering to Australian foreign policy a greater impression of consistency 
and stability. As Owen Harries has observed in his study of Australia's external 
affairs: "If one considers the grand strategy of Australian foreign policy over the last 
century what strikes one is its essential simplicity and consistency" (Harries, 2006). 
In terms of foreign policy, for instance, Downer asserts that "Australian values" are at 
the core of Australia's foreign policy, which not only affects Australian foreign policy 
decisions but also "guide our approach to the world" (Downer, 2006). As he states: 
"Our national identity informs our foreign policy, not the other way around. And that 
identity places a premium on freedom- freedom of speech , a free press, freedom of 
religion , liberal democratic values and liberal economic values" (Downer, 2006). 
Indeed, the responsibility to fight for Australia's interests while also reflecting "the 
values and ethics of the Australian people" are considered "the twin pillars" upon 
which all of Australia's foreign policy is based and the common thread across all 
Australian policies in international affairs (Downer, 2006). In an increasingly 
globalising world , moreover, these Australian values and ethics are considered to 
become even more important in the future with the Australian Government more and 
more developing its external policies less in relation to geography and "more in terms 
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of developing functional affinities with countries and groups of countries with which 
we share specific interests and values" (Calvert, 2003). 
In terms of security , moreover, identity is progressively becoming an accepted 
explanation for Australia's approach to security among academics and strategists. 
Consider Hugh White, for instance, who without specifically referring to identity 
describes Australia's enduring traditional concerns and needs in the realm of security 
(a strong predilection to alliances and independent self-reliance while at the same 
time showing a possessiveness of its neighbouring islands and a vulnerability and 
anxiety about invasion from the north) as stemming from "a deeply held sense of 
separateness from our regional environment" which "to most Australians ... seem so 
natural as to appear self-evident" (White, 2002a, p. 257). As he explains: "A quick 
comparison with New Zealand , for example -so close and in many other ways so 
similar - suggests that in fact this set of perceptions is very distinctively Australian" 
(White, 2002a, p. 257) . It is really identity factors then that can in reality provide the 
best explanation for the way these ideas about Australia's security have been 
"curiously durable throughout Australia's history as a self-conscious strategic entity" 
(White, 2002a, p. 257), and explain why "it would take a tectonic shift in Australian 
attitudes to align Australia's defence policy with contemporary trends in Europe, New 
Zealand and Canada" (White, 2002a, p. 258). 
This enduring sense of Australian national identity can be summed up in the words 
'an independent, realist and allied Australia'. Indeed, it seems independence, 
realism and alignment to powerful traditional allies have been principle drivers 
behind the formation of Australia 's foreign policy since the outset. 
Independence 
The primary importance of independence in the Australian identity and its influence 
on important political decisions can be traced back to the decades preceding 
federation to the 1880s, when Australia first began to develop a sense of 
nationalism. Primarily this was due to Australia's settler population which was 
composed of a feisty mix of convicts -so-called "live lumber" - forcibly shipped to the 
colonies, in addition to masses of impoverished, down-trodden immigrants from 
England , Ireland and Scotland including a high percentage of Irish Roman Catholics, 
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all of whom had no great love or affinity to the British Empire (Mclean , 2003, p. 55; 
Dunn, 1984, p. 27-29, 32; I. Grant, 2001 , p. 22). Additionally , however, having been 
founded earlier than New Zealand in 1788 rather than 1840, the Australian colony 
had by the time of federation existed for 113 years - 73 years more than its Tasman 
neighbour- during which time its inhabitants had had more time to develop a sense 
of 'Australian-ness', namely, the perception of possessing uniquely Australian 
characters and perspectives in a distinctly Australian landscape and demography 
(Biainey, 1987; Mclean, 2003). Consequently, instead of having nationalism "thrust 
upon them" as New Zealand did66 , Australia , being sure of its identity, began early to 
push for its own independence and sovereignty in the wider world , seeing federation 
as a means of: ensuring greater defensibility to the continent; reserving 'Australia for 
the Australians'; and projecting a greater influence through being more powerful and 
respected (Mclean, 2003, p. 66, 224). In this way Australian identity made its first 
exhibition of its power to influence Australian politics. As Smith & Hempenstall 
explain , for Australians "federation was more than a business deal: it was a matter of 
sentiment, a 'sacred cause' driven by a 'desire for identity and status' and a grander 
future" (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005). 
This identity of an 'independent Australia' was ever-after to be a fundamental driver 
in Australia's foreign policy decisions throughout its history to the present day. 
During the World Wars, for instance, it has been argued that it was this notion of 
independence and 'separateness' from Britain that led Australia to not only insist on 
'Australian rules' for deserters during WWI , but also to withdraw its troops from the 
Imperial plan to instead deploy them alongside the Americans in the Pacific in 
defence of its own national interests (Mclean, 2003). Likewise, it was a desire for 
greater expression of this independence that caused Australia to develop a truly 
'independent Australian foreign policy' in the 1970s, indicating that it would no-longer 
automatically commit to the actions or interests of traditional allies , since Australia 
had its own interests and own sense of right and wrong in international affairs 
(Rawdon Dalrymple, in Anderson, 1998). Furthermore, Australia's adoption of a 
66 ;\s Keith Sinclair states in reference to the aftermath of Britain joining the EEC in 1973, and ew 
Zealand's reluctance and slowness up until this time to attain full independence and control over its 
foreign policy: "Instead of an ennobling American revolution, New Zealand experienced a somewhat 
humiliating rejection of the l\lorherland. Of many New Zealanders it may be said that they were not born 
to it and did not achieve it, but had nationalism thrust upon them" (Sinclair, 1991, p. 340). 
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defence posture centred on 'independent self-reliance' in the late 1980s, to replace 
its former doctrine of 'forward defence', can be attributed to a greater emphasis on 
Australia being as independent as it was feasibly able to be (Gatley, 2001 ). In this 
sense Australia's continuing independent security stance could be considered a 
more accurate reflection of Australia's identity now, than was revealed in former 
years. 
Realism 
Similarly Realpolitik and a tendency to plan on the basis of 'worst case scenario' 
have long been a tradition in Australia's foreign and security policy outlook. This 
tradition has its roots right back in the early days of the Australian colony when the 
Australian colonials feared invasion or attack by the Japanese "Yellow Peril"67 , the 
Russians, and the Germans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Gordon , 
1960; Dunn , 1984). In fact , Australian fear of invasion by one country or another has 
always been a central strain in the Australian psyche. This has resulted in two 
tendencies in Australia's external policies: firstly , a tendency to keep potential 
aggressors at arms length ; and secondly, a strong inclination to join with traditional 
allies, through usually significant military contributions per capita , to fight against 
emergent threats . One historical example of the former is the way that Australia was 
profoundly unhappy with Britain both when it forged a security alliance with 
'dangerous' Japan in the early years of the 1900s and later when Britain asked 
Japan to provide an escort for the ANZAC troops on their way to Egypt in World War 
I (Gordon, 1960; Dunn , 1984). As for the latter, just as Australia was more proactive 
in providing Australian frigates for use by the British Navy in the early twentieth 
century, it has likewise, while sharing mutual goals with New Zealand, always been 
demonstrably keener in its security commitments, providing more resources and 
greater numbers of servicemen to its wars whether in the Second World War in 
1939-1945, in Vietnam in 1965, in Afghanistan in 1980 (McKinnon, 1989) or today in 
the South Pacific .68 Though these differences in numbers can partly be attributed to 
67 This "startled consciousness" of the potential threat of Japan to .'\ustralia can be seen as far back as 
1894 when ,-\ustralia took part in military exercises in Sydney Harbour in preparation for any rendez .vous 
with Japanese warships following Japan's defeat of China in battle that year (Gordon, 1960, p. 22). 
6H During the Vietnam War, being "keener" and "more concerned about Asia", the Australians maintained 
a force of 8,000 soldiers including conscripts in \ ' ietnam, compared to a commitment of 800 men by New 
Zealand. Likewise during the 1980 ;\fghanistan \Xlar, the .-\usrralians were at,rain more keen to commit to 
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great differences in population size, the fact remains that Australia has throughout its 
history always expressed a more willing and enthusiastic attitude towards its security 
commitments than its smaller neighbour, owing it seems to a greater sense of 
realism in its foreign affairs, which saw the prospect of military attacks or invasions 
on the Australian homeland as being more highly likely than New Zealand has ever 
professed. 
Additionally , during the Cold War it could be argued to be realism and an inclination 
to plan for the worst case scenario that saw Austral ia become host to at least four 
US military installations including the satellite-linked communications and 
surveillance facility at Pine Gap outside Alice Springs, which while adding to 
Australia's sense of security, also made Australia a target of Soviet nuclear attack on 
home soil right up until the collapse of Communism in 1989-1991 (Dunn, 1984, p. 
193-194; Boanas, 1989, p. 34). Today too, this difference between Australia 's 
tradition of realism and New Zealand's tradition of idealism can be clearly seen in 
their disparate strategic outlooks, with Australia, on the one hand, preparing for a 
risky future in the Asia-Pacific and developing a traditional defence structure with 
high combat capabilities across all three branches of the ADF on the basis of 50-
year plans, while on the other hand, New Zealand prepares for a continuing 'benign' 
environment, disbanding the air-combat wing of the Air Force and diminishing naval 
combat capabilities, all in the pursuit of turning the NZDF into an international 
peacekeeping force whose main purpose is to defend other people in other people's 
countries overseas. It is also Australia's sense of realism that prompts the nation to 
continuously foster a strong working relationship with Indonesia as the most 
populous Muslim nation in the world located on Australia's doorstep. Finally, it could 
likewise be argued to be a strong realist strain, when combined with a strong sense 
of threat in the War on Terror, that has enabled Australia to not only endorse the use 
of force as a general tool in International Relations, but also explains the nation's 
willingness to use force wherever it deems it useful or necessary in international 
affairs, including the use of pre-emption in fighting global terrorists and those nations 
which host or sponsor them. 
the war than their ~-\ntipodean counterpart~, deploying a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean while ew 
Zealand offered only naval and air support "as resources permit" (McKinnon, 1989, p. 22). 
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Finally, realism can account for the way that Australia has become so "enmeshed" 
with American global strategy since the end of the Second World War (Gatley, 2001 , 
p. 16), adopting American strategic values, interests and 'balance of power' thinking , 
which is said to have made the two nation's foreign and security policies "virtually 
indistinguishable" (O'Brien, 2001 , p. 33). Indeed, the US-Australian relationship is 
based on the core realist calculation within Australia that good relations with this pre-
eminent global power is vital in advancing Australian security and interests in the 
world and securing the most benefits from the process of globalization . This belief 
stems from Australia's belief, as mentioned previously, that the pivotal forces 
shaping the world today are the primacy of the US in a unipolar 'balance of power' 
world and globalization, considered likewise to be centred on the US (George, 2003; 
O'Brien , 2005; Patman, 2005). As Robert Patman has argued: "By presenting itself 
as Washington's staunchest ally, Australia anticipates political , military and 
commercial favours coming its way in bilateral relations as well as increased clout in 
the global institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO, and greater respect 
and recognition from regional major powers like China" (Patman , 2001 ). In short, as 
Harries similarly asserts, Australia's alignment with the leading Western country 
makes "good realist sense" (Harries, 2006). Fundamentally , however, this 
assessment relates to America's status on the world stage as not only the most 
powerful state within the international community , but also increasingly a hegemon 
rather than just a superpower (or "hyperpower'' as some have named it). Indeed, 
being more powerful than ever before in its history with preeminent military 
capabilities incorporating the latest military technology, an annual defence 
expenditure of over US$320 billion (equating to more than twice the amount spent by 
the other NATO countries combined} , immense wealth , and an extensive global 
reach in all three military, political and economic spheres, the United States is 
without doubt a force to reckon with in international affairs (Organski & Arbetman , 
1993; Eliot Cohen, 2002, p. 37; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 20). These 
facts combined have meant that the US-Australian alliance has remained - and will 




Finally, the desire and need to be allied with the great Western powers, particularly 
the one possessing the greatest power and influence on the world stage at any one 
time, is another theme within Australia's national identity that has been reflected in 
its foreign and security policy decisions over the decades. As Owen Harries states, 
Australian foreign policy "has always consisted of allying oneself closely with a great 
power that is committed to preserving the existing international order against those 
who want to change it radically" (Harries, 2006). Identity provides a strong and 
consistent explanation for such a tradition in Australia's foreign affairs, since "the 
need for a "great and powerful friend" is deeply embedded in the Australian psyche" 
(Harries, 2006). 
In fact the historical record is rife with allusions to this predominant emphasis on 
allies in the Australian state of mind . From its infancy to the middle of the twentieth 
century, the Australian nation's "mate"69 in international affairs was Great Britain for 
obvious reasons of history, heritage and kin . As the Second World War progressed, 
however, and the Empire began to unravel with British power increasingly being 
eclipsed by the United States, Australia's shift in primary allegiance from England to 
America - its wartime companion and fellow-in-arms in the Asia-Pacific - was as 
inevitable as it was logical. Indeed, the notion of an 'allied Australia' theme in the 
national identity working to reinforce the US-Australian alliance can be seen in 
regard to Australia's like-mindedness and loyalty to nuclear-policies along with the 
US in the ANZUS affair of the mid-1980s70 which continues to this day, as well as 
Australia's full participation in the War on Terror in the 2000s as illustrated in 
Howard's immediate promise of "full Australian support" for the United States 
following the September 11 terrorist attacks, which ultimately led to Australia's 
involvement in both the Afghan and Iraq wars in subsequent years . As Harries 
states, in making such a pledge "even before he knew what the policy response of 
that country would be", Howard was being true to the tradition of alliances and 
69 A "mate" being from Australia's point of view not just a friend, but a friend with whom :\ustralia shares 
many similarities ami things in common (i.e. nations of a \X! estern character or embracing \V'estern values). 
; o Even despite rumblings of anti -nuclear sentiment among tht parties in parliament, especially the 
:\ustralian Labor Party (}.LP) (ftmpleton, 2004). Tht idea of strong alliances in the .-\ustralian psyche was 
stronger than dissent. 
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mateship in the Australian psyche - "he merely walked on an established path" 
(Harries, 2006). 
While such a preoccupation over allies has been rather bitterly and cynically 
condemned by New Zealand commentators , who denounce Australia for having a 
"national identity still over-reliant on the relationship they have forged with the two 
great Anglo-Saxon powers - the United States of America and the United Kingdom" 
(Trotter, 2005), it must be noted that Australia's sense of national identity does not 
involve the "sceptical, prickly independence" and preciousness about sovereignty so 
often exhibited by New Zealand (as in the ANZUS affair which some consider left 
New Zealand in a state of "friendlessness") (Mclean, 2003, p. 16). For Australians, 
alliances do not equate to national dependence or subservience, but rather to strong 
but equal friendships in an uncertain and dangerous world . Independence and 
alliances are mutually compatible. Indeed, the idea of 'mateship' is a strong concept 
within the Australian national identity, evidence of which being not only John 
Howard's repeated references to it as a fundamental Australian value throughout his 
tenure as Prime Minister, but also his attempt to have the mateship notion inserted 
into the preamble of the Australian Constitution (Smith, 2005). Indeed, as a more 
recent illustration may show, consider Downer's response when quizzed during his 
visit to New Zealand on whether or Australia will leave its troops in Iraq. "In the case 
of Australia and the Americans, we are mates and we stick with our mates ," Downer 
expounded ('Downer: Don't beat up on Bush', 2007): 
It sort of gets to the notion of mateship in Austral ia really. Do you just 
abandon your mates? Do we say to the Americans you can do it all , we 
are just going to abandon you, or do we stick by them? I think we feel in 
the end we stick by our mates in difficult times ('Pullout from Iraq would 
create chaos- Peters', 2007).71 
71 It is interesting to note along this vein of thought that even Kevin Rudd, the new leader of the 
A.ustralian Labor Party, has repeatedly confirmed his commitment to a strong US alliance, despite his 
many repeated protestations to the contrary which insinuated that he would implement a staged withdraw 
of ADF troops from Iraq if elected ('Costs and benefits of having a big friend', 2007). The fact is, as the 
former leader of the ALP proclaimed in 2002, the ;\LP strongly supports the alliance and always has 
(Crean, 2002). Or as Kevin Rudd has himself said in past times on the matter, while asserting his desire to 
see the US-1\ustralian alliance last for 100 years or more: " It would be self-delusional for .\ustralians to 
consider any unilateral withdrawal from ANZUS"; .\ustralia should continue to support .\NZUS "quite 
apart from the benefits which ANZUS delivers to Australia's bilateral defence and non-defence 
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This idea of 'mateship' has even been remarked on by the United States too, as 
Cheney expressed during his visit to Australia this year: "Americans know that for 
this country , "standing by your mate when he's in a fight" are more than words in a 
song , and they signify a way of life. Having Australia's friendship makes my country 
very grateful and very proud" (Cheney, 2007) . 
It is not just the fact of Australia's emphasis on strong alliances within its national 
identity alone, however, that has helped to make the US-Australian alliance what it is 
today. It is possible to go one step further and make the case that it is Australia's 
identification with the United States since the Second World War, with both nations 
embracing the same values and interests, that actually spurs on the US-Australian 
alliance. This has remained the status quo even with Australia 's changing 
demography and the way that it has become increasingly multicultural and of non-
British origin in the post-war years. This is because Australia 's influx of migrants 
came predominantly from Southern Europe, the majority of whom embraced many of 
the same Western values and democratic traditions as the 'original' Australians, 
meaning that Australia has undergone no major challenge to its national identity and 
so continues to reflect a basically "Western make-up" and identity (Mclean, 2003; 
Calvert, 2003)n As Calvert and Harries have expressed on the matter, the two 
countries share "common strains of identity", including common values, institutions 
and cultural similarities (Calvert, 2003; Harries, 2006), making a strong US-
Australian friendship a mutually acceptable and agreeable state of affairs. Or as 
Howard has expressed on the matter: "Australians and Americans are people of 
determination, of moral courage, and decency. We are strong countries that have 
sacrificed greatly for peace and freedom at home and on distant shores. Our 
purposes in this world are good and right" (Howard , 2005). Indeed, it is this mutual 
identification which not only bolsters and propels the US-Australian relationship 
relationship with the United States"; the only real challenge for the future is for Australians "to add to the 
traditional agenda of the relationship new areas of policy, including environmental management and global 
warming" (Rudd, 2001). This means that the prospect of the US remaining Australia's "mate" and 
featuring largely in ;\ustralian external policy in future years is all but certain. ;\s another example this 
month also illustrates, fo llowing a 45-minute self-described "good-natured, very open discussion" with 
Bush Juring the :\PEC summit in Sydney, when asked if he thought he could develop a close friendship 
with President Bush, RuJJ replied "I'm a friendly sort of guy" ('Rudd keeps talks with Bush off record', 
2007) . 
72 Indeed, the balancing act between retaining Australia's Western Anglo-Celtic outlook anJ status while at 
the same time engaging closely with Asia is considered today to be "at the heart of ["-\ustralian] foreign 
policy" (Calvert, 2003). 
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forward but also has given rise in the post-9/11 years to a muscular mutual desire "to 
defend those values, if necessary fight for them, and always to be ready to repel 
those who would seek to take those freedoms away" (Howard , cited in Cheney, 
2007) , especially as two countries who have been continuously democratic for the 
last 100 years. This compatibility in core national identities and interests is 
acknowledged not only in high-ranking political circles, however, but also at ground-
level within Australian society. The conclusions made by journalist Caroline 
Overington of The Australian last year on the US-Australian relationship is a primary 
illustration of this point. "The United States is not the enemy," she writes. "The United 
States is a brave defender of democracy, which in turn means for the values that are 
important to Australians, such as liberty, dignity and the prosperity of man" 
(Overington , 2006). 
Australian Identity. Terrorism & Iraq 
In fact , Australia's sense of identity not only offers a comprehensive explanation for 
many of Australia's trends and traits in its foreign and security policy, but provides 
strong explanations for two of Australia's most overt and controversial actions in the 
international sphere since 2001 - its "full participation" with the United States in the 
War on Terror, and its involvement in the Iraq war which saw the overthrow of 
Saddam's authoritarian regime. As Howard stated in 2003: 
Australia 's foreign policy must always serve our national interest. .. It must 
be constantly crafted and adjusted to promote the values, the security, 
and the prosperity of the Australian people. Our foreign policy should be 
pragmatic but it should also tell the world what we stand for and what we 
oppose (Howard , 2003). 
Identity & the War on Terror 
In regard to terrorism, firstly , Australia saw the horrific events of 9/11 as "an attack 
on the lifestyle and democratic values of all Australians and of all peace loving 
people" (Downer, 2002), signifying the need for Australia , the US and other freedom-
loving nations to join together to fight against terrorism and promote democracy and 
freedom around the world . Already considering itself a terrorist target owing to its 
unalterable identity as a Western nation , and named by Osama bin Laden as an 
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enemy of AI Qaeda due to its intervention in East Timor (Howard , 2003 [4]) , 
Australia's large and expansive commitment to the War on Terror with its provision of 
political will , logistical support and troops on the ground (Downer, 2002) can be seen 
to be motivated by a strong desire to preserve the Australian national identity and 
way of life. As Downer states: 
There has never been a time when Australia's foreign policy was a more 
vital ingredient in forging our nation's future or a more crucial factor in 
how we view ourselves. Today, Australian foreign policy must operate in 
a very unpredictable world , therefore now more than ever it must be a 
very Australian foreign policy (Downer, 2002). 
Consequently, it may be seen that it is in defence of its identity and values in the War 
on Terror that Australia has endorsed such aggressive measures in tackling 
terrorists and those states which sponsor their activities, and been willing to use 
force as well as new tactics such as President Bush's pre-emption doctrine. This is 
because Australia believes terrorism to be not a force that can be defeated through 
reason or the normal channels of diplomatic negotiations. Terrorists are not in the 
Australian or American view rational or reasonable people - committed to force they 
must be met with force. Consequently , the Australian Government remains open to 
being a 'pathfinder' and breaking new ground when dealing with the complex 
scenarios of the war against terrorism, including that of wielding force in new and 
more extensive ways. As Downer asserts, "we must remain ambitious ... to develop a 
positive and confident future for Australia in a world of change" through exercising "a 
strong, independent, responsive and pragmatic foreign policy" (Downer, 2002). Or 
as Howard expressed in reference to Iraq, "peace-loving peoples must sometimes 
act forcefully if freedom is to be secured"73 (Howard , 2005). This is because, as he 
explains: 
71 In a related way, Australia's desire to protect and promote its values and interests can more generally 
explain Australia's more assertive approach than New Zealand to its international affairs including in the 
.-\sia-Pacific (as Australia's raid of the Prime Minister's office in the Solomon's during RAMS! last year 
illustrates). 
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The responsibility of elected leaders is to serve the interests and promote 
the values of the people- as we see them and as best we can . This does 
not mean adjusting to opinion polls , but it does mean that foreign policy 
can never be conducted over the heads of our people (Howard , 2005). 
Identity & The Iraq War 
Identity can also easily be argued to have promoted Australia's involvement in the 
Iraq war too, since Australia believed its foreign policy should never be fashioned to 
buy immunity from threat but rather to reflect Australian values (Howard, 2003 [4]) , 
and also considered being a spectator and "sitting on the sidelines" to be neither 
"good for Australia" nor "the Australian way" (Howard , 2003 [4]). In fact, through its 
participation in the overthrow of Saddam, Australia not only considered itself to have 
acted in a way that best expressed the Australian identity in having "neither shirked 
the issues nor watered down our principles" (Downer, 2003, May 14), but also 
viewed its ADF personnel to be defending "our freedom, our values and our security" 
through its war-fighting in Iraq (Downer, 2003 [3]) , a feat which Howard asserted had 
"done this country proud" (Howard , 2003 [6]) . 
Indeed, identity can provide explanations not only for Australia's participation in the 
war, but also for its on-going commitment to a democratic and stable Iraq, as shown 
in its continued deployment of ADF personnel to the Gulf and the Government's 
refusal to withdraw its troops until " the job has been finished". Australia meets two 
needs within its core psyche in doing so: firstly , it is able to strengthen the US-
American alliance by 'sticking by its mate' and proving itself to be a faithful ally in a 
friend 's time of need; and secondly, through its participation in Iraqi nation-building 
Australia is able to promote its own "Australian values" in the wider world - namely 
freedom, democracy, respect, 'a fair go' for all and a willingness to help others - all 
of which are considered by Australia to be the strongest most noble values in the 
history of man (Hawke, 2003b; Howard, 2005).74 Howard expressed this notion in 
74 In fact the importance of these Australian values have not only impacted Australia's external policies, 
but also its approach to internal ones. Consider the Australian media frenzy in 2005 over the comments 
made by Federal Education l\finister, Dr Brendan Nelson, who told l\Iuslim educators who do not accept 
and teach Australian values to "clear off'. As he stated: "If you want to be an ,-\ustralian, if you want to 
raise your children in ,-\ustralia, we fully expect those children to be taught and to accept ,-\ustralian values 
and beliefs. \Y/ e want them to understand our history ami our culture, the extent to which we believe in 
mates hip and giving another person a fair go, and basically if people don't want to support and accept and 
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2005 when he said that as "one of the world's oldest and continuing democracies" 
Australia's involvement in Iraq contributes to Australia's "fine tradition" and "proud 
history of supporting political and economic freedom" in the world (Howard, 2005). 
As he reflected on his Government's decision two years earlier: 'This was a difficult 
decision , but eight million brave Iraqi voters helped convince me it was the right one" 
(Howard , 2005) . Moreover, through its involvement in overthrowing one of the 
world 's worst dictators and its subsequent assistance in helping to give Iraqis their 
first chance of establishing a fair democratic system of government, an event which 
without the Coalition of the Willing would not have been possible after all75 , Australia 
considers itself to not only have acted to preserve "the way of life that 
Australians .. . hold dear'' (Calvert, 2003), but also ended the "myth of little Australia" 
(Kelton, 2005) showing how democracies can "find renewed power and purpose 
abroad from institutions and instincts at home" (Howard, 2005). As Howard explains: 
"Australia brings with its role in the world certain ideas and values. Our place in the 
international system is informed by who we are, and by what we stand for'' (Howard , 
2005). 
In fact , Australia's entire approach to foreign affairs can be summed up in the notion 
of promoting its identity as a "Good International Citizen", a notion which though 
likewise expressed in Wellington , is regarded quite differently in Canberra (Devetak 
& True, 2006). Instead of New Zealand's interpretation of being seen to act in an 
'internationally acceptable' manner in its foreign affairs, primarily through extensive 
engagement in multilateral forums and institutions not least the UN, Australia 
considers good citizenry to be less about appearances and more about being 
'effective' (Kelton , 2005). As Australia sees it, in a global community made up of an 
array of nations of different ethnicities, religions, values and backgrounds, it would 
be folly to try and 'please the crowd' as it would never be able to please everyone. 
Instead, Australia embraces its freedom of choice and commits to what it perceives 
to be the 'right thing' for Australia to do, whether to secure its own national security 
and interests, or the peace and security of the international community at large. As 
Downer describes this Australian approach : "We are not about trumpeting our own 
adopt and teach Australian values then they should clear off' ('Minister tells Muslims: accept Aussie values 
or 'clear off, 2005) . 
; ; Consider the contemporary example of Cuba, for instance, where Fidel Castro's demise has only led to 
the instatement of an eyually dictatorial relative so that the cycle of oppression and repression goes on. 
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international good citizenry simply for the sake of it. That is a trap for the ideologues 
and the naive. We are about good international citizenry where it can be shown to 
deliver tangible results for our interests and those of other people" (Downer, 2002) . 
Identity & the Antipodes: Explaining Trans-Tasman Divergence 
In sum, there is a compelling case that New Zealand and Australia 's divergence in 
international affairs is being driven by notions of national identity rather than 
geographical , external or economic factors. Indeed, as Devetak & True argue, the 
differences arising between the Tasman nations in their foreign policy approaches, 
and their divergent responses to globalisation's security challenges, such as the 
trans-national threat of terrorism "are not reducible to material and geopolitical 
factors" nor "result solely from divergent national interests and different calculations 
concerning how best to respond to current geopolitical issues". Rather, "more 
fundamentally, the foreign policy differences arise from different governmental 
worldviews and conceptions of state identity" (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 251 , 254). 
These notions of national identity not only affect foreign policy behaviour and the 
way both countries see the world , however, but also the way they see themselves 
and their own role in that world . The Dominion Post aptly described this reality in 
2005 in its observations of the Anzac ceremony at Gallipoli in 2005: 
New Zealand dreams of itself as a pacifist country that rejects the US 
alliance, runs down its war-fighting capability and deploys forces only for 
peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes. Australia sees itself as an 
active participant in global power politics, a staunch ally of the US, with a 
combat capability ready to defend the interests of the country and its ally 
('Two Different Dreams', 2005). 
"The two countries' conceptions of themselves have grown apart", it concluded. "The 
Japanese have a saying for this - same bed , different dreams'" ('Two Different 
Dreams', 2005) . 
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Though such an explanation , in O'Brien's words, "does not, yet, convince the 
sceptics" (O'Brien , 2002, p. 14), nevertheless there is a growing number of 
academics asserting the crucial role of identity in understanding state behaviour and 
foreign policy choices on the world stage. Such a development combined with the 
wealth of historical evidence now seen to support such an approach must signify 
then that it is in fact identity factors, when combined with aspects of Hugh White and 
David McCraw's respective explanations of strategic perception and disparate 
political ideologies in both Tasman governments (political ideologies which in fact 
draw on different identity themes and traditions within the existing national identity 
pool to promote competing interpretations of New Zealand's role in the world76) , 
which best explain trans-Tasman divergence in foreign affairs today. 
As Mclean likewise concludes: "Contrary to any conventional wisdom that the two 
countries are like peas in a pod , the record suggests that separatist and localized 
notions have prevailed from the outset" (Mclean, 2003, p. 17). 
71
' See English and Prebble's speeches to the New Zealand Institute of International "-\ffairs which each 
juxtapose the opposing interpretations of New Zealand's national identity, one from the Left and the 
other from the Righr in the political spectrum (English, 2002; Prebble, 2002). 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion it seems that just as it is identity factors that are chiefly responsible for 
much of the strangeness in the trans-Tasman relationship, made manifest 
particularly in the odd dynamics of rivalry and indifference, it is likewise disparate 
national identities, when combined with strategic and political factors , that have been 
driving the widening divide between New Zealand and Australia in our International 
Relations. This has become particularly evident over the past decade, as New 
Zealand's national identity has evolved into a stronger and more widely divergent 
form from Australian identity, than was the case previously in former years. 
Fundamentally, on the New Zealand side, this increasing divergence in the 
international sphere stems from the strains of fierce independence, idealism and 
multilateralism within the core national identity today. These together have shaped 
the options available to the Government in the formation of its foreign and security 
policy, resulting in : a high emphasis on multilateralism as the way forward for New 
Zealand and the world ; a propensity to avoid the use of force wherever possible; and 
a tendency to have a weaker more distant rapport with Washington . On the 
Australian side, by contrast, external policy has been most strongly influenced by the 
strains of strong independence coupled with an equally sturdy and abiding 
commitment to nation-state 'mates' and a predominant streak of realism within the 
Australian national identity. These have in the same way motivated the development 
of external policies which incline towards bilateral diplomacy over multilateralism, a 
willingness to use force where useful or necessary in global affairs, and a powerful 
and steadily-strengthening alliance with its closest friend and strategic ally the United 
States. Indeed, so entrenched are these inclinations in the Tasman neighbour's 
psyche and foreign policy, that in hindsight, their clash over the 2003 Iraq War was in 
many respects inevitable. 
In reality , one could expect the same kind of political upheaval between the 
Antipodean pair wherever two or more of these areas of difference - multilateralism, 
force and relations with the United States - overlap or come together in an 
international issue, possibly even in the Pacific should the Tasman pair and the 
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United States join together more fully to address the problems and instability of the 
Pacific Islands in future years . 
The NZ-Australian Relationship: Recommendations for Moving Forward 
As for the question of how to improve the trans-Tasman relationship, there are a 
number of things that, in my view , need to be accepted or taken into account on 
both sides in order to revive the fading Anzac Spirit between the two countries. 
Firstly, both nations - but especially New Zealand - need to realise that the trans-
Tasman relationship can no-longer be taken for granted. Strong international 
relationships, like good marriages, are only happy and healthy when the two parties 
work at the relationship, expending time, energy and money into producing good 
results. At present this kind of commitment from within New Zealand's political 
sphere comes sporadically, even half-heartedly, especially when New Zealand 
Governments try to win domestic points by placating the home crowd at Australia's 
expense. The present Labour Government's deliberate sabotage of trans-Tasman 
relations this month over a rather trivial matter of Air New Zealand's transportation of 
Australian servicemen to Iraq is a case in point. It follows that this kind of behaviour 
does not evoke the level of trust and faith Australia needs if it is to align itself more 
closely with New Zealand and with New Zealand's needs in either economics or 
security. After all, owing to New Zealand's small size and remote geography, we 
need Australia politically, economically and militarily. Indeed, New Zealand dilly-
dallying over issues such as the creation of a single economic market only serves to 
sour an already precarious economic relationship . Likewise, it should go without 
saying that making defence decisions without taking into account the needs of our 
nearest neighbour and strongest security ally, or considering the effect on the NZ-
Australian defence relationship, is negligent, precipitous and simply unwise -
especially when Australia is the one country New Zealand relies on to come to our 
own defence should the need arise. New Zealanders all too often count on a sense 
of goodwill in Canberra that is in fact evaporating. The relationship is not set in 
stone -the time for flippancy is past. 
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Secondly, in order for a better friendship to develop between these old mates and 
rivals , Australians and New Zealanders must stop impugning the other nation's 
motives in the international sphere. All too often it is as though the Tasman 
relationship becomes infused with suspicion and laced with malice, seemingly under 
the belief that the choice of one particular course of action by one nation were taken 
to spite the other, rather than being in fact based on separate national considerations 
combined with different national identity strains (for example, New Zealand's nuclear 
policy and Australia's FTA with the United States) . As this thesis has shown, it is 
separate and different national identities between the Antipodean pair that can best 
account for New Zealand and Australia's divergence in external policies on the world 
stage. Both nations therefore ought to acknowledge and accept these differences, 
while also realizing that it is these stark differences that will time and again prompt 
disparate behaviour within the international sphere, as on the National Missile 
Defence project and Iraq. While these differences will also inevitably hamper closer 
trans-Tasman relations, expecting and accepting such areas of disparity are key to 
safeguarding the friendship when such clashes occur in the international sphere. In 
my opinion , the aptitude of Howard, Downer and Clark to refrain from commenting 
on the other nations' sovereign decisions over the past year is a good step forward in 
this regard . 
Thirdly, New Zealanders especially need to not only 'drop the superiority act' in our 
dealings with Australia (so illustrative of a kind of colonial hangover), but also stop 
the obsession with staying "separate and different" from Australia , largely driven by 
fear and paranoia that any Australasian collaboration will in some way extinguish 
New Zealand's own unique identity and culture. While such fears might have been 
more plausible in 1901 , they are entirely unfounded and unnecessary today. Indeed, 
on the subject of sovereignty, both PM Howard and Alexander Downer have 
repeatedly affirmed their full acknowledgement of New Zealand's sovereignty as a 
nation and its right to make its own choices and decisions in international affairs. 
There is in fact no need for New Zealand to still be asserting its national sovereignty 
on the world stage in the twenty-first century - such a fact is already accepted as a 
given, owing to New Zealand's long history of self-government and independence. 
Repeated assertions of the fact are in truth rather passe. Moreover, New 
Zealanders and Australians will always be different, and perceived as different by 
193 
outsiders as well as by each other, as was the case when the ANZACs fought 
together in World War I. Though similar in many ways, there are differences in age, 
landscape, size, political organization and political development between our two 
nations that can not be erased, and similarly differences in ethnic heritage, 
indigenous peoples, pioneer experiences, legends and heroes, national 
characteristics and mindsets, experiences of war, current demographies, approach 
and manner, and linguistic expressions and accents between the two peoples. 
Wherever and whenever we work or fight alongside each other, New Zealanders and 
Australians will always display different characteristics that will set them apart. 
Consequently, New Zealanders have nothing to fear from a greater NZ-Australian 
collaboration. 
Fourthly, there needs to be a greater awareness within both countries of the many 
commonalities and areas of mutual compatability that exist within the two national 
identities, which provide a firm foundation for greater cooperation and an enduringly 
close relationship between our respective countries. We are both strong and stable 
democracies committed to the values of democracy and freedom in the form of 
democratic government and individual human rights and freedoms. We both 
embrace the same traditions of egalitarianism and a 'fair go' for all, and both promote 
the rule of law, collective security and market liberalization in the way of free trade. 
Both countries are also strategically united in their geography and security interests, 
and share a history of nobility in wartime, having never waged war in pursuit of 
foreign territory, instead repeatedly launching joint peacekeeping operations in 
support of neighbours and regional or global stability , whether in East Timor, the 
Solomon's, Tonga or Afghanistan. We are both also generous and compassionate 
in times of crisis, able and wiling to work together to relieve human suffering such as 
in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings or the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. 
Finally, New Zealanders and Australians are also two peoples greatly compatible in 
being adventurous, resilient, pragmatic, unsentimental, low-key and unassuming 
people free of grand designs or pretensions in the world . In short, in each other both 
peoples have a mutual and natural ally. 
Indeed, New Zealand and Australia have much to offer one another. While being 
close but separate nations, the two countries have much to gain in greater political , 
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economic and military collaboration, especially in the context of a shared Pacific 
neighbourhood of mutual concern to both. On the one side of the Tasman, 
Australians could benefit greatly from New Zealanders legacy of good race relations 
and its greater cultural awareness, expertise and more conciliatory approach in 
dealing with the various Pacific cultures in the region. Likewise, on the other side of 
the Tasman , New Zealanders could learn from Australian experiences and examples 
politically, economically and militarily as a country 62 years older than itself, and use 
the Australian experience as a template for fostering its own national development in 
response to its own unique situation and needs, as has been the case often in New 
Zealand history. By way of illustration, New Zealand learnt from the disorganized and 
chaotic Australian experience of settlement to implement a more orderly system in 
the 1800s, and followed Australia's example by shedding the vestiges of British rule 
and developing new Asia-Pacific markets for trade throughout the late 1900s. 
Indeed, in the Pacific Island region, New Zealand and Australia have a unique 
opportunity to work together much like a soft-cop, hard-cop duo, the efficacy of which 
approach any decent police force around the world will attest to. 
Fifth, New Zealand and Australia need a new framework or structure for any future 
amelioration of trans-Tasman ties in order to better frame their relations with each 
other. It has been the lack of such an overarching plan or roadmap in which to 
define their relations with each other - once provided so effortlessly by the British 
Empire and then by American grand strategy during the Cold War - that has 
contributed substantially to the trend of spontaneous ad hoc policy-making on either 
side of the Tasman , which has proved so instrumental in destabilizing and worsening 
NZ-Australian relations . In fact there is an overwhelming consensus in academic 
circles that a new widely-focused outward-looking paradigm is exactly what is 
needed to 'galvanize' the two communities and spark a more cooperative defence 
relationship. The Asia-Pacific region combined with the growing unrest there is 
logically and naturally just such a wider context for improving trans-Tasman 
relations. This is a region in which New Zealand and Australia are singularly united 
in their common interests and desire of peace and stability, as their combined 
approach to Fiji's General Bainimarama and that country's 'coup-habit' well shows. 
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If a strong and effective collaboration is to result in the Tasman countries dealings 
with Pacific unrest and state-failure, however, then importantly New Zealand must 
look to its own Defence Force and fill the aerial and naval capability gaps which the 
current Clark administration has seen fit to lose. There are three reasons for this . 
1. First, the loss of hard-core war-making long-term capabilities has in fact 
impacted materially not only on New Zealand's ability to carry out softer short-term 
peacekeeping operations, but also its training and deployment of NZDF personnel, 
as well its ability to provide substantial air cover in combaf7 . Until restored, these 
capability gaps will not only continue to significantly hinder NZDF operations and 
protection of personnel , but also a healthy all-round security relationship. After all , 
New Zealanders may have inherited a strong strain of Scottish frugality , which bodes 
well for the country in times of financial hardship or difficulty, but it ought not to 
become the ordinary way of life. 
2. Second, it is likely that in dealing with future crises situations in the Asia-
Pacific, whether in the Pacific Island countries or further afield in the Asian heartland 
such as potentially in Myanmar today following the recent upheavals there, both 
Australia and these nations themselves will require more from New Zealand than a 
uniformed airfreight, search and rescue or coastguard force , and desire greater 
combat capabilities from New Zealand than those that the country currently 
possesses. Indeed, New Zealand's low defence capabilities in this regard have 
been an ongoing matter of concern within Australia , even having been called into 
question by potentially the next Prime Minister of Australia , Kevin Rudd . Additionally, 
should New Zealand wish to meet its full potential and play a greater role on the 
world stage in preserving global security in future years , it will be necessary for New 
Zealand to incorporate higher levels of combat capability across all three branches of 
the NZDF - army, navy and air force - and to possess the ability to use them 
effectively in combat. In any case, given human inability to predict the future and the 
future shape of the strategic environment, as 9/11 so starkly demonstrated, a policy 
77 Or in other words, as an analogy may better explain, in having given away the 'family car' due to the fact 
that long-rerm trips ro other cities an:: no-longer expected or foreseeable in the near future , New Zealand 
has lost its ability ro make short trips into town too and are forced into the position of having to rely on 
others, or indeed carch the bus or stay home. 
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of military preparedness for every eventuality will enable New Zealand to respond 
effectively to any global security development in future years. 
3. And third , defence matters can not be quarantined from other aspects of the 
NZ-Australian relationship , as PM Howard has stressed. Those here in New 
Zealand must not forget that New Zealand 's ability to contribute to the defence of 
Australia has a tangible impact on attitudes in Canberra towards the country 
generally and specifically in terms of New Zealand's wider needs and interests in 
International Relations. 
In sum, the shape and strength of the future trans-Tasman relationship will depend 
most on what New Zealanders make of it. What New Zealand reaps from the 
relationship will be proportional to what is invested in it. Of course this does not 
mean that will not be differences and issues of variance and divergence between 
the Tasman pair on matters of external and internal policy, as our respective 
positions on the Iraq war and the long-lasting dispute over allowing New Zealand 
apples into Australian markets well demonstrate. However, just as it has been 
shown in the past time and again , the trans-Tasman relationship is durable and 
flexible enough to outlast any minor skirmishes such as these. It will remain strongly 
and firmly intact whatever the future holds if New Zealand and Australia will respect 
the differences and accept each other for the nations that we are. If our two peoples 
make the most of the relationship and all the commonalities that we share, there is 
no doubt that New Zealand-Australian relations will go from strength to strength in 
future decades. 
New Zealand's National Insecurity: From One Kiwi to Another 
It behoves me, as a fellow Kiwi , to also say a few words here regarding New 
Zealand's national identity, or rather our national insecurity, and what ought to be 
done about it if we are ever to go forward into the world as a stronger, more 
confident, more cohesive nation . 
Insecurity has been an abiding feature of New Zealand life for over a century and 
continues to have a large impact on the way that we think and act as a nation today 
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- especially in International Relations. Fierce independence and anti-nuclearism 
have become defining characteristics of New Zealanders in the 21 51 century. 
However, in my view, these notions are in fact convenient masks for a creeping 
underlying panic regarding who we are and what we are supposed to be in the world 
- a point of uncertainty to New Zealand ever since we divorced our British parent. 
Indeed, this uncertainty has been brewing within society for a long time. Back in 
1985 the editor of the Listener wrote: 
That cracking sound you hear is our break with the past. Anzus, All Black 
tours of South Africa , the familiar faces at the head of so many of our 
institutions for the last 20 years - gone, or going .. . Some look for 
explanation , some for reassurance. There is a sense of dislocation, a 
desire for new signposts. But the old familiar faces, the reassuring 
voices, are moving on (cited in McPhee, 1987, p. 283) . 
Twenty years later and New Zealanders are still searching for those new signposts 
about our destiny as a nation and as a people in the wider world . The lack of 
leadership on this point has actually provoked some to call on New Zealanders to 
"stop relying on other [politicians] for leadership and reach within themselves 
instead" (Olympic champion Paul Kingsman , in Peart, 2005). The 'brain drain' effect, 
in which 25-30,000 young New Zealanders leave our shores permanently each year 
to reside elsewhere in the world is strong evidence of such a pervasive sense of 
insecurity and unhappiness among New Zealanders on this point. Indeed, a Phillips 
Fox poll found in 2005 that 44% of New Zealanders of all ages have already 
considered leaving New Zealand for good (Bryant, 2005) . Worse still , the 2007 
'Quality of Life' survey found that, while New Zealanders thought the quality of life in 
New Zealand was good overall despite growing concerns for our security , an 
immense 39% of New Zealanders said they were not proud of their country ('Kiwis 
generally happy with life', 2007). This is a serious indictment of New Zealand and its 
political and economic leadership today. 
Since 2005, moreover, New Zealand's sense of national identity has been 
challenged further with divisions appearing between Maori and Pakeha, citizens and 
immigrants, town and country, and liberals and conservatives - all exacerbated 
further by substantially changing demographics and a seeming shift away from our 
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Western heritage and traditional allies towards the Asia-Pacific - a region that still 
today is for many New Zealanders a 'foreign' part of the world. We are increasingly 
becoming a divided nation . Recognising that it is identity that drives foreign policy 
then, it seems evident that this insecurity and uncertainty within New Zealand society 
has become perceptible in the nation's foreign and security affairs too. Increasingly, 
there seems to be a gap appearing between those New Zealanders who want to 
retain the vestiges of our Western heritage including strong close political and 
military relationships with our traditional allies (including the US) , and those who 
want to 'cut our losses', become a Republic, and move forward as a more pacifist 
"Pacific nation" looking predominantly to the Asia-Pacific. It is the struggle and 
confusion within New Zealand on this point that has resulted in such non-consensus 
within society regarding the ANZUS break-up in 1985, the disbanding of high-level 
combat capabilities of the NZDF in 2000-2001 , and again over the War on Terror 
and Iraq in 2001-2003 -with a great undecided majority being between the two 
poles of the spectrum (McPhee, 1987; 'Australia and New Zealand : The Defence 
Policy Gulf , 2000; Larkin, 2001) . There can be no doubt that New Zealand is in an 
identity crisis - a crisis that will not just 'go away' without strong conciliatory 
leadership provided by those at the top of the political process. 
Identity Matters 
What appears to be most lacking in , and therefore driving , New Zealand's national 
insecurity on this point, is a greater awareness across all sectors of society regarding 
what we have to offer in the world as a nation and as a people. In the hope of aiding 
the development of such a general consciousness among New Zealanders, several 
points for consideration will be provided in the following . 
West-meets-East 
First, there needs to be a greater awareness and acceptance of New Zealand's 
present realities . On the one hand, we are a nation founded on Western values and 
traditions incorporating a strong British heritage, while on the other hand, we are a 
nation situated inescapably in the Pacific with vital interests in the Asia-Pacific to 
foster and protect. There will never be peace and confidence within New Zealand 
society unless we embrace a national identity that gives room and expression for 
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both . The Asia-Pacific lobby can not politically or verbally force New Zealanders into 
some kind of denial of our heritage and history, while the pro-Western groups can 
equally no-longer deny the realities of our geographical position and our increasingly 
Asian-Pacific demography. The way forward is to incorporate aspects of both 
realities in our national identity in acknowledgement of who we are and where we 
live, meaning neither moving forward to an Asia-Pacific future at the expense of our 
history and past, nor moving forward nostalgically to closer relationship with Western 
friends while ignoring the country's present Asia-Pacific realities nor the way that we 
and the world have changed in past decades. 
Dependence & Independence 
Second, in guiding this country forward New Zealanders need to be careful regarding 
the notions of dependence and independence. For most of our history New Zealand 
has been a nation displaying a kind of clingy 'dependency syndrome', tying its hopes 
and identity to that of a more powerful like-minded friend . As a result, New 
Zealanders have a tendency to want to immerse itself in the power of another, 
instead of retaining a sense of sovereign distance to which this country is without 
question entitled. After all , as an autonomous self-governing nation for one hundred 
years now, this nation is well able to stand on its own two feet. At present I believe 
New Zealand has identified and tied its fortunes rather too closely with that of the UN 
organization , meaning that our estimation of our own self-worth as a nation rises and 
falls on the fortunes of the UN. It would be much more judicious and sage for New 
Zealand to remember that the organization was created as a collective security body 
to serve the needs of its members, not for the members to serve the needs of the 
UN, and while it is indeed a most important international forum and vehicle for 
progress in a host of issues, it is not New Zealand 's master. We are a sovereign 
nation. As for the other matter of independence, New Zealand has tended to be 
rather too ferocious in its lauding of national independence. There is no-longer any 
need for New Zealand to be so vocal nor fight so hard to be considered independent. 
Today this fact is already taken for granted in international affairs. Just as it would 
be a silly thing for an athlete to keep sprinting having already won the race, it is 
equally unnecessary for New Zealand to be continually using a megaphone on this 
point. 
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What New Zealanders Have to Offer the World 
Third, New Zealanders need to be reminded of just what kind of people we are in the 
world and all the wonderful qualities we possess which are both valued and needed 
in the world today. Whether of Maori heritage with forebears renowned for their 
advanced tribal development, their bravery, and excellent sea-faring and war-fighting 
abilities, or of Western heritage descended from the early New Zealand pioneers and 
adventurers, known for their courage, resilience, inventiveness, determination and 
modesty, or descended from Asian or Pacific immigrants who have grasped 
opportunities and worked to make a new life for themselves in a foreign land - New 
Zealanders are today a people that are warm, friendly, pragmatic, open-minded , 
innovative, technologically-savvy and well-grounded , enjoyed and liked in the world 
wherever we go. As such , New Zealanders already encompass many advantages 
and have much to offer the world . 
In particular, due to our excellent war-time qualities of hardiness, discipline and 
courage-under-fire, in addition to a merciful inclination and a highly-developed sense 
of morality, we are particularly the kind of people that the world needs in times of 
crisis and conflict. Indeed, New Zealanders have won respect and admiration 
wherever they have engaged in battle for exactly these kinds of qualities, whether 
that be the exploits of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) in Gallipoli and 
the battle of the Somme in World War I, or today in the valiance and 'extraordinary 
heroism' displayed by the NZ SAS squad of 2001-2001 in Afghanistan, for which it 
was awarded the distinction of a United States Navy Presidential Unit Citations in 
2006. This suggests that New Zealand could play a more meaningful role in the 
world than just contributing to peacekeeping and nation-building operations - that it 
does in fact have great potential to be one of those few countries on the world stage 
willing and able to ensure global peace and security, administer justice, and further 
international political development by taking part in those military interventions 
deemed necessary by the international community in the future . We might also be 
more vocal and active with other strong democracies in advancing the values of 
democracy and freedom - as once we did with regard to Apartheid - values which we 
not only already have and enjoy here in New Zealand , but upon which our entire 
nation and society are also based . Our great concern and passion for safeguarding 
the basic human rights of man should be a source of help and motivation in these 
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respects. As a strong liberal democracy, moreover, New Zealand should never be 
afraid of developing close relationship with like-minded democratic nations in this 
quest wherever they are to be found - including with our traditional allies as nations 
that are not only three of the strongest and most stable democracies in the world , but 
also nations with whom New Zealand shares many shared values and common 
strains of identity. Indeed, our commitment to democracy and our history of sacrifice 
and commitment to its cause in the world should render such a focus obvious for 
New Zealand in the future. 
Additionally, however, as a well-travelled internationally-adept people coming from a 
highly multicultural society, in which the idea of justice and fairness are essential 
elements, New Zealanders are also well placed to play a stronger role in 
international affairs than they do currently , able to contribute to global development 
and security in the areas of not only negotiation and advocacy in a legal context, but 
also in terms of mediation for international disputes, as it did with regard to Fiji this 
year. Norway's example of having become the world 's pre-eminent international 
mediator with a key role in the Israel-Palestine dispute despite its small size and 
peripheral location is a case in point. In order to mediate effectively, however, New 
Zealanders must stop equally condemning all use of force in international affairs, and 
begin to place a greater weight on the exceptionally important factor of 'motive'. The 
way that this crucial element of moral judgement has become of such little import in 
New Zealand society today in relation to force has in fact become increasingly 
apparent in the last year, as illustrated in the way that an Auckland gun-shop owner 
faced criminal charges for shooting an armed intruder in self-defence, that New 
Zealanders were 'outraged' at the idea of police using Taser-guns likewise in self-
defence against the most aggressive criminals , and even in the political and social 
storm over the use of force as a legitimate form of discipline in the child 'anti-smack' 
legislation. In fact, at present New Zealand does not seem to make a distinction 
between good and bad motives or make allowances for differences in purpose for 
such a use of force, as demonstrated in New Zealand's utter condemnation of both 
Israel and the terrorist Hezbollah organization in their resort to force during the 2006 
conflagration, regardless of the fact that one was using force to antagonize and 
destabilize a sovereign nation , while the other was applying force in fundamental 
self-defence and the preservation of its borders and future security. The two actions 
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are not equal. If in New Zealand courts of law we can make a distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, then as a nation we ought to make the 
same distinction in our assessments about the use of force in international affairs. 
Moreover, in a more general sense, New Zealand needs to more keenly accept the 
fact, as many democracies on the international stage already have, that in situations 
where leaders of threatening countries are unreasonable, as was the case with 
Saddam Hussein and is today the case with the present Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad who defiantly persists in development nuclear programmes, force is 
often the only real alternative for dealing with the threat posed - an unfortunate but 
ultimately necessary option . The fact is that in these situations, as the old maxim 
attests, decisive action often speaks louder than a barrage of well-meaning but 
ultimately powerless words. 
A Refocused National Identity - A New National Day 
Finally, there needs to be a shift in New Zealand society towards defining ourselves 
by what and who we are rather than by what we are against (i.e. nuclear power and 
dependence on superpowers). We need to become more confident and optimistic -
about who we are, what we represent, the skills we have to offer, the values we 
embrace - and more generally aware of the fact that as a nation we have a lot going 
for us. This shift in general attitudes is not the work of a night. However, since as 
Identity Theory has shown, national identities are socially constructed, being 
comprised of ideas and notions that can and do change over time (Wendt, 1992; 
Fearon, 1999), a revitalization and refocusing of New Zealand's national identity in 
future years is both possible and feasible. This can be done from grass-roots up, 
with a greater social awareness of national identity issues, or from the top down, 
through future government's guidance and direction towards the kind of country we 
want to be fifty years from now. At present, while the Labour Governments have 
continually stressed the strains of independence, idealism and multilateralism in the 
New Zealand national identity, there are other equally important strains within the 
national psyche that could be made better use of in future years, such as the strains 
of loyalty and common cause with allies, strong commitments to the spread of 
freedom and democracy, and wartime sacrifice for noble causes. It is possible that a 
future government's adoption of a fuller range of identity strains and traditions with 
New Zealand's sense of national identity will in fact be of great assistance in helping 
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to heal the social divides that, much like our earthquake faultlines , have crisscrossed 
the length and breadth of the country, dividing and menacing New Zealand society 
wherever they have gone. Undoubtedly too, a greater social awareness of the 
strategic Asia-Pacific environment we live in would greatly abet a fuller 
understanding among New Zealanders of the risks inherent in the region , the need 
for a better-armed and structure Defence Force, and the kind of role New Zealand 
would like and might need to play in the region in future years . 
Most importantly, however, to consolidate and strengthen New Zealand's sense of 
itself, and to promote a new relaxed kind of confidence, optimism and forward-
thinking among New Zealanders about ourselves and our nation, we need to institute 
a new national day - a New Zealand Day - one that is not clouded with bicultural 
tension and hostility as is Waitangi Day, nor immersed in a cloak of tragedy and grief 
as is Anzac Day. These days each have their important purpose and place in New 
Zealand history and society - Waitangi Day is a day to remember the founding 
document of our nation and to embrace our biculturalism, while Anzac Day is a day 
to remember and to honour those many New Zealanders over the century who have 
sacrificed their lives in the fight against aggressive expansionism to ensure ours and 
other people's freedom and security. However, neither days comprise the right kind 
of vehicle to enhance a sense of nationhood and togetherness. For my part, I would 
suggest the 261h November every year should be just such a new national holiday, 
since it was on this date one hundred years ago in 1907 that New Zealand first 
became a sovereign self-governing Dominion . This day should be a day of 
celebration , positivity, and pride, not only in the sorts of people we are, and the 
uniquely Kiwi identity, heritage and qualities we possess, but also in the kind of 
country that we and our forebears have successfully built up from scratch beginning 
167 years ago with the arrival of those first immigrant ships in Wellington. On this 
day we could for once nationally enjoy the fact of being New Zealanders with all that 
that entails. A day to celebrate our culture, our heroes, our legends, our songs, our 
landscape, our successes, our innovation and our people - a day to celebrate all 
that we are and all that we can yet be. 
This is the way for the future . 
204 
As the great New Zealand historian , J. C. Beaglehole, once concluded long ago: 
the history of this country has been the history of its discovery - a 
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